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Cover Photo: Presidents Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia shake hands in front of their Cuban counterpart, Fidel Castro, during a meeting at the Plaza de la Revolución in Havana, 29 April 2006. The presidents signed a pact adding Bolivia to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). AFP PHOTO/Adalberto ROQUE

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Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders

U.S. Representative Ike Skelton

The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, Democrat, Missouri, was scheduled as the graduation speaker for the Command and General Staff Officer Course of 2006. Official duties kept the congressman from attending the graduation, so he asked to share his prepared speech with a wider audience through this article in Military Review.—Editor

IN MAY, I was honored to be invited to speak to a distinguished group for the 125th Anniversary of the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On that occasion, I talked about the ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu because I had been thinking about how our military approaches counterinsurgency and how we train future leaders to be able to respond to any challenge they might face.¹ I had just been reading LTG David Petraeus's article in *Military Review* and George Packer's articles on the efforts of COL H.R. McMaster and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar.² I was very impressed with their approaches in Iraq to intelligence and leadership. When the College invited me back to give the graduation address, because I felt I had just given quite a history lesson, with tongue in cheek, I promised that the next time I came to Fort Leavenworth I would talk about Carl von Clausewitz.³

When I returned to the Capitol, I began to think seriously about what more field grade officers could learn from arguably the greatest military thinker of all time. Many of these officers have recently experienced combat in Afghanistan or Iraq, and all of them had just spent most of a year studying how to apply their studies and experience to national security challenges and opportunities, today and in the future. I knew that they did not expect to get another history lesson on their graduation day. Instead, they would be thinking, "I thought classes were over." I also knew that for these action-oriented people, a year in the classroom must sometimes feel like being in prison. I knew they would just want to get on with things.

While I wanted to congratulate them on completing a rigorous course of study, I also felt compelled to give them something meaningful that they could take with them as they faced even more challenging assignments, issues, and situations almost immediately. Although all I could give them were words, the words could embody ideas that might serve them well. Because I so strongly believe in lifelong education, I thought I would urge these young people who have voluntarily made a commitment to serve the Constitution and the people of this Nation to continue to study and think and learn about serious professional issues as they took on assignments of increasing authority and responsibility. So I decided that I wanted to talk to them about their families and the future. I knew it would surprise them, but I

The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, Democrat, Missouri, has represented Missouri's Fourth Congressional District since 1977. He is the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, and minority member of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces. He has written four other articles for Military Review: "The Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in Unpreparedness" (July-August 1997), "JPME: Are We There Yet?" (May 1992 and January-February 1997), "Inspiring Soldiers to Do Better than Their Best" (January-February 1996), and "Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-Cold War Era" (September 1993).

decided to give them five postgraduate assignments to guide their way.

Unfortunately, because I am the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, the debate in the House of Representatives on Iraq kept me from attending that graduation. So I wanted to share these thoughts with a wider audience.

I know the old saw, “If the military had wanted you to have a family, it would have issued you one.” But the leaders of today’s military recognize that we recruit Soldiers, but retain families. Leaders should never forget that their personnel have a family outside the military. More than ever before, with cellular phones and electronic mail, photographs, and video clips, Soldiers can have almost constant contact with their friends and family, no matter where they are in the world. As with most things in life, this can be either a positive or a problematic thing. This constant contact can be a great comfort or a source of worry. Most important, Soldiers’ performance can hinge on knowing that the military is taking care of their families while they are deployed. While our Nation often says thank you to our men and women in uniform, I encourage all military leaders, as well as all our citizens, to recognize the sacrifices military families make and to thank them as well.

But what about the families of the field grade officers? The officers might feel as if their branch of service is their family, but we know they would not have been able to achieve what they have in their profession without the support of family and friends. So, we and they should thank their husbands and wives or significant others; their grandparents and moms and dads, and children; and their close friends. These family members have all helped the Nation by sustaining these officers in their endeavors at school, on staff, and in the field. And all our military professionals should always remember that they belong to a family, a community, and a nation beyond the military.

Now I knew these officers might have thought, “I’ve read Clausewitz, and he never mentioned family.” So I wanted to remind them that it was only through Clausewitz’s wife, Marie, that his masterpiece *On War* survived.⁴ After his untimely death, she took the fragments of that masterwork and finished it so that generations of military students around the world would not only be able to study his observations of Napoleonic battles and

Revolution, but would also think about the essence of war and strategy beyond their own particular time and place. Were it not for his wife; were it not for their close and special relationship; were it not for her shared understanding of the importance of his military theories; were it not for the urging of their mutual friends; Clausewitz’s most significant insights might have been lost for all time.

In addition, Clausewitz recognized that militaries depended on the societies from which they came for both moral support and physical sustainment. He wrote that militaries are bound to the values and structures of their societies. But when militaries become disconnected from the people or lose the Nation’s support, they are bound to be defeated. So leaders must not forget that they and their Soldiers also embody this Nation—their larger family.

Beyond these considerations of family, as time passes, I appreciate the timelessness of Clausewitz’s thoughts on the art of war and strategy more and more. These ideas, distilled from history, his extensive and broad wartime experience, and his powerful intellect, will continue to be relevant in the future. And as officers graduate from field-grade-level professional military education institutions, I wanted to tell them in the starkest of terms, *This Nation does not have enough strategists*. So, the post-graduate assignments I would give them would challenge them to become master strategists. I think a review of Clausewitz’s ideas will help in this endeavor.

Most of us know that, even though many people quote Clausewitz, few have actually read his work. Even fewer understand what he was trying to do, so they misunderstand what he said. One who does understand him better than most is Peter Paret, the editor of the best English version of *On War*.⁵ Paret gets it because he knows that to understand Clausewitz’s ideas, you have to understand his historical context. Paret has studied both the history of ideas and the history of war.

During the Napoleonic Wars, there were other military experts who tried to devise better strategies and tactics in order to master military science. These thinkers, in the period of the Enlightenment, sought to master war through rational thought. Clausewitz was unique. He wanted to understand war itself. Also a child of the Enlightenment, he sought to understand war as a human phenomenon. He wanted to devise a theory about war’s structure,

its internal dynamic, its links with other elements of man's social existence. He and his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, analyzed the interdependence of military, social, and political changes brought about by the French Revolution.

Unique for his time, Clausewitz had broad experience in small-unit tactics, climactic battles, staff duties, and strategic planning. He became a reformer who helped modernize the Prussian army in ways that had huge social implications. This transformation, as in our time, was undertaken in the midst of fighting an asymmetric, revolutionary conflict, while preparing for other possible adversaries.

In the midst of this, Clausewitz decided that in order to devise a true theory of war, experience with the technologies and techniques of war and the study of history were necessary. But experience and study were not sufficient to bring true understanding or wisdom. One also had to explore many aspects of the world outside the military. His goal was not to distill timeless strategies or to master tactics. He really wanted to understand history in order to identify the essential elements of war and to understand how they functioned together.⁶ He reached for wisdom beyond knowledge.

Because Clausewitz thought strategy was an art rather than a science, he compared the study of war to the study of painting. One could study the history of painting and have all the right tools, but that would not enable one to master art. Great art could not be mechanically pursued or mass-produced. Outcomes were unpredictable, uncertain. Study was not important for memorizing techniques or mimicking others. Study and experience simply formed a foundation for one's own theories, one's own art, appropriate to one's own context.

So Clausewitz, rather than trying to find solutions to his generation's military and security challenges, hoped his work would stimulate the ideas and debates of others in the future. By this, each generation would move the ideas forward. Important to this perspective, Clausewitz was an idealist in the 19th century tradition, the tradition named for Friedrich Hegel, which posited that ideas move history. Clausewitz wrote about war as an "idea," and he used Hegel's dialectic to examine its nature. He juxtaposed total war and limited war as thesis and antithesis. He did not prefer or advocate for one or the other, he simply recognized that in contemplat-

ing them, one would reach a synthesis which would, of course, become the new thesis to argue against. So the first postgraduate assignment, after a bit of a break from studies, is to reread Clausewitz, with his historical context in mind.⁷

There were others who recognized that the late 18th century political and social revolutions had changed war.⁸ But they did not understand that change. As they tried, in the tradition of the day, to reduce war to applied mathematics, their systems were abstracted from reality and from history. Their definitions of tactics and strategy were bound by time and technology, using "within range of the cannon" and "out of range of the cannon" to denote the difference. In the pursuit of a science of warfare, they left out the things they could not measure—the human parts, like the morale of the soldiers, the psychology of the commander, and an assessment of the human enemy.

Clausewitz knew from his study of history and his combat experience that these were essential to any theory. He knew that military reforms would impact other aspects of human existence, society and the economy; he pushed for the officer corps to be based on merit rather than on nobility; and he opposed the arbitrary discipline and mind-numbing practices used on the enlisted force. He also criticized his society for regarding war as a matter for the army alone. In the political and diplomatic realm, he believed that the Prussian government allowed itself to be isolated from prospective allies and then gave the soldiers impossible tasks.

Partly because of his criticisms of the existing authorities, Clausewitz was not promoted. In fact, he and others resigned their commissions when the king surrendered territory to the French to stage their invasion of Russia. These resignations sent the revolutionary message that an officer's conscience took priority over his oath to the king. Clausewitz also designed a plan to raise provincial militias against the French—another act of revolutionary military and political importance in Prussia.

Later, when Clausewitz regained his commission, he was able to make significant contributions at the new Prussian war college, where he lectured on strategy and insurgency. He also put considerable brain power into the immediate needs, the intellectual, technical, organizational and political problems, of rebuilding a defeated army. At the same

time, Clausewitz was still committed to developing a theory of war. A theory would help his students develop their own ideas, drawing on their experience, a study of professional subjects, and an intense study of history. Their studies would not generate doctrine, rules, or laws of action. Clausewitz wrote, “While history may yield no formulae, it does provide an exercise for judgment.” His students should not memorize tactics and strategy. Instead Clausewitz sought to refine his students’ judgment for future leadership.

In addition to all this, Clausewitz continued his own studies. He attended lectures on science, on logic, and on ethics. He read books on mathematics, philosophy and aesthetics. He constantly read more history to test his ideas as they emerged. He knew his theory had to be comprehensive, it had to be logical, it had to represent reality, and it had to be historically defensible. It had to account for things that could not be measured. And it had to be flexible enough to be further refined. He hoped there would be people just like our field grade officers who would continue to refine his ideas through their experience and their own ideas to create new syntheses.

In his pursuit of theory, Clausewitz decided there were certain constants. These would be organizing principles for thinking about war and strategy. These constants were war’s social and political nature and the duality of war—its two forms, “total” and “limited.” Of course the latter consisted of two ends of a spectrum that would never be reached in reality. Absolute total war would be mutual suicide and therefore an end to policy rather than its continuation. And the ultimate in limited war would be a war not fought.

The long version of Clausewitz’s most famous quote is, “War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Our Nation is learning again that military actions cannot be abstracted from their political, diplomatic, economic, social or cultural contexts or consequences. This is true in fighting the Global War on Terrorism and an Iraqi insurgency. It is true in our diplomatic efforts to

sway Iran’s leadership and in convincing our allies to support nonproliferation. And it is true in debating the decision to send the National Guard to our southern border to stem illegal immigration.

We learn—repeatedly, it seems—that before taking action, we should know what we’re getting into. When we talk about the use of force or the threat of force, or when we use military forces for non-violent purposes, we should not imagine a bright line where political or diplomatic activity ceases. We cannot think that when diplomacy or policy fails, war or military operations begin, military victory is won, and then political and economic activity simply resumes. We must use all the instruments of national power in constant, simultaneous and parallel action in peacetime, and in war, to support our national security objectives. We have

Our Nation is learning again that military actions cannot be abstracted from their political, diplomatic, economic, social or cultural contexts or consequences.

to recognize this timeless constant and move beyond military jointness to truly integrated interagency planning and operations. So the second postgraduate assignment is: Find and institute better ways of working with your counterparts in civilian agencies, including non-traditional partners, rather

than just proposing ways in which they can work better with you.

But what of war’s essential nature? Clausewitz wrote that war is a violent clash, a collision of two living forces. But, the paradox is that war’s violence must be disciplined and limited in order for it to express a political purpose in a rational, utilitarian manner. War’s violence must not obliterate the political purpose. Therefore, political leaders should control the conduct of war, but not displace soldiers in the planning and conduct of operations. Nor should political leaders ask the impossible of the military. At the same time, military leaders must remember that armed forces do not exist for their own sake. As Clausewitz noted, “There can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”

So of what use is theory? It is not of any use if it does not account for war’s reality. So Clausewitz added concepts that he thought were essential parts

Five Postgraduate Assignments

1. Reread Clausewitz with his historical context in mind.
2. Find and institute better ways of working with your counterparts in civilian agencies, including non-traditional partners, rather than just proposing ways in which they can work better with you.
3. Think about how to better tie the means we use to the ends we seek, whether you are on staff or in combat.
4. No matter how much you want to be in the field, you must continue your education.
5. Our leaders, our officers, must honor their family and their Nation by speaking truth to power. We all must tell and live the truth as well as we can.

of real war. In history and his experience, war's timeless elements were *friction* and *chance*.

Friction is the sum total of all the impediments in war to achieving one's goals. It is all the errors, accidents, and technical and human difficulties that affect military decisions and actions. Friction cannot be planned out of operations or tactics with mathematical formulae. It cannot be eradicated with transformation through improved technology or science. Friction is in the very nature of war, and actually all human endeavors. In real war, Clausewitz observed, there is also always uncertainty. He said, "War is the province of chance. In no other sphere of human activity must such a margin be left for this intruder. It increases the uncertainty of every circumstance and deranges the course of events."

Since friction and chance could not be planned away or overcome by technology or better tactics, they would dominate war were it not for creative intellectual and emotional energy. One had to strive then to understand and exploit war's unquantifiable elements to best advantage. Clausewitz called this ability "genius." To him though, genius was not just in the exceptional individual, but also could be found in the abilities and feelings on which the behavior of ordinary people, including the lowest

ranking soldiers, was based. Clausewitz lived in the age of Napoleon, so this is significant. He said, "We cannot restrict our discussion to genius proper, as a superlative degree of talent . . . What we must do is survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity. These, taken together, constitute the essence of military genius." It is the intellectual and psychological strengths of the commander and his subordinates; the morale, spirit, and self-confidence of the army; as well as the traits and values of whole societies as reflected in their soldiers, all taken together. Clausewitz believed that extraordinary originality, initiative, and creativity could be present in every human being; in each of us.

So, to what purpose should we put genius? Finally, we come to strategy. Many do not really know what it is—but I am sure it is not a plan on PowerPoint® slides. Strategy is the relationship between war's purpose, objective, and means. The political purpose defines the means, the degree of effort or force, and the extent of resources to be expended. These should determine the military objective. Since war is a clash of two forces, strategy must also account for the adversary's political and military purpose. We cannot assess these simply by mirror-imaging our own.

The ends and the means and our assessment of the enemy must always be connected. This is the essence of strategy. Clausewitz wrote, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking." And he added, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." Unfortunately, we have had to learn again, in Iraq and Afghanistan, that how we conduct military operations, and how our forces conduct themselves, have effects far beyond the battlefield, roads, checkpoints, or detention facility. They have strategic importance. Our leaders at every level are responsible for both operations and the discipline and conduct of their personnel; they must be held accountable for both.⁹

This is the reason why rules of engagement or rules for the use of force should not be considered a nuisance. They are not separate from war. They must

be part of the strategy. They must be constructed in a way that shows we understand the essence of war and the purpose of using military forces. They should prevent us from losing a war, despite winning all the battles. They protect us from losing the hearts of the people whom we seek to liberate, those whom we support in building democracy. They are meant to insure that we do not lose ourselves or betray the ideals of the people and the Nation we represent. So the third postgraduate assignment is: Think about how to better tie the means we use to the ends we seek, whether you are on staff or in combat. Never assume the connection; be conscious about establishing the relationship between the two.

If our officers maintain their integrity, their Soldiers will fight for them as they fight for each other.

As I prepared these thoughts on Clausewitz, I reflected on the reason people prefer to get their ideas on war from Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Jomini. Their works are relatively short, they are easy, they embody common sense, they give you the list or the formula, you could even fit them in your rucksack. But our military's profession is not easy, so I have a fourth postgraduate assignment for our field grade officers: No matter how much you want to be in the field, you must continue your education.

Clausewitz is a role model. Our officers must not shy away from the tough questions; they must keep their minds open when they ponder these. They must study history, not to find the "Holy Grail" of strategy, but to fully understand what strategy is and who we are as a Nation. They must strive for wisdom, rather than knowledge for its own sake. They should take a teaching assignment if they can. And, perhaps most important, they must mentor their subordinates to continue their education.

Finally, there's one last assignment. Our leaders, our officers, must honor their families and their Nation by speaking truth to power. We all must tell and live the truth as well as we can. Congressmen and others in leadership positions depend upon our officer corps for this. And, I would promise all, if they would be punished for telling the truth, those who

would punish them are not worthy of their loyalty.

If our officers maintain their integrity, their soldiers will fight for them as they fight for each other. As they trust their officers, their leaders should always remind them that they are also fighting for a larger purpose. The result will be that they will use better judgment and take right action to return home to their families with honor, rather than in shame.

We know our military officers fight for the young men and women in their charge, and they fight for their own families and this Nation and its ideals. We entrust them with this. They are given grave responsibility and significant authority. They must be accountable. They must remember that honorable ends cannot ever justify dishonorable means, because these two are not separate. Ends and means are inseparable parts of a whole, in ethics as well as in strategy. Our military officers must be able to look in the mirror each day and say, "I was honest with myself, my leaders, my Soldiers and my family; I acted with integrity today." And if sometimes, like the rest of us, they make a mistake, they must admit it and try their best to make it right. I have every bit of confidence that our field grade officers can do this, that they can complete the five assignments I want to give them.

I congratulate all our professional military education graduates on their achievements. We should all celebrate them at this time when they recommit to their profession and our Nation's security. I wish them all Godspeed as they and their families face the challenges of the future. **MR**

NOTES

1. Remarks of Congressman Ike Skelton, 1 May 2006, "The Next 125 Years—Celebrating the Past and Present While We Journey Back to the Future with Sun Tzu" on the occasion of the Command and General Staff College 125th Anniversary celebration, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

2. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review* (Jan-Feb 2006), 2-12; George Packer, "Letter from Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Afar," <www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060410fa_fact2>.

3. Based on a reading of "Clausewitz" by Peter Paret in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton, 1986), 186-213.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1984).

5. *Ibid.*

6. Howard and Paret point out that it is telling that Clausewitz chose Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* as a model.

7. Howard and Paret write about this in an extensive discussion in their edition of *On War*, 1984. In addition, at the National War College at Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington DC, Strategy instructors advise students to read the chapters of *On War* in the order that Clausewitz wrote them rather than the order in which he refined them, to better understand the evolution of his dialectical thinking as dialectic.

8. Among the 18th century revolutions were the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. These thinkers include the French officer Antoine-Henri Jomini and Dietrich von Bülow. John Shy "rehabilitates" Jomini in his essay in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 143-185.

9. On command responsibility see the Tokyo Tribunals (1946-1948) and the Supreme Court decision, *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946).



Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army

Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Grunow, U.S. Army

IF AMERICA AGREES with President George W. Bush that failure in Iraq is not an option, then the adviser mission there will clearly be a long-term one. The new Iraqi Army (IA) will need years to become equal to the challenge posed by a persistent insurgent and terrorist threat, and U.S. support is essential to this growth. Having spent a year assigned to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) equipping and training a new Iraqi armored brigade, I offer some recommendations to future advisers as they take on the job of working with the IA to build a professional and competent fighting force.

This article draws on my experience as the senior adviser for the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) charged with assisting the 2d Armored Brigade, 9th Mechanized Division, based 15 miles north of Baghdad in Taji, Iraq. When my 10-man team arrived in August 2005, the brigade was just beginning to form. Equipped with the T-72 tank, the 2d Brigade was the only armored brigade in the IA. Over the next 11 months, my team, along with 4 other battalion-level teams, assisted in manning, equipping, training, and employing this growing military organization. At the end of my tour in June 2006, the 1700-man brigade had taken the lead in its area of responsibility. I share the following observations for future advisers.

First, appreciate the importance of the advisory mission and understand the enormity of the task at hand. Iraqi officers with whom I have spoken agree unanimously that a U.S. presence in Iraq is absolutely essential to prevent catastrophic collapse of the government and civil war. A vital element of this presence is the Iraqi Adviser Group (IAG), which is tasked to coach and guide the IA toward self-sufficiency. While the new Iraqi government struggles to become autonomous, there is just no competent institution other than the IA that can prevent anarchy. But the dismantling of the old IA in 2003 left little to reconstruct, so multi-national forces have been forced to reconstitute a new IA from scratch. The wisdom of the dissolution of the old army is not at issue here; it is the consequences of this decision that advisers must comprehend to appreciate the full scope of their challenge.

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PHOTO: Soldiers with the 9th Iraqi Army Division (Mechanized) parade a fleet of refurbished T-72 tanks before an audience of Iraqi and Coalition officials at Taji Military Base in November 2005. The tanks were part of a donation of equipment arranged by NATO. (U.S. Army)

Next, make an effort to understand the Iraqi soldiers; cultivate a respect for their culture. Each American adviser starts with great credibility in terms of military expertise, and the Iraqis believe that we can do anything if we put our minds to it. With a measure of humility and cultural sensitivity, each adviser can use this perception to great advantage building the new Iraqi force.

Finally, understand that the relationship among the Iraqi unit, the advisers, and the partner unit can be contentious, so as you work with your Iraqi unit, foster your relationship with the Coalition partners as well. The Coalition is charged with building the IA to stand on its own so that eventually it can be self-sustaining. But it's tough to simultaneously conduct combat operations against insurgents while providing training opportunities for the Iraqis, and the friction among all the organizations involved can inhibit the Iraqi unit's growth.

The Adviser's Challenges

By disbanding the old IA, the United States accepted responsibility for replacing an institution that was both respected and feared throughout Iraq. Saddam could count on his army to maintain control against internal dissent, as evidenced by the effective suppression of large-scale rebellions in the north and south during the 1990s. Iron discipline was the norm under Saddam. The lowliest lieutenant could expect instant obedience and extreme deference from his soldiers. Today's army is very different. Unlike Saddam's, the new army serves the cause of freedom, and officers and soldiers alike are a bit confused about what this means.

Recruiting, retaining and accountability. One of the most critical tasks for the army is recruiting and retaining soldiers. Soldiers are under no effective contract, and they always have the option to leave the service. As of this writing, the only power holding them is the promise of a paycheck (not always delivered) and a sense of duty. Good soldiers leave after receiving terrorist threats against their families. Less dutiful soldiers fail to show up for training if they think it will be too hard. In areas where the duty is difficult and deadly, unit AWOL rates approach 40 percent. The old IA executed deserters unhesitatingly; the new army watches powerlessly as soldiers walk away from their posts, knowing full well that the army has no real means to punish them.

I believe that many of the officers join because they have a great sense of duty and want to save their country from chaos. They have assumed roles in the new IA at great personal risk. In my brigade alone, the litany of personal tragedy grew with depressing regularity. The commander's brother was kidnapped and killed. The deputy commander's cousins, hired to protect his family, were found murdered and stacked up on his doorstep with a note saying he was next. Two of four battalion commanders had to move their families because of death threats. A deputy battalion commander's son was kidnapped and has not been found. Staff officers, soldiers, and interpreters spoke of murdered relatives or told harrowing personal stories of close calls with terrorists.

Iraqi soldiers and officers are making a daily choice between continuing to invest in the new government and opting out to focus on making the best of possible anarchy. Without steadfast American support, these officers and soldiers will likely give up and consider the entire effort a lost cause. Until the government and its security forces become more competent, this will be a risk.

Personnel accountability is another issue, but not so much for the Iraqis as for the Americans. The Iraqis are horrendous at keeping track of their soldiers. There are no routine accountability formations, and units typically have to wait until payday to get a semi-accurate picture of who is assigned to the unit. Because Iraqi status reports are almost always wrong, American advisers have taken to counting soldiers at checkpoints to get a sense of where combat power is distributed.

IA motivation. In addition, Iraqi commanders are reluctant to deploy a robust percentage of their combat power outside the wire. In one instance, Coalition partners and advisers to 2d Brigade observed with alarm that a 550-man infantry battalion could only put about 150 soldiers in the battlespace at any given time. Initially, American advisers tried to increase deployed strength by securing copies of the daily status report and questioning why so few soldiers were on mission. We sat down with the Iraqi commanders and highlighted the dismal statistics in an effort to embarrass them into doing better. We attempted to get the Iraqis to enforce a Ministry of Defense (MOD) policy that allowed no more than 25 percent of the unit to be on

leave. We developed PowerPoint® slides that depicted the number of combat platoons on security missions and asked about the status of uncommitted platoons. Using another metric to illustrate how the numbers just did not add up, advisers counted combat vehicles on mission. This sustained effort led to no noticeable improvement. The Iraqis believed they were meeting mission. They did not perceive their allocation of manpower to be a problem.

It was not until 2d Brigade was poised to take the lead in its area of operations (AO) that advisers witnessed a new approach to making the maximum use of available combat power. When they started planning their first independent operation, one of the Iraqi battalion commanders and the brigade staff worked together to devise a plan that allocated a significant amount of combat power to the mission. While some of this power was reallocated from current operations, a fair percentage was new combat power finally getting into the fight. Clearly when the Iraqi commander believed in the mission, he would find the forces to make it happen.

Still fighting the last war. Another challenge is that the IA's tactics are outmoded. They are still fighting their last war, the high-intensity Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a war with clear battle lines fought with mass military formations, and one in which civilians on the battlefield were a nuisance, not the center of gravity.

Future advisers would be wise to study this war, an 8-year conflagration with a total casualty count of over 1.5 million. Large-scale attacks and huge battles were the rule. Iranian human-wave assaults presented Iraqi soldiers with a target-rich environment. I heard many stories of battlefields covered with bodies following huge expenditures of ammunition. The T-72 tank was considered extremely effective, but required infantry to keep Iranian soldiers from leaping onto them to deliver grenades. Iraqi officers claim the battles against the Americans of 1991 and 2003 were aberrations, whose outcomes they attributed to U.S. air power and huge technological overmatch. They continue to take great pride in their accomplishments in "defeating Iranian aggression."

Accordingly, at the tactical level, officers and soldiers from the old army are inclined to try to solve



Iraqi soldiers, with help from Coalition advisers, spent three days off-loading 77 T-72 tanks, which will equip the 2d Brigade.

U.S. Army

current, low-intensity tactical problems using the techniques of the 1980s. I frequently heard the refrain that if the Americans would only "turn them loose," the Iraqis would defeat the insurgency in short order. But Iraqi commanders are reluctant to put tanks in an urban environment because the close quarters give excellent opportunities for insurgents armed with rocket propelled grenades. They refuse to split up three-tank platoons because it has been ingrained in them to never subdivide below this level.

Iraqi soldiers tend to react under fire as though they are in a large-scale attack. They must learn fire discipline and careful target selection in a battlefield filled with noncombatants. Unfortunately, the Iraqi "death blossom" is a common tactic witnessed by nearly every U.S. Soldier who has spent any time outside the wire. Any enemy attack on the IA, whether mortar, sniper, or an improvised explosive device, provokes the average Iraqi soldier to empty his 30 round magazine and fire whatever belt of ammunition happens to be in his machine-gun. Ninety percent of the time, there is no target, and the soldiers always agree that this is extremely dangerous, in addition to being a grievous waste of ammunition. But they continue to do it.

A similar phenomenon occurs when Iraqis react to the death of a comrade on the battlefield. The reaction is very dramatic. I once observed overwrought Iraqi soldiers start to rampage through a civilian community, an event that could have been tragic if an adviser had not stepped in to stop it. At another time, an enemy sniper attack triggered a reaction that had Iraqis "returning fire" nearly 90

minutes after the enemy had delivered one deadly shot. This “burst reaction” may be attributed to Iraqis experiencing denial, anger, and grief all at the same time. Still, although they react strongly to the loss of a friend or loved one, grim repetition seems to allow them to move on rather quickly.

At the operational level, the Iraqis do not fully grasp the importance of multiple lines of operation, to include governance, infrastructure, and the economy. Their tool of choice is the blunt instrument of force directed liberally at all threats, real and perceived. The IA disdains working with civilians—the 60-division Saddam-era army had no need to ask for cooperation. Many Iraqis assured me that the local sheik is always responsible for whatever happens in the area under his control. Under Saddam, if any trouble occurred, the sheik and his entire family would be sent to jail with no questions asked. And jail in Iraq was an unpleasant place. Iraqi leaders understand our reverence for the rule of law in theory, but not in practice. For example, they have difficulty understanding why we treat detainees so well and why so many are released back into society. Under Saddam, the army did not have to worry about winning hearts and minds. Force and fear worked well to ensure domestic submission.

This is not a good model for the current low-intensity counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, and it complicates the mission of helping the Iraqis defeat insurgents. The new IA must learn to fight

using strategies and tactics far different than those used in the past and largely alien to the new army. Officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel are good at following orders but less comfortable at initiating and planning the small-unit operations required in COIN. Overall, the new generation of soldiers and officers is slowly learning the difference between serving their country and serving a dictator, but it is clear that the process of adopting more effective tactics, techniques, and procedures is clearly going to take some time.

Infrastructure. Some aspects of building a new army can be overcome relatively quickly. The MOD will soon make routine a system to recruit, train, and distribute new soldiers. The National Maintenance Contract will open up the flow of spare parts from eager foreign suppliers. Soldier pay should soon become a reason that soldiers stay in the Army instead of a constant source of frustration that has driven many out.

Other advances will take more time. The nascent system of schools and training centers should evolve into a coordinated network that ensures military competence and professionalism. Regional support centers will need time to establish an effective Iraqi logistics system. Personnel management agencies will improve to reduce distractions and allow commanders to make the most of their available manpower. In the meantime, advisers and U.S. support provide critical credibility while these systems become viable.

Field Marshal Viscount Slim, on serving with foreign troops in World War II:

Accustomed as I was to Indian battalions in the field with usually only seven or eight Europeans, it [having a large number of European soldiers in native units] struck me as an unnecessarily generous supply. I never changed that view and later experience confirmed it. This I know is rank heresy to many very experienced ‘coasters.’ I was constantly told that, far from being too many, with the rapidly expanded African forces, more British officers and N.C.O.s were needed. But these large British establishments in African units had great drawbacks. The only way to fill them was to draft officers and N.C.O.s willy-nilly to them, and this did not always give the right kind. The European who serves with native troops should be, not only much above average in efficiency and character, as he must accept greater responsibility, but he should serve with them because he wants to, because he likes them.

—William Slim, Viscount, *Defeat into Victory*, MacMillan Publisher Limited: London, 1986. p. 166.

Know the Soldiers, Know the Culture

We must be careful when making broad generalizations about working with Iraqis. The 2d Brigade commander once held up his hand with fingers extended to make the point that, like the varying lengths of his fingers, people come with different strengths and weaknesses: Each of us is unique. Nevertheless, it helps for advisers to be aware that they aren't working in Kansas, or Georgia, or Texas. In other words, it is good to know the soldiers and the culture.

Relationships. Iraqis value relationships more than results. They will interrupt a conversation, no matter how important, to pleasantly greet someone who has entered a meeting room late or unannounced. Their reputation for not wanting to recognize misconduct or failure is well earned. (Advisers have found that photographic evidence is essential to achieve a constructive after-action review.)

Ingenuity. Economic sanctions and austerity have made the Iraqis outstanding improvisers. We witnessed an Iraqi sergeant working to improve the appearance of his new brigade headquarters. Lacking a paint brush, he was applying red paint to decorative fence posts with his bare hands. In a later upgrade, the commander had his men use purple metal headboards from surplus bed parts to line the sidewalk, creating an appealing approach to his building. Because beds seemed to be in excess across post, his example spurred many copycats.

Iraqis also display great ingenuity with maintenance operations. A maintenance adviser for one of the tank battalions told me with pride how his unit mechanics were doing "direct support level work with less-than-organizational-level tools," which is like removing a tank engine using a hoist and an off-the-shelf tool kit from Wal-Mart. When we conducted a routine check of a traffic control point, an IA company commander demonstrated how his men had changed an engine head gasket on site. This expertise and can-do spirit extends to finer work as well. One mechanic fixed a complex traversing and elevating unit using only pliers and a coat hanger. In certain endeavors, the Iraqis definitely illustrate the cliché, "If there's a will, there's a way."

Fatalism. Iraqis tend to be fatalistic, surrendering their future to the will of Allah. This explains how they can continue to function despite daily car bombings, atrocities, and murders that have touched

nearly every family. When my Iraqi friends returned from leave, I always asked them about their "vacation." (It is one of the phrases I have memorized in Arabic.) About 30 percent of the time, they had some bad news to relate: a kidnapped cousin, a death threat, or a bombing near their home. After we commiserated about the event, the Iraqi typically ended by saying "Allah kareem" ("God is generous"). This was not really stoicism, because it was sometimes accompanied by tears. It did, however, show that Iraqis feel far less in control of events than the average American does.

For Americans, the most frustrating aspect of this fatalism is that it translates into a lack of diligence and detailed planning. Iraqis eschew operational calendars and typically forecast little beyond the next 48 to 72 hours. One example of this lack of regard for planning occurred prior to the handing over of operations to the 2d Brigade. The American commander's battle rhythm included representation at local government meetings each week. When the Iraqis took charge of this schedule, they continually re-tasked responsibility for attendance, selected officers at random to attend and take notes, and generally failed to make the most of this opportunity to engage local leaders. The morning operations and intelligence update, a staple at every American tactical operation center (TOC) and an opportunity to synchronize operations, usually drew only token Iraqi attendance.

To their credit, the Iraqis almost always made mission, but it was typically not to the standard that Americans expect. When fellow advisers complained about how the Iraqis would fritter away opportunities by failing to plan, I encouraged them to persevere. If repeated often enough, at least some of our advice eventually had an effect. But to reduce frustration, I would also tell them, "Remember, we're in Iraq!"

Reacting versus planning. Failing to plan does not necessarily mean laziness. It just means that Iraqis prefer to "react to contact" and make things happen when they have to. Soon after the Samarra mosque bombing on 22 February 2006, the government of Iraq called on the new armored brigade to send a battalion task force into Baghdad to assist in controlling sectarian violence that threatened to devolve into civil war. A warning order came to the unit leaders around noon on a Sunday, and the official order was issued at about 1800. American

planners were busy requesting a 24-hour delay to facilitate detailed planning, but the Iraqis were assembling a task force for movement. As the advisers scrambled to prepare teams to accompany them, the Iraqi commanders were issuing orders and checking load plans. At about 0200 Monday morning, the first company left the motor pool on its way to the link-up point. Between 0530 and 0845, 3 companies totaling 11 BMPs (Russian armored vehicles) and 19 tanks had rolled into separate operating bases to report to 3 different brigades of the Iraqi 6th division. I accompanied one of the tank companies. Upon arrival, I asked where the soldiers could bed down for a couple of hours to get some sleep. The Iraqi commander replied that the tankers would be going directly into the city; a short time to refuel and conduct maintenance was all that could be afforded. By 1130 that morning, all elements of the armored task force were in positions around the city of Baghdad, providing a powerful symbol of the

growing strength of the IA. Over the next 12 days, Iraqis watched with pride as their tanks and BMPs were a daily fixture on the evening news.

Bottom line. Advisers are most effective when they can approach Iraqis with a measure of humility, appreciating Iraqi strengths while acknowledging their weaknesses. Iraqis will return the level of respect that we accord them.

Getting the Relationships Right

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are here to help them, not win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. It might take longer, and it might not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs it will be better.

—T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,”
Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917

This quotation, displayed at biweekly meetings of senior leaders and advisers to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the Multi-National Division, Baghdad (MND-B) AO, offers today’s advisers a great example to emulate. Clearly, the job of creating long-term order and prosperity in Iraq is in the hands of the Iraqis. Any casual observer of American politics can understand that. Moreover, we know that Iraqi leaders do their best work when they feel ownership of a course of action.

Problematic command relationships. The command relationships among the IAG advisers, the Iraqi unit, and the Coalition partner unit are problematic. The partner unit is normally a U.S. brigade which has responsibility for an AO within one of the multi-national commands. The IAG advises Iraqi units that operate in the partner unit’s battlespace. But neither



DoD

2d Brigade soldiers on parade in refurbished T-72 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers in a ceremony at Taji Military Base 15 miles north of Baghdad, 17 November 2005.



DoD
Iraqi soldiers march by the reviewing stand at Taji Military Base in a ceremony celebrating the largest NATO-driven equipment donation to date (17 November 2005).

the IAG nor the Iraqi unit have a formal command relationship with the partner unit. Iraqi units have their own chain of command, and are not part of the Coalition.

One of the most frustrating points of friction I observed was caused by mistaken beliefs about the latter. Many U.S. commanders thought that the Iraqi force was part of the Coalition and OIF was another exercise in Coalition warfare. Numerous examples demonstrate how this misunderstanding created confusion and discord: An Iraqi platoon leader refusing to participate in a combined patrol because he had not received an order from his battalion commander; Iraqi patrols leaving their assigned area to respond to an MOD order to escort a convoy from Baghdad to Taji; an Iraqi brigade commander ordering a squad to remain in an ambush position, effectively masking a U.S. unit that had already occupied a position nearby; and Iraqi soldiers refusing to follow American orders to search a mosque until the order was cleared by an Iraqi division commander. In all of these examples, the U.S. commander had operational control of Iraqi units, but the Iraqi chain of command was leaning forward to take charge before it was designated for official command and control functions. While the American commander's first impulse was to be furious with the Iraqis, from the perspective of building new units, there was clearly good news in this evidence of a strengthening Iraqi chain of command.

Although the Coalition units and IA units do not share chains of command, U.S. platoon leaders in the partner units are required to conduct combined (Iraqi and U.S.) operations in order to improve the IA unit's combat readiness. The intent is that the

experienced, well-trained U.S. units will train Iraqis in troop-leading procedures, the orders process, and mission execution for an operation, but all too often the combined operation consists of a "drive-by" pick-up of an Iraqi squad while the U.S. unit is on the way to the objective. This puts an Iraqi face in the crowd, but does little to develop a capable ISF.

Strategy and tactics at odds.

For some time now, building the new ISF has been the strategic main effort in Iraq. Pentagon pronounce-

ments emphasize placing Iraqis in the lead. Nearly every mission statement I saw in theater referred to "developing capable ISF" as an essential task. At the tactical level, however, brigade and battalion commanders must necessarily concentrate their time, talent, and resources on fighting insurgents. This was clearly the case in my experience during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III and IV. The MND-B AO, for one, is still too dangerous for tactical commanders to focus on training the IA at the expense of security, which leaves the heavy lifting of building the new ISF to Iraqi commanders and their advisers. This arrangement can work only if the U.S. force provides enough stability to allow the Iraqis to train and practice tactics, techniques and procedures inside and outside the wire.

Culture trumping mission. Another problem plaguing the strategy is that it's unnatural for U.S. Soldiers to step back and allow their Iraqi partners to take the lead when the Soldiers think they can do it more efficiently and quickly. From private to colonel, the American Soldier is task-oriented, and even the most experienced advisers forget that our real charge is to train the Iraqis so that they can do the job. I once saw an adviser developing a PowerPoint® "storyboard" depicting a significant

...all too often the combined operation consists of a "drive-by" pick-up of an Iraqi squad while the U.S. unit is on the way to the objective.

action that had occurred with an IA unit. I asked him if he was working with his Iraqi counterpart to put it together. He replied that it would “take four times as long to do it that way.” This same thinking prevails in combined operations centers, where American battle captains have a tendency to tell their Iraqi counterparts what to do, rather than allowing them to work through the planning and decision making process.

This is the wrong approach. Eventually Iraqi officers will have to make their own judgment calls and handle complex situations without U.S. support. We must improve their planning skills and strengthen their chain of command at every opportunity. Iraqi leaders should chair meetings with local leaders and the units should handle tactical situations to the limits of their capability. We must constantly find ways to put the IA in front while making sure they are prepared to succeed.

Disparity of capability. The great disparity in capability between U.S. and IA units also works against the IA training effort. It takes a 2,000-man Iraqi brigade to take over an AO formerly controlled by a 600-strong U.S. battalion, and even then there is a drop in capability. There are many reasons for this delta:

- The U.S. work ethic is second to none—especially when Soldiers are deployed far from home and can focus 100 percent on getting the job done. Arab culture, on the other hand, is much less focused on the clock; it takes the long view that everything will happen in due time, “in shah-allah” (“God willing”).
- The IA is not rotating units into the AO; rotation off the line consists of a liberal leave schedule that reduces the force by 20 to 30 percent at any given time.
- The American military is probably the most thoroughly trained force in the world, but Iraqi soldiers make do with 3 to 5 weeks of basic training before entering the battlespace. Most IA units rely on experienced former soldiers to make up for immature training programs. This new IA must fight as it forms and grows. The Iraqi brigade I advised went from initial soldier reception to independent operations with Coalition support in a mere 10 months.
- American staffs are huge, and a host of technological tools facilitate situational awareness. The battle captain in a brigade combat team (BCT) runs a TOC shift of 15 officers and soldiers while

his Iraqi counterpart typically has 2 radio operators and a cell phone to call the commander. Iraqi officers are amazed when they enter a U.S. brigade command post; they are awed by the buzz of activity and big-screen displays. The contrast between the well-funded, professional U.S. Army and the fledgling Iraqi volunteer force is huge. An adviser who does not keep this in mind is likely to unfairly denigrate his Iraqi counterpart and do poorly in coaching him. A U.S. commander who ignores this disparity is likely to paralyze the Iraqi TOC by demanding the same level of information from them that he expects from his own TOC.

...American battle captains have a tendency to tell their Iraqi counterparts what to do, rather than allowing them to work through the planning and decision making process.

In spite of these disparities, in less than one year the 2d Armored Brigade received and distributed all combat equipment, soldier uniforms, and even barracks furniture while simultaneously conducting individual and small-unit training. The brigade did this even though officer fill remained at 50 percent or less during the first 5 months and present-for-duty status suffered from the aforementioned leave policy. Moreover, the brigade now takes the lead on operations within its AO, suffering casualties and fighting the enemy alongside its American partners. Coalition partners and advisers share in this accomplishment because they have allowed the IA to perform while taking pains to shield them from failure. They will have to do so for some time to ensure continued progress.

Distractions of combat. Some friction between advisers and U.S. tactical commanders is inevitable. Advisers know firsthand that preparing a brand-new army in Iraq requires patience, flexible expectations, and compromise, but U.S. tactical commanders are busy fighting insurgents; they have little time to meet with their Iraqi brothers-in-arms, to debate tactics, or to concern themselves with the

IA's administrative problems. It doesn't help that, at times, adviser teams require augmentation from the U.S. unit of 10 to 25 Soldiers per battalion to accomplish tactical missions. Some commanders see this requirement as a wasteful drain on their resources. Then there is the burdensome requirement to train Iraqi units during combat operations. This effort involves pesky translation issues and tiresome distractions; it is easier to conduct a U.S.-only mission than to go through the pain of turning a combat mission into an Iraqi training event. While the U.S. Army's reputation for being task-oriented is well earned and one of our greatest strengths, it becomes an impediment when the essential task is to cede mission accomplishment to the Iraqis.

Signs of change. The differing emphases between OIF III (which ended January 2006) and OIF IV demonstrated that American commanders were definitely improving in their ability to support Iraqis in the lead. In November 2005, an OIF III brigade commander staunchly defended his formal authority over Iraqi formations by refusing an IA division commander's request to allow a company team to participate in a ceremony marking a donation of NATO armored vehicles. During preparation for the December election, this same colonel emphasized that "if we want our Iraqi units to play in our battlespace, they better be ready." From the operational standpoint this stance made sense; the colonel clearly wanted either reliable troops or none at all. But from the strategic standpoint of developing a capable ISF, he missed the mark. The opportunity to get IA soldiers into the fight was worth every bit of lost military efficiency.

During OIF IV, after the sea-change directing that Iraqis be put in the lead, U.S. commanders deferred to the "Iraqi solution" from MOD down to the company level. As the 2d Brigade took over its AO in May 2006, the U.S. commander respected the Iraqi commander's prerogatives. Although misunderstandings continued to occur, the overall direction was very positive, thus reinforcing the Iraqi chain of command.

It would be naive to think that the problems between advisers and partner units have been solved. Some friction will inevitably persist. But both groups must find a way to put the Iraqis in the lead; otherwise, the Iraqi dependence on U.S. forces will continue. Good relations between advisers and

the partner unit are essential to mitigate adviser-commander problems. Advisers must be nearly as proactive in educating their U.S. partners as they are in working with their Iraqi counterparts, but the partner unit must be willing to participate. During my year in Iraq, I worked with two American brigade commanders. The first preferred not to deal with advisers, and I was unsuccessful in establishing any semblance of a constructive relationship with him. The second commander was far more focused on making advisers and Iraqis part of his team. I was invited to participate in morning net calls designed to improve situational awareness and address outstanding issues. In addition, periodic meetings between the American commander and his Iraqi counterpart were extremely productive.

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Final Observations

Moderate Iraqis are taking great risks to build their country and defend it against those who choose anarchy, extremism, or a Saddam-style dictatorship. When I asked an Iraqi deputy brigade commander if he was optimistic about the future, he responded that security was the first imperative and the most difficult condition to achieve. Once the Iraqi Government provides security, he said, then everything to follow will be easy. He argued that the Iraqi people do not expect much from their government because the vast majority had received little during 35 years under Saddam.

As American military forces begin to pull back, Iraqi forces will become more central to establishing a safe and secure Iraq. U.S. advisers are critical partners in this mission. They provide expertise and, more important, reassurance that the forces for democracy and moderation have a powerful ally at their side. Advisers who approach this important mission with a constructive attitude and a willingness to put Iraqis in the lead will make important and satisfying contributions to this effort. I personally

consider my year in Iraq as the most significant of my 22 years in the Army.

Despite low approval ratings and doubters back home, President Bush might just be correct about establishing a free and democratic Iraq in the center of the strategic Middle East. My Iraqi friends yearn for a day when their children can enjoy peace and prosperity in a country that has no excuse for being poor. The current generation understands that they are paying the price now so that future generations can enjoy what has so far been denied.

The land of the two rivers, brimming with untapped oil resources, can surely become a shining example that elevates the region above its history

of perpetual conflict. Of course, the future holds more senseless killings and strategic setbacks. The enemy is determined and will continue to go to any length to frustrate freedom. But the process of gaining control while battling the insurgency must continue even as the entire world debates the wisdom of the effort. This mission is a significant challenge for the most powerful military in the world; it will exceed the capability of this new IA for some time to come. But no great undertaking has ever come easy. Current and potential partners participating in OIF should keep this in mind as they continue the important work suggested by the mission's name. **MR**

GOING HOME

I'm wearing my Class A uniform, waiting on flight number 4505.
The plane will pick me up in New York and deposit me in Philadelphia, where
I will meet an old Army friend; together we'll travel to a special ceremony.

My polyester uniform does not breathe well; on a long trip
I begin to offend those around me.
The tie chokes me: like a man noosed for execution.
My luggage strap tears at my ribbons, scattering them on the dirty floor.
I am choking.

As I make my way to Gate 28, a vet from The Greatest Generation walks up to me.
He and his wife would like to buy me lunch.
I thank the man for serving our country and add that it is I who should buy him lunch,
Then remember: I am waiting for Dave to come home from Iraq.
The old vet nods understandingly, we look into each other's eyes, shake hands, and
I disappear to be alone.

While I sit in the empty gate (I am early) CNN reports that a suicide bomb went off in Tal-Afar.
Tal-Afar is near Mosul, where Dave was stationed.
I think, "These are the times to say 'I'm sorry' to those who matter most."
I wait for Dave in silence.
My only companions are a tired stewardess and CNN—broadcasting to no one.

A woman in a two-piece suit comes up to me.
Reflexively I reply: "Yes, Ma'am"
She informs me that Dave is waiting for me in the cargo area.

The gate slowly fills; the gazes multiply.
I can't stop it.
A flood I have sought to suppress washes down my face.
Stares crowd closer...I can barely see them, yet I feel them.
They suffocate me.

A man in a suit waiting to board "First Class" casually reads
the sports section of a newspaper,
Tossing aside the front page aside: "Suicide Bomber Kills Four in Mosul."
I don't need to read the story because I know the picture too well.
I also know that the press probably mailed in the story from the comfort of a hotel suite,
ignoring the details.

I want to tell this man that while he lounges in "First Class" my friend Dave lies in cargo.
What will I say to his wife Cindy when I meet her?
Words and thoughts swirl around my head, but I can't locate anything.
All I feel is grief, and Cindy does not need me to cry on her shoulder.
There are no Army manuals to instruct me on what to do. I am at a loss.
I am the escort officer who is taking my fallen comrade home for the last time.

—For Dave: Rest Easy, Brother
MAJ Zoltan Krompecher
October 1st, 2005

Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, Retired

THE FIRST STEP in meeting the challenge facing us in Iraq today or in similar war zones tomorrow is to understand that insurgency and counterinsurgency are very different tasks. The use of Special Forces against insurgents in Vietnam to “out-guerrilla the guerrillas” provided exactly the wrong solution to the problem. It assumed that the insurgent and the counterinsurgent can use the same approach to achieve their quite different goals.

To define insurgency, I use Bard O’Neill from *Insurgency and Terrorism*. He states: “Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses *political resources* (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics.”¹

Counterinsurgency, as defined by Ian Beckett, “is far from being a purely military problem . . . co-ordination of both the civil and military effort must occur at all levels and embrace the provision of intelligence . . .”²

On the surface, these definitions suggest that insurgency and counterinsurgency are similar because each requires political and military action. However, when one thinks it through, the challenge is very different for the government. The government must accomplish something. It must govern effectively. In contrast, the insurgent only has to propose an idea for a better future while ensuring the government cannot govern effectively.

In Iraq, the resistance does not even project a better future. It simply has the nihilistic goal of ensuring the government cannot function. This negative goal is much easier to achieve than governing. For instance, it is easier and more direct to use military power than to apply political, economic, and social techniques. The insurgent can use violence to delegitimize a government (because that government cannot fulfill the basic social contract to protect the people). However, simple application of violence by the government cannot restore that legitimacy. David Galula, in his classic *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, expresses the difference between insurgency and counterinsurgency very clearly: “Revolutionary warfare . . . represents an exceptional case not only because as we suspect, it has its special rules, different from those of the conventional war, but also because most of the rules applicable to one side do not work for the other. In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly. It is the same war for both camps in terms of space and time, yet there are two distinct warfares [sic]—the revolutionary’s, and shall we say, the counterrevolutionary’s.”³

Enduring Traits of Insurgency

Mao Tse-Tung wrote his famous *On Guerilla War* [Yu Chi Chan] in

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1937. Despite the passage of time, many of his basic observations about insurgency remain valid. First and foremost, insurgency is a political, not a military, struggle. It is not amenable to a purely military solution without resorting to a level of brutality unacceptable to the Western world. Even the particularly brutal violence Russia has inflicted upon Chechnya—killing almost 25 percent of the total population and destroying its cities—has not resulted in victory.

The second factor has to do with the political will of the counterinsurgent's own population. If that population turns sour when faced with the long time-frame and mounting costs of counterinsurgency, the insurgent will win. This has been particularly true whenever the United States has become involved in counterinsurgency operations. Insurgents have learned over the last 30 years that they do not have to defeat the United States militarily to drive us out of an insurgency; they only have to destroy our political will. Today's insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq understand this and have made the political will of the U.S. population a primary target of their efforts.

A third unchanging aspect of insurgency involves duration. Insurgencies are measured in decades, not months or years. The Chinese Communists fought for 27 years. The Vietnamese fought the U.S. for 30 years. The Palestinians have been resisting Israel since at least 1968. Even when the counterinsurgent has won, it has taken a long time. The Malaya Emergency and the El Salvadoran insurgency each lasted 12 years.

Finally, despite America's love of high technology, technology does not provide a major advantage in counterinsurgency. In fact, in the past the side with the simplest technology often won. What has been decisive in most counterinsurgencies were the human attributes of leadership, cultural understanding, and political judgment.

In short, the key factors of insurgency that have not changed are its political nature, its protracted timelines, and its intensely human (versus technological) nature.

Emerging Traits of Insurgency

While these hallmarks of insurgency have remained constant, the nature of insurgency has evolved in other areas. Like all forms of war, insur-

gency changes in consonance with the political, economic, social, and technical conditions of the society it springs from. Insurgencies are no longer the special province of single-party organizations like Mao's and Ho Chi Minh's. Today, insurgent organizations are comprised of loose coalitions of the willing, human networks that range from local to global. This reflects the social organizations of the societies they come from and the reality that today's most successful organizations are networks rather than hierarchies.

Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources... and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics.

—Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*

In addition to being composed of coalitions, insurgencies also operate across the spectrum from local to transnational organizations. Because these networks span the globe, external actors such as the Arabs who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Afghans who fought in Bosnia, and the European Muslims who are showing up in Iraq, are now a regular part of insurgencies.

In a coalition insurgency, the goals of the different elements may vary, too. In Afghanistan today, some of the insurgents simply wish to rule their own valleys; others seek to rule a nation. Al-Qaeda is fighting for a transnational caliphate. In Iraq, many of the Sunni insurgents seek a secular government dominated by Sunnis. Other Sunnis—the Salafists—want a strict Islamic society ruled by Sharia. Among the Shi'a, Muqtada Al-Sadr operated as an insurgent, then shifted to the political arena (while maintaining a powerful militia and a geographic base in the slums of Sadr City). Although temporarily

out of the insurgent business, his forces remain a factor in any armed conflict. Other Shi'a militias are also prepared to enter the military equation if their current political efforts do not achieve their goals. Finally, criminal elements in both Afghanistan and Iraq participate in the unrest primarily for profit.

At times, even their hatred of the outsider is not strong enough to keep these various coalition groups from fighting among themselves. Such factionalism was a continuing problem for anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan in the 1980's, and savvy Soviet commanders exploited it at times. We see major signs of the same symptom in Iraq today.

This complex mixture of players and motives is now the pattern for insurgencies. If insurgents succeed in driving the Coalition out of Afghanistan and Iraq, their own highly diverse coalitions of the willing will not be able to form a government; their mutually incompatible beliefs will lead to continued fighting until one faction dominates. This is what happened in Afghanistan when the insurgents drove the Soviets out. Similar disunity appeared in Chechnya after the Soviets withdrew in 1996, and infighting only ceased when the Russians returned to install their own government. Early signs of a similar power struggle are present in the newly evacuated Gaza Strip.

The fact that recent insurgencies have been coalitions is a critical component in understanding them. For too long, American leaders stated that the insurgency in Iraq could not be genuine because it had no unifying cause or leader; therefore, it could not be a threat. The insurgents in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine have never had a unified leadership or belief other than that the outside power had to go. Yet these insurgents have driven out the Soviet Union and continue to contest the United States, Russia, and Israel. The lack of unity in current insurgencies only makes them more difficult to defeat. It is a characteristic that we have to accept and understand.

Showing the adaptability characteristic of successful organizations, many insurgencies are now transdimensional as well as transnational. As Western efforts have reduced the number of insurgent safe havens, insurgents have aggressively moved into cyberspace. There, the high capacity of broadband has greatly increased the Internet's utility for insurgents. Expanding from simple communica-

NEW INSURGENCY TRAITS

- **Emergence of networked coalitions of the willing**
- **Evolution into transdimensional organizations**
- **Ability to fund themselves**
- **Wide variety of motivations behind different coalition elements**

tions and propaganda, insurgents and their terrorist counterparts have moved to online recruitment, vetting of recruits, theological indoctrination, training, and logistical arrangements. Insurgents never have to meet an individual recruit until they feel comfortable; then they can use the Internet as a meeting site that they control. The wide availability of password-protected chat rooms allows insurgents to hold daily meetings with very little chance of discovery. Not only do Western intelligence agencies have to find the insurgents' chat room among the millions out there and crack the password, but they also must do so with a person who can speak the insurgents' language and who is convincing enough to keep the other chat participants from simply logging off. And, of course, insurgents can also move out of the larger chat room into private chat, which makes the infiltration problem even harder.

Another major change in insurgencies is that they are becoming self-supporting. Modern insurgents do conventional fundraising, but they also run charity organizations, businesses, and criminal enterprises. In the past, most insurgencies depended on one or two major sponsors, which the United States could subject to diplomatic or economic pressure. Now, the insurgents' more varied money-raising schemes, combined with the ability to move funds outside official banking channels, make it increasingly difficult to attack insurgent finances.

Enduring Characteristics of Counterinsurgency

Just as insurgencies have enduring characteristics, so do counterinsurgencies. The fundamental

weapon in counterinsurgency remains good governance. While the insurgent must simply continue to exist and conduct occasional attacks, the government must learn to govern effectively. The fact that there is an insurgency indicates the government has failed to govern. In short, the counterinsurgent is starting out in a deep hole.

The first governing step the counterinsurgent must take is to establish security for the people. Without effective, continuous security it does not matter if the people are sympathetic to the government—they must cooperate with the insurgent or be killed. Providing security is not enough, however. The government must also give the people hope for a better future—for their children if not for themselves. Furthermore, this better future must accord with what the people want, not what the counterinsurgent wants. The strategic hamlets campaign in Vietnam and the ideological emphasis on freedom in Iraq are examples of futures the counterinsurgent thought were best, but that didn't resonate with the population. In Vietnam, the peasants were intensely tied to their land; in Islamic culture, justice has a higher value than freedom.

The view of the future must address the “poverty of dignity” that Thomas L. Friedman has so clearly identified as a driving motivator for terrorists.⁴ The people must have hope not just for a better life as they see it, but also for the feeling of dignity that comes from having some say in their own futures.

There has been a great deal of discussion recently about whether the war in Iraq has progressed from terrorism to an insurgency and then to a civil war. While this is very important from the insurgent's point of view, it does not determine the first steps a counterinsurgent must take to win. As always, the

first step is to provide security for the people. If the people stop supporting the government out of fear of insurgents, terrorists, or other violent groups, the government can only begin winning back its credibility by providing effective security. How that security is provided can vary depending on the threat, but the basic requirement is nonnegotiable. Thus, the fundamental concepts of counterinsurgency remain constant: provide security for the people and genuine hope for the future.

Emerging Characteristics of Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgent must also come to grips with the emerging characteristics of insurgency. To deal with the networked, transnational character of insurgents, the counterinsurgent must develop a truly international approach to the security issues he faces. In addition, he must counter not just a single ideology, but all the ideologies of the various groups involved in the insurgency. This is daunting because attacking the ideology of one group might reinforce that of another. Successful ideological combat also requires the counterinsurgent to have deep cultural and historical knowledge of the people in the conflict. Success in this kind of fight will be difficult to achieve, but it can be attained if the government attacks the insurgents' coalition by exacerbating individual group differences.

Finally, the government must find a way to handle the numerous external actors who will come to join the insurgency. The true believers among them can only be killed or captured; the rest must be turned from insurgents to citizens. If possible, the counterinsurgent should keep foreign fighters from returning to their homes to spread the conflict there. Obviously, this will require a great deal of international cooperation. However, the nations involved should be anxious to cooperate to prevent these violent, potentially rebellious fighters from returning home.

Visualizing the Insurgency

With the mixture of enduring and emerging characteristics in insurgencies, the question arises as to how best to analyze the modern form. A clear understanding of the insurgency is obviously essential to the counterinsurgent. Unfortunately, recent history shows that conventional powers initially tend to

Counterinsurgency...is far from being a purely military problem...co-ordination of both the civil and military effort must occur at all levels and embrace the provision of intelligence...

—Ian Beckett

NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAITS

- **Develop an international approach**
- **Counter multiple ideologies**
- **Know the culture and its history**
- **Handle the outsiders**

misunderstand insurgencies much more often than they understand them. In Malaya, it took almost 3 years before the British developed a consistent approach to the communist insurrection there. As John Nagl has noted, “Only about 1950 was the political nature of the war really grasped.”⁵ In Vietnam, it took until 1968 before General Creighton Abrams and Ambassador Robert Komer provided an effective plan to deal with the Viet Cong in the south. In Iraq, it took us almost 2 years to decide that we were dealing with an insurgency, and we are still arguing about its composition and goals.

To fight an insurgency effectively, we must first understand it. Given the complexity inherent in modern insurgency, the best visualization tool is a network map. The counterinsurgent must map the human networks involved on both sides because—

- A map of the human connections reflects how insurgencies really operate. A network map will reveal the scale and depth of interactions between different people and nodes and show the actual impact of our actions against those connections.

- A network map plotted over time can show how changes in the environment affect nodes and links in the network. Again, such knowledge is essential for understanding how our actions are hitting the insurgency.

- Models of human networks account for charisma, human will, and insights in ways a simple organizational chart cannot.

- Networks actively seek to grow. By studying network maps, we can see where growth occurs and what it implies for the insurgent and the government. By studying which areas of the insurgent

network are growing fastest, we can identify the most effective members of the insurgency and their most effective tactics, and act accordingly.

- Networks interact with other networks in complex ways that cannot be portrayed on an organizational chart.

- Network maps show connections from a local to a global scale and reveal when insurgents use modern technology to make the “long-distance” relationships more important and closer than local ones.

- Networks portray the transdimensional and transnational nature of insurgencies in ways no other model can. Networks can also reveal insurgent connections to the host-nation government, the civilian community, and any other players present in the struggle.

- Finally, if we begin to understand the underlying networks of insurgencies, we can analyze them using an emerging set of tools. In *Linked: The Science of Networks*, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi points to these new tools: “A string of recent breathtaking discoveries has forced us to acknowledge that amazingly simple and far reaching laws govern the structure and evolution of all the complex networks that surround us.”⁶

We should also use network modeling when we consider our own organizations. Unlike the hierarchical layout we habitually use when portraying ourselves, a network schematic will allow us to see much more clearly how our personnel policies affect our own operations. When we chart an organization hierarchically, it appears that our personnel rotation policies have minimal effect on our organizations. One individual leaves, and another qualified individual immediately fills that line on the organization chart; there is no visual indication of the impact on our organization. If, however, we plotted our own organizations as networks, we could see the massive damage our personnel rotation policies cause. When a person arrives in country and takes a job, for some time he probably knows only the person he is working for and a few people in his office. In a network, he will show up as a small node with few connections. As time passes, he makes new connections and finds old friends in other jobs throughout the theater. On a network map, we will see him growing from a tiny node to a major hub. Over the course of time, we will see his connections to other military organizations, to

U.S. and allied government agencies, host-nation agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and so forth. Just as clearly, when he rotates we will see that large hub instantaneously replaced by a small node with few connections. We will be even more alarmed to see the massive impact the simultaneous departure of numerous hubs has on the functionality of our network.

To assist us in building our network maps, we can use any of a number of sophisticated anti-gang software programs that allow us to track individuals and visualize their contacts. Essentially sophisticated versions of the old personalities-organizations-incidents databases, these programs allow us to tie together the intelligence reports we get to build a visual picture of the connections revealed. For instance, we pick up a suspect near a bombing site, check him against the database, and find that although he has not been arrested before, he is closely related to a man we know to be involved in a political party. We can then look at other members of the family and party to see if there are other connections to the incident, to the person we arrested, or to the organization possibly involved.

Good software will allow for instant visualization of these relationships in a color-coded network we can project on a wall, print out, or transmit to other analysts. Good software almost instantly accomplishes the hundreds of hours of scut work that used to be required to tie isolated, apparently unrelated reports together. It allows us to look for third- and even fourth-level connections in a network and, thus, to build a much more useful network map. In particular, we will be able to see the gaps where we know there ought to be connections.

Ten years ago, software of this analytical quality was available and being used to track gang activity in the United States. I am uncertain of the status of current DOD human intelligence software, but I doubt it reaches down to the critical company and platoon levels of the counterinsurgency fight. We have to take aggressive action to get better software and make it work. If cities can give this kind of information to policemen on the streets, we owe it to our companies and platoons.

By mapping the human connections in insurgent networks and then applying cultural knowledge and network theory to the networks, we can understand them more clearly. We can also apply the common-sense observation that most networks grow from pre-existing social networks. In fact, such an approach has already been used. Marc Sageman has done a detailed study of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, mapped the operational connections, and then compared them to pre-existing social connections.⁷ His work points the way to much more effective analysis of insurgent and terrorist organizations.

Sageman's studies have revealed the key nodes and links in each of Al-Qaeda's parts and how changes in the operating environment over time have affected those parts. Sageman has also identified both the real and virtual links between individuals and Al-Qaeda's constituent organizations. Most important, however, the studies give us a starting point from which to examine any network:

...most networks grow from pre-existing social networks.

the preexisting social connections of a society. Rather than starting from scratch, we can analyze the limited intelligence we do obtain within the social and cultural context of the insurgency. In short, Sageman's approach

allows us to paint a picture of the enemy network that we can analyze.

Security not Defensive

For the counterinsurgent, the central element in any strategy must be the people. The counterinsurgent has to provide effective government in order to win the loyalty of the people. This is easy to say, but helping another country establish good governance is one of the most challenging tasks possible. The conflict in Iraq highlights how difficult it is to help establish a government in a fractious society. Beyond the discussion of whether or not there is a civil war in Iraq, we can't even agree on whether a strategy that focuses on the people is inherently offensive or defensive. Obviously, if our approach is perceived to be a defensive one, most strategists will be reluctant to adopt it, simply because defense rarely wins wars.

In fact, in counterinsurgencies, providing security for the people is an inherently offensive action.

No one questions that during conventional wars, attacks that seize enemy territory to deny the enemy resources, a tax base, and a recruiting base are considered offensive actions. But for some reason, when we conduct population control operations in counterinsurgency, they are considered defensive even though these operations have the same effect: They deny the insurgent the things he needs to operate.

A population control operation is the most offensive action one can take in a counterinsurgency. Just like in conventional war, once you have seized a portion of the enemy's territory, you cannot then evacuate it and give it back to him. If you do so, you simply restore all the resources to his control while eroding the morale of the government, the people, and your own forces.

In a counterinsurgency, big-unit sweeps and raids are inherently defensive operations. We are reacting to an enemy initiative that has given him control of a portion of the country. We move through, perhaps capture or kill some insurgents, and then move back to our defensive positions. In essence, we are ceding the key terrain—the population and its resources—to the insurgent. We might have inflicted a temporary tactical setback on our enemy, but at a much greater cost to our operational and strategic goals. The fact that we sweep and do not hold exposes the government's weakness to the people. It also exposes them to violence and does little to improve their long-term security or prospects for a better life.

Clearly, population control operations are the truly offensive operations in a counterinsurgency. Just as clearly, host-government and U.S. forces will rarely have sufficient troops to conduct such operations nationwide at the start of the counterinsurgent effort. Thus, we need to prioritize areas that will receive the resources to provide full-time, permanent security; population control, and reconstruction. The clear, hold, and build strategy is the correct one. However, it must recognize the limitations of government forces and, for a period, cede control of some elements of the population to the insurgent to provide real protection for the rest of the population. This is essentially the “white, grey, and black” approach used by the British in Malaya.⁸ As Sir Robert Thompson has noted, “Because a government's resources, notably in trained

manpower, are limited, the [counterinsurgent] plan must also lay down priorities both in the measures to be taken and in the areas to be dealt with first. If the insurgency is countrywide, it is impossible to tackle it offensively in every area. It must be accepted that in certain areas only a holding operation can be conducted.”⁹

Further, by focusing our forces to create real security in some areas rather than the illusion of security across the country, we can commence rebuilding. The resulting combination of security and prosperity will contrast sharply with conditions in insurgent-controlled areas. When we have sufficient forces to move into those areas, the people might be more receptive to the government's presence.

Command and Control

There is an old saying in military planning: Get the command and control relationships right, and everything else will take care of itself. It is a common-sense acknowledgement that people provide solutions only if they are well-led in a functional organization. Thus the first and often most difficult step in counterinsurgency is to integrate friendly-force command and execution. Note that I say “integrate” and not “unify.” Given the transnational, transdimensional nature of today's insurgencies, it will be impossible to develop true unity of command for all the organizations needed to fight an insurgency. Instead, we must strive for unity of effort by integrating the efforts of all concerned.

While the U.S. military does not like committees, a committee structure might be most effective for command in a counterinsurgency. There should be an executive committee for every major political subdivision, from city to province to national levels. Each committee must include all key personnel involved in the counterinsurgency effort—political leaders (prime minister, governors, and so on), police, intelligence officers, economic developers

...the first and often most difficult step in counterinsurgency is to integrate friendly-force command and execution.

(to include NGOs), public services ministers, and the military. The political leaders must be in charge and have full

authority to hire, fire, and evaluate other members of the committee. Committee members must not be controlled or evaluated by their parent agencies at the next higher level; otherwise, the committee will fail to achieve unity of effort. This step will require a massive cultural change to the normal stovepipes that handle all personnel and promotion issues for the government. One of the biggest hindrances to change is that many think the current hierarchical organization is effective. They think of themselves as “cylinders of excellence” rather than the balky, inefficient, and ineffective stovepipes they really are.

Above the national-level committee, which can be established fairly quickly under our current organization, we need a regional command arrangement. Given the transnational nature of modern insurgency, a single country team simply cannot deal with all the regional and international issues required in effective counterinsurgency. Thus we will have to develop a genuine regional team. The current DOD and Department of State organizations do not lend themselves well to such a structure and will require extensive realignment. This realignment must be accomplished.

Once the national and regional committees are established, Washington must give mission-type orders, allocate sufficient resources, and then let in-country and regional personnel run the campaign. Obviously, one of the biggest challenges in this arrangement is developing leaders to head the in-country and regional teams, particularly deployable U.S. civil leaders and host-nation leaders. An even bigger challenge will be convincing U.S. national-level bureaucracies to stay out of day-to-day operations.

Once established, the committees can use the network map of the insurgency and its environment to develop a plan for victory. The network map provides important information about the nature of the interaction between the key hubs and smaller nodes of the insurgency. While the hubs and nodes are the most visible aspects of any network, it is the nature of the activity between them that is important.

***...one of the biggest challenges
...is developing leaders to head the
in-country and regional teams...***

We must understand that well to understand how the network actually functions. This is difficult to do, and

what makes it even more challenging is that one cannot understand the network except in its cultural context. Therefore, we must find and employ people with near-native language fluency and cultural knowledge to build and interpret our map.

Speed versus Accuracy

For counterinsurgencies, Colonel John Boyd’s observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop remains valid, but its focus changes.¹⁰ In conventional war, and especially in the aerial combat that led Boyd to develop his concept, speed was crucial to completing the OODA loop—it got you inside your opponent’s OODA loop. We have to use a different approach in counterinsurgency. Stressing speed above all else in the decision cycle simply does not make sense in a war that can last a decade or more.

In counterinsurgency, we still want to move speedily, but the focus must be more on accuracy (developed in the observation-orientation segment of the loop). The government must understand what it is seeing before it decides what to do. To date, network-centric concepts have focused on shortening the sensor-to-shooter step (Boyd’s decision-action segment). Now, we must focus on improving the quality of the observe-orient segment. Even more important, the OODA loop expands to track not just our enemy’s reaction, but how the entire environment is reacting—the people, the host-nation government, our allies, our forces, even our own population.

Attacking the Network

Because effective offensive operations in a counterinsurgency are based on protecting the people, direct action against insurgent fighters is secondary; nevertheless, such action remains a necessary part of the overall campaign plan. Once we understand the insurgent network or major segments of it, we can attack elements of it. We should only attack, however, if our attacks support our efforts to provide security for the people. If

there is a strong likelihood of collateral damage, we should not attack because collateral damage, by definition, lessens the people's security. In addition, the fundamental rules for attacking a network are different from those used when attacking a more conventional enemy. First, in counterinsurgency it is better to exploit a known node than attack it. Second, if you have to attack, the best attack is a soft one designed to introduce distrust into the network. Third, if you must make a hard attack, conduct simultaneous attacks on related links, or else the attack will have little effect. Finally, after the attack, increase surveillance to see how the insurgency tries to communicate around or repair the damage. As they are reaching out to establish new contacts, the new nodes will be most visible.

Information Campaign

An integral part of counterinsurgency is an effective information campaign. It must have multiple targets (the host-country population, U.S. population, international community, insurgents and their supporters); it must be integrated into all aspects of the overall campaign; and it can only be effective if it is based on the truth—spin will eventually be discovered, and the government will be hard-pressed to recover its credibility.

Furthermore, our actions speak so loudly that they drown out our words. When we claim we stand for justice, but then hold no senior personnel responsible for torture, we invalidate our message and alienate our audience. Fortunately, positive actions work, too. The tsunami and earthquake relief efforts in 2004 and 2005 had a huge effect on our target audiences. Consequently, our information campaign must be based on getting information about our good actions out. Conversely, our actions must live up to our rhetoric.

To study a highly effective information campaign, I recommend looking at the one conducted by the Palestinians during Intifada I. A detailed examination of how and why it was so successful can be found in *Intifada*, by Schiff and Ya'ari.¹¹

Summary

Today's counterinsurgency warfare involves a competition between human networks—ours and theirs. To understand their networks, we must understand the networks' preexisting links and the cultural and historical context of the society. We also have to understand not just the insurgent's network, but those of the host-nation government, its people, our coalition partners, NGOs, and, of course, our own.

Counterinsurgency is completely different from insurgency. Rather than focusing on fighting, strategy must focus on establishing good governance by strengthening key friendly nodes while weakening the enemy's. In Iraq, we must get the mass of the population on our side. Good governance is founded on providing effective security for the people and giving them hope for their future; it is not based on killing insurgents and terrorists. To provide that security, we must be able to visualize the fight between and within the human networks involved. Only then can we develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents. **MR**

NOTES

1. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc, 1990), 13.

2. Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Armed Force and Modern Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare 1900-1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 8.

3. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), xi.

4. Thomas L. Friedman, "A Poverty of Dignity and a Wealth of Rage," *New York Times*, 15 July 2005, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/opinion/15friedman.html?ex=1279080000&en=881732206e2082d5&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&mc=rss>>, accessed 7 July 2006.

5. John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 71.

6. Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, *Linked: The New Science of Networks* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002). See also Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 2003).

7. Mark Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

8. Used by the British in Malaya, the white-grey-black scheme is a corollary of the clear-hold-build strategy now in use in Iraq. White areas were those declared completely cleared of insurgents and ready for reconstruction and democratic initiatives. Grey areas were in dispute, with counterinsurgents and insurgents vying actively for the upper hand. Black areas were insurgent-controlled and mostly left alone pending the reallocation of government resources from other areas. See Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Vietnam and Malaya* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), Chapter 10.

9. Thompson, 55.

10. COL John Boyd articulated the OODA loop concept in a lengthy slide presentation. For a discussion of the OODA loop and other Boyd theories, see "Boyd and Military Strategy," <www.d-n-i.net/second_level/boyd_military.htm>, accessed 10 July 2006.

11. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, March 1990).

Responding to Bolivian Democracy: Avoiding the Mistakes of Early U.S. Cuban Policy

Waltraud Queiser Morales, Ph.D.

FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS, U.S. Government policy has been to promote democracy in Latin America. The election of Evo Morales as president of Bolivia is perhaps the strongest evidence to date that countries on the Andean Ridge are achieving that often-stated policy goal. By all accounts, Morales's election gave him the first true public mandate in Bolivia's history. But Morales's platform, even since taking office, has included anti-foreign and anti-U.S. commitments that have disconcerted some U.S. policymakers (and to some extent European and Latin American policymakers as well). In turn, these policymakers have declared Morales a threat. That kind of reaction is premature, however, and could undermine long-term U.S. policies concerning human rights and democratic values.

The purpose of this essay is threefold: first, to consider whether failed U.S. relations with revolutionary and reformist regimes in the past, especially with Castro's Cuba, offer any lessons for building an effective U.S. policy toward the new Morales government; second, to analyze the key aspects of Bolivia's current social, political, and economic situation; and third, to evaluate the validity of North American concerns.

The U.S. and Latin American Revolutionary Movements

Revolutionary movements in Latin America have been especially challenging to U.S. interests. Overall, the United States has been inconsistent in its approach to these movements and often unfaithful to its own stated policies or to the humanitarian and democratic values that supposedly underpin its policies.¹

U.S. policies toward revolutionary change in the hemisphere (and in other parts of the world) have been shaped by three factors: consideration of larger strategic concerns in other regions of the world, especially fear of global threats and Great Power rivalries; ideological and moral imperatives such as anticommunism and democratic enlargement; and protection of the economic interests of the private sector and the free market.²

As a result, in almost all of Latin America's major revolutions (Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, and Nicaragua—Bolivia in 1952 being the one exception), the United States treated revolutionary change as a threat to its interests. It believed such change would have an adverse impact on U.S. investors and would decrease U.S. political influence because new governments would adopt "more independent domestic and foreign policies and . . . [would be] less likely to conform to U.S. policies."³

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Secretary-General Kofi Annan shakes hands with Evo Morales Aima, President of Bolivia, in Vienna, Austria, 12 May 2006.

To be fair, in the cold war setting of the era, U.S. policy largely hinged on genuine security concerns associated with the Great Power rivalry pitting Western democracies against nations aligned with the communist Soviet Union and Maoist China. However, legitimate concerns about Latin America often degenerated into a single-minded obsession with anticommunism, an obsession that viewed popular revolutionary movements with suspicion and as little more than Soviet and Communist Chinese surrogates. U.S. policymakers justified subversive actions and militaristic confrontations with revolutionary regimes throughout the region, including those in Guatemala and Cuba, by citing the need to stem communism.

One such intervention occurred in Guatemala in 1954, when a CIA paramilitary operation overthrew the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz. As its codename suggests, Operation Success was initially viewed as a political victory. But it was a success only in the most mechanistic, superficial sense, and only for the short term.⁴ In its aftermath, Guatemala descended into 30 years of authoritarianism, civil war, and ultimately ethnic genocide that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. The Guatemala case can hardly be considered a long-term success when viewed against the standard of human rights values upon which America was founded. In fact, only relatively recently has something like a democracy appeared in Guatemala. Simmering bitterness and the legacy of political violence unleashed in the 1950s have long scarred the country's political process.

The U.S. and Castro

Similarly heavy-handed and short-sighted U.S. policies toward Cuba needlessly forced Fidel Castro to align Cuba with the Soviet bloc in the interest of regime survival. Subsequently, all the consequences of cold war confrontation followed, to include a near nuclear catastrophe.

From the outset of the 1959 Cuban revolution, U.S. policymakers and intelligence experts assessed Castro as a figure with potentially great influence in the region because of his powerful, charismatic personality. In fact, early U.S. assessments expressed cautious but open admiration for Castro. A 1959 CIA memorandum described Castro as “a new spiritual leader of Latin American democratic and anti-dictator forces.”⁵

As a result, U.S. policymakers initially pursued a primarily passive “policy of forbearance” toward Castro. Experts at the time believed Castro’s objectives for his new regime were vague, and that, rather than working from a blueprint, the regime was developing through a process of “day-to-day accretion.”⁶ Indeed, Castro later admitted that “his early political ideas were not truly Marxist and his position in coming to power was still somewhat ‘idealistic’ and ‘utopian.’”⁷ The U.S.’s first response was therefore quite favorable: It promptly recognized the new government and dispatched a more sympathetic ambassador to Cuba.⁸

For the first few months Castro followed a basically reformist program. Significantly, there were no anti-U.S. comments, and he promised to respect Cuba’s 1940 constitution and forego expropriation of private property, especially U.S. assets, which were substantial.⁹ Soon, though, in apparent response to the consequences of U.S. policy elsewhere in the region and because of the lessons of Arbenz’s overthrow in Guatemala, Castro began to publicly assert that if Cuba’s revolution were to survive, it “could not afford the luxury of the democratic process.”¹⁰

U.S. assessments turned to suspicion as Castro began to act independently, with defiance toward the United States and criticism of its perceived involvement in Cuba’s internal economy and political affairs. U.S. policymakers were also dismayed by Castro’s growing cult of personality and the example Cuba’s revolution set as it rapidly gained influence throughout the region. When Castro visited Venezuela in

March 1959, the CIA station chief in Caracas said, “It seemed to me that something like a chain reaction was occurring all over Latin America after Castro came to power . . . a new and powerful force was at work in the hemisphere. It had to be dealt with.”¹¹ U.S. officials at the time appeared as much or more alarmed by Castro’s caudillo-like leadership style than by his Marxist tendencies or any early contact he might be having with Moscow and Peking.¹²

In short order, Castro’s program to neutralize political opponents and consolidate power in his own hands aroused the U.S. Government’s ire and enmity. The United States had exerted overriding influence over Cuba’s political and economic affairs since 1898, and moves to nationalize certain economic assets, along with Havana’s increasing flirtation with Moscow, sounded alarm bells in Washington. However, what seemed to antagonize President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s government most was “Castro’s open and belligerent defiance of U.S. political primacy in the hemisphere.”¹³

In retrospect, U.S. policymakers failed to understand that Castro’s actions addressed legitimate, popular concerns about Cuba’s political and economic sovereignty. They were also blind to the fact that Castro’s regime was utterly dependent on aid from an outside sponsor to ensure its stability and survival. The blunt, intimidating U.S. policy of threats and economic reprisal that followed only made Castro and his followers more intransigent toward the United States and more susceptible to the overtures of other Great Powers. Among the latter, the only viable and willing sponsor was the Soviet Union, which was actively seeking ways to increase its influence.

As a consequence, according to then-U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Philip W. Bonsal (who had been reassigned from Bolivia), the high-handed, clumsy U.S. response succeeded in “driving the Soviet Union into Castro’s arms.”¹⁴ With Latin American analyst Cole Blasier, Bonsal has also suggested that the U.S. decision to cut its sugar quota

(so vital to the Cuban economy) and arm an exile force gave Castro an excuse to do what he had been unable or reluctant to do: break with the United States. In Bonsal’s words, the United States was “unwisely cooperative in removing the obstacles to” Castro’s turn to the Soviets.¹⁵ Blasier concludes that “the effects of U.S. policies toward Cuba were diametrically opposite to their purposes, and . . . appear to have been totally self-defeating.”¹⁶

The situation began to unravel after March 1960, when Eisenhower gave the CIA the green light to organize and train a counterrevolutionary force.¹⁷ Up to that point, and perhaps as late as 16 April 1961—the day Castro declared the Cuban revolution to be “socialist”—Castro’s policies might still have been moderated and U.S.-Cuba relations normalized.¹⁸ The next day, however, the CIA launched the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and after that things went entirely wrong.



Fidel Castro speaks with members of Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces from his base in Jaguey, Cuba, during the Bay of Pigs invasion, April 1961.

Because the United States failed to appreciate Castro's nationalist and humanist-socialist goals, and instead adopted policies aimed at humiliating and isolating his regime, Cuba was converted into a principal conduit for Soviet influence in Latin America. In the end, Castro's revolutionary agenda would transform Cuban society for the worse (at least as far as the economy and democracy are concerned) and bitterly sour U.S.-Cuba relations up to the present day.

Lessons Learned: Guatemala and Cuba

Guatemala and Cuba provide a foreign policy lesson: Both regimes might have been influenced and moderated through normalized U.S. relations with less damage to democratic development and human lives. In particular, the eventual U.S. response to the Cuban revolution—the Bay of Pigs—was “one of those rare events in history—a perfect failure,” which actually succeeded in consolidating Castro's authoritarian regime internally and enhancing his international image.¹⁹ At the same time, it tarnished the U.S. image in the hemisphere and beyond.

These cases also highlight the moral question of whether it is proper for the United States to roll back a country's revolution or radical reforms, especially popularly supported democratic reforms, as in the cases of Arbenz in Guatemala, Salvador Allende in Chile, and Morales in Bolivia today. For the United States, all these cases (Cuba too) suggest an important lesson: The most effective way to encourage democratic and socioeconomic change in a revolutionary or reformist government and to improve long-term regional stability is to compromise and engage constructively with those governments. Otherwise, U.S. conflicts with such governments turn into confrontations that challenge a people's right to determine their own political destiny—and that is an unwise approach in an age when U.S. policy ostensibly aims at democratic expansion. This lesson is especially important as the United States attempts to define its relations with Morales in Bolivia.

Lessons of Cuba Applied to Bolivia

Morales's election affirmed the Bolivian people's clear preference for democratic solutions and under-

lined the resilience of Bolivian state institutions.²⁰ History and previous foreign policy misadventures suggest that the foremost goal of U.S. policy in Bolivia—and in all of Latin America—should be to facilitate representative institutions and respect democratic governments, even if they seem to impinge on American interests.²¹ Washington's response to Morales must be measured and constructive, and not overreact to the anti-American and anti-imperialist rhetoric that he uses to rally his constituency. Policymakers should consider the confused U.S. policy response to Castro in 1959 as instructive for today.

Early U.S.-Cuba relations suggest several cautions for current and future U.S.-Bolivia relations. First, this is a critical time to influence relations with the Morales government. Morales's policies are not fully defined and are idealistic and utopian, just as Castro's were in 1959. Second, Morales's anti-American posture is not sustainable without third-party assistance. Although an earlier Bolivian revolutionary government (1952) did not have a viable third-party option as Castro did in 1960, Morales clearly does today: He is capitalizing on his close alliances with Castro and Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. Indeed, Bolivia is for Venezuela what Cuba was for the Soviet Union—a strategic place to showcase its influence and counter U.S. goals.²² The majority of Bolivians live in extreme poverty and are not interested in ideology or geopolitics; they welcome Venezuelan and Cuban economic assistance. Moreover, Bolivia's already anti-American climate amplifies high-profile “civic action” and humanitarian assistance by Caracas and Havana.²³

The pragmatic response to Morales's approach to Chávez might be for the United States to increase rather than decrease economic assistance to Bolivia; in effect, the United States could supplant Venezuela and become Bolivia's third-party sponsor. To do so, it will have to de-link aid as much as possible from “conditionality,” whether that concerns Washington consensus models or coca leaf eradication and the drug war.

Bolivia's struggle for economic development can be assisted (or impeded) by effective globalization and the U.S.'s support. U.S. aid, trade agreements, and tariff arrangements should not be contingent on strict “Washington consensus” economic policies;

North American policymakers must appreciate the importance and viability of alternative socialist and hybrid development models. Many Bolivians (especially the majority indigenous peoples and communities) oppose “privatization” and the neoliberal policies that betrayed the spirit of the 1952 revolution to benefit elites and foreign investors. Opposition to neoliberalism has fueled popular rebellion against previous presidents. U.S. policymakers must see that significant backsliding by Morales on this issue will impede his government’s democratic development and stability. The United States should remain flexible regarding “nationalization” of Bolivia’s energy sector and help the nation develop its last major resource efficiently and justly. Bolivia’s 2003 “Gas War” and a 2004 referendum confirmed overwhelming support for a new gas law.²⁴ Morales’s May 2006 decree “nationalizing” the gas industry represents the culmination of this process and is central to his continued credibility and popular support.

In addition to resisting the urge to make aid conditional, the United States must also rethink how it apportions that aid. Over the last 2 decades, the bulk of U.S. funds spent in Bolivia have gone to coca leaf eradication, militarization of the Andean “drug war,” alternative crop development, and attempts to shore up Bolivia’s weak criminal justice system. Instead, aid should emphasize local economic and human development and people-to-people interaction (like the medical and educational assistance provided by Cuba and Venezuela). Despite some \$1 billion in U.S. foreign aid to Bolivia since the nation’s return to democracy in 1985, about \$100 million annually in U.S. aid is either invisible to the people or dismissed (and even resented) as self-serving and manipulative.

No single issue—such as the U.S. anti-drug policy—should dominate U.S. policy with Bolivia. An obsession with coca production will only embitter U.S.-Bolivia relations at the expense of long-term U.S. national security interests. Current Andean drug war policies have failed to reduce the



Compensation for Bolivian farmers in the Chapare, who were given \$2,500 per hectare to voluntarily manually eradicate their fields, has been ended. Fields planted after 1988 are now subject to forced eradication without compensation. Bolivia intends to eliminate all “excess” coca by the year 2002 under its 5-year plan.

supply of illicit drugs and caused collateral damage in Bolivia and the region.²⁵ Much like the economic sanctions against Cuba, U.S. counterdrug policy in Bolivia has been inflexible and self-defeating. Pressure to meet counterdrug targets has had a destabilizing effect economically and politically, contributing to the fall of previous Bolivian governments.²⁶ Coca eradication is a bone of contention between the Bush and Morales administrations. Rather than emphasize eradication and forcible crop reduction, the United States should seriously consider the alternative uses of coca leaf and their commercialization—a plan that Morales (like previous Bolivian presidents) has proposed. Bolivian coca farmers are not “narcofarmers” or linked to global terrorist networks. Defining the Bolivian drug problem as a terrorist threat will only complicate its resolution and contribute to instability. Coca growers primarily seek a viable economic livelihood; therefore, sustainable development and economic growth will address the country’s drug trafficking problem at its root.²⁷

Production of coca leaf is not only an economic issue, but also a cultural one: Ironically, because of U.S. opposition the leaf is an especially potent symbol of ethnic identity, national pride, and anti-imperialist (read anti-U.S.) defiance. Approaches to it need to take this into account.

Seeing Things As They Are

The world outside the United States almost universally views Morales's election as a historic victory for democracy, Indian rights, and global indigenous populism. Morales promotes popular causes and promises radical change. He is a man of the people, not a member of Bolivia's educated economic elite, and he has been chosen by the majority of the people in one of the fairest elections in the country's history. Self-made, informally educated, and with limited political experience, he ran for congress in 1997 and won, receiving one of the highest votes of confidence in this election as well. His cabinet today is representative of all of Bolivia, not just its political class. Many of his ministers are university-educated radicals and leaders of the country's indigenous, labor, peasant, and social movements, not professional politicians. Several are women, and others are Indian. As Bolivia's first president of a radical labor-peasant movement (sindicalismo), Morales might also become Bolivia's first elected socialist president.

Long before assuming the presidency, Morales led the Coca Growers Federation. In that role, he revived labor-peasant militancy and radicalism and brought the movement to national prominence. Only months after assuming the presidency, Morales was reelected as head of the federation, making him simultaneously the leader of a national peasant union and the country. While this poses a potential conflict of interest, it might also give Morales great leverage to moderate the coca growers' demands and influence them politically. This affinity might help his government fulfill its electoral promises and reforms within the rule of law and constitutional legitimacy—in other words, by democratic means. After 7 presidents in 6 years, Bolivia's people are desperate for political stability and democratic continuity.

It is unclear to what extent Morales and his political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo) will implement actual socialist principles of political economy in Bolivia. Although he favors the typical anti-imperialist, anti-globalization rhetoric, Morales is not a dogmatic Marxist; he is a pragmatist whose ideological orientation is more indigenous and communitarian. Moreover, he has pledged to govern justly, not according to Marxist-Leninist dogma, but according to ancient

Aymara-Quechua ethical principles: "Don't be lazy, do not steal, do not cheat, and do not lie." Some of Morales's closest advisers and ministers, like Andrés Solíz Rada, the Minister of Hydrocarbons, are Marxist and anti-globalist, but Morales is following a more pragmatic path to reform. How long he continues with this approach might depend in large measure on the U.S. and international response to his government and its policies.

The most effective way to encourage democratic and socioeconomic change in a revolutionary or reformist government and to improve long-term regional stability is to compromise and engage constructively with those governments.

Nationalization: A Litmus Test?

Policymakers have often associated nationalization with leftist and Marxist regimes. Cuba's expropriation of U.S. properties chilled its relations with the U.S. and has remained a major stumbling block to normalization. Therefore, Morales's 2006 May Day "surprise" announcing the "nationalization" of Bolivia's oil and gas sector and the military "occupation" of foreign operations raised negative associations and policy responses in Washington. However, the decree suggests that moderation rather than radicalism might be Morales's style. Indeed, the action was not really a surprise, a nationalization, or an occupation. During his electoral campaign and post-inaugural international junket, Morales frequently alluded to his intention to nationalize the country's energy resources (while also promising to respect private property rights). Moreover, 80 percent of the voters in the 2004 referendum had supported nationalization, and when Morales's predecessor, President Carlos Mesa Gisbert, failed to follow through, it precipitated his early departure. In this context, Morales's nationalization was "nothing but the long needed and awaited contract-renegotiation

under a populist guise.”²⁸ Thanks to this “renegotiation,” the state increased its share of production in the largest concessions from some 18 percent to 82 percent. The move is projected to more than double the revenue from the energy sector.

While the government increased its share of the energy take by 350%, Morales’s move didn’t really nationalize the industry; rather, it was “a symbolic nationalization” that served to defuse the nationalization agenda and boost Morales’s popularity rating, which had fallen (but never fell lower than 65 percent) in the months after he took office.²⁹ The decree was also a strategic move to influence voting for the Constituent Assembly elections then underway, and to shore up support for Morales’s party.³⁰ Citizen reaction to the decree indicated that most Bolivians—even those who did not vote for Morales and generally oppose his policies—supported “nationalization.” Although U.S. private property will not be greatly affected, the decree concerned U.S. policymakers, since respect for private property has long been a U.S. litmus test for Latin American governments. Bolivian policymakers might have learned from the Cuban case and remained largely noncommittal in their public responses to U.S. reactions.

Much of the U.S.’s concern about Morales has focused on the growing role in Bolivia of Venezuela’s Chávez, who applauded Morales’s “nationalization” decree as “historic.” It is no secret that Morales counts Chávez, along with Ernesto “Ché” Guevara and Fidel Castro, as one of his heroes. Pretty clearly, Morales’s political roots, like Chávez’s, lie in social revolutions in Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and, of course, Bolivia’s earlier revolution. Unlike his Venezuelan mentor, however, Morales has strong democratic credentials and credibility.³¹ Morales and the MAS were swept into power by an unprecedented democratic, populist landslide. After decades of run-off elections in which major presidential candidates failed to achieve an absolute majority in the first round of balloting, Morales won 54 percent of the vote, clearly a popular mandate. That mandate was for change, inclusion (especially of the poor and indigenous groups), economic development, and social justice; in short, it was for meaningful, effective democracy.

Morales’s election was also a mandate to reassert national sovereignty and autonomy over Bolivia’s

domestic policies, including coca leaf production, economic development, natural resources, and foreign relations. It stands to follow that, given the tremendous U.S. influence in all of these areas historically, and especially since 1952, Morales’s mandate implies greater autonomy from Washington. The U.S. foreign policy challenge will be how to assist Bolivia’s democratic development while encouraging Morales to pursue an independent democratic path, one that does not depend on Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution and its largesse.³²

In the past, the U.S. confronted governments that pursued independent policies of which it disapproved. Bolivia, though, has been an interesting and somewhat anomalous case. Unlike elsewhere, U.S. policy toward Bolivia’s revolutionary government in 1952 and its democratic successors was constructive and supportive; it became the basis for more than a decade of close, cooperative relations.³³

Democratic vs. Revolutionary Change

The 2005 Morales election can be a watershed event for democracy in Bolivia and Latin America and can help remake the U.S. image in the hemisphere. Historically, the Monroe Doctrine—a containment policy—and emphasis on security and hegemony at the expense of popular democracy has proved damaging to U.S. principles and credibility. The human rights interlude of President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s was meant to rehabilitate American foreign policy, much as President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933 Good Neighbor Policy rehabilitated the Monroe Doctrine by renouncing intervention; however, in response to the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and civil wars elsewhere in Central America, the United States refocused its policy on containment and counterinsurgency. As a consequence, for more than a decade the region’s democratic development was sacrificed for short-term national security interests.

Today, the United States has an opportunity to help make Bolivia a model of successful democratic development and consolidation. Rather than react emotionally and precipitously to the Morales election, as the United States did to Castro’s revolution, a more constructive, collaborative engagement with the Morales government will better advance Bolivian and U.S. policy interests in the long run. **MR**

NOTES

1. Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976). Published over 30 years ago, Blasier's might have been the first comparative analysis of U.S. responses to revolutionary change. The study includes the failed Guatemalan reforms of 1954, but predates the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution. Many of his observations could be applied here as well.

2. *Ibid.*, 232.

3. *Ibid.*, 211.

4. Peter Kornbluh, ed., *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 8. See also Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982); Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

5. Kornbluh, 6.

6. Blasier, 182.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, 179. Also Philip W. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the U.S.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).

9. *Ibid.*, 179; see 183 for figures on the U.S.'s intimate trade and investment relations with Cuba. For similar and varying interpretations, see Wayne S. Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations since 1957* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), 43; Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Richard E. Welch Jr., *Response to Revolution: The U.S. and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

10. *Ibid.*, 185.

11. Kornbluh, 7.

12. *Ibid.*, 6. See also Anatoly Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

13. Blasier, 194. See also Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Paterson argues that U.S. officials were more worried about Castro's "Third World neutralist posture" and his aspirations "to become a hemispheric if not global anti-imperialist leader," a kind of Caribbean Nasser, 257. Paterson quotes a State Department officer who felt the United States should not "give in to Castro" or "we would get kicked around in the hemisphere," 255.

14. Quoted in Blasier, 198. See also Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). Domínguez does not believe that the United States pushed Castro into the arms of the Soviets.

15. Blasier, 208. Also Welch, 10 and 26. Paterson quotes Ambassador Bonsal as saying that "Russia came to Castro's rescue only after the United States had taken steps designed to overthrow him," 258.

16. Blasier, 205. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced at the time that the Monroe Doctrine was dead and that "Castro will have to gravitate to us like an iron filing to a magnet." Khrushchev quoted in Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 105.

17. Blasier, 190-91. Also see Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987).

18. Blasier, 200.

19. Historian Theodore Draper, cited in Kornbluh, 2-3.

20. Mark Falcoff, "The Last Days of Bolivia?" American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (June), <www.aef.org>. For more see Kent Eaton, "Bolivia at the Crossroads: December 2005," *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 76-81; Ramiro

Orias Arredondo, "Bolivia: Democracy under Pressure," in Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, and Riordan Roett, eds., *The Andes in Focus: Security, Democracy and Economic Reform* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 45-65; and Waltraud Queiser Morales, *Bolivia: Land of Struggle* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

21. For example, the dispute with Bolivia and other Latin American governments that ratified the treaty of the International Criminal Court but refused to sign a protocol exempting American military members from the Court's jurisdiction when operating in the country might do more harm than good. The suspension of U.S. military training and assistance to Bolivia will harm important bilateral military relations and close a valuable avenue for cooperation.

22. For this interpretation as well, see Juan Forero, "U.S. Aid Can't Win Bolivia's Love as New Suitors Emerge," *The New York Times*, 14 May 2006, A4.

23. *Ibid.*

24. The 2003 Gas War was a series of protests mounted by indigenous people and labor against government policies in the gas industry that were perceived to cater to foreign energy companies. As such, it was only the latest instance of popular discontent over the way Bolivia's natural resources have been mishandled. During the "war," which unseated President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and sent him fleeing to Miami, government soldiers killed more than 60 protesters. The 2004 referendum was an attempt by Sanchez de Lozada's successor, President Carlos Mesa Gisbert, to quell the discontent over gas by asking Bolivians how they wanted the government to handle the gas industry. The referendum pointed toward nationalization, but fell short of soliciting it directly.

25. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). Youngers concludes that U.S. international drug-control policy has undermined democracy and democratic development in the region and notes areas of concern: "the expansion of the role of military forces in drug control efforts; inappropriate roles assigned to police forces; human rights violations; restrictions on civil liberties; the fostering of political instability; undermining local decisionmaking; lack of transparency and accountability; and abuses resulting from forced eradication of crops used in drug production," 342. Also Sewall H. Menzel, *Fire in the Andes: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996).

26. Waltraud Q. Morales, *A Brief History of Bolivia* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 230-234; and Youngers and Rosin, 350-351.

27. Youngers and Rosin, 352-53.

28. "Journal of Bolivian Business and Politics," Web Log of Jonathan Olguin, a Bolivian studying at Florida State University, <<http://b2bolivia.blogspot.com/>>.

29. *La Prensa*, La Paz, 3 May 2006, <www.laprensa.com.bo/hoy/especial/especial101.htm>.

30. The Constituent Assembly elections were in early July 2006. Morales's MAS party won more than half the seats, but it fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to authorize amendment of the constitution.

31. For example see, Javier Corrales, "Hugo Boss, How Chávez is Refashioning Dictatorship for a Democratic Age," *Foreign Policy* (January-February 2006): 32-40.

32. Coronel Max G. Manwaring, Ejército de los EE.UU., "El Nuevo Maestro del Ajedrez Mágico: El Verdadero Hugo Chávez y la Guerra Asimétrica," *Military Review Hispano-American* (January-February 2006): 17-29. Specifically, Coronel Manwaring asks: "¿Cuáles son las medidas más eficaces para apoyar un país que está bajo la mira del bolivarianismo para resistir este llamamiento revolucionario?"

33. See Kenneth D. Lehman, *Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999) and the contrasting view of Laurence Whitehead, *The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism* (London: Haslemere Group, 1969).

On Deck in the September-October **Military Review**

- ▶ LTG John R. Vines—*Operationalizing Battle Command*
- ▶ LTC Alfred E. Renzi—*Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence*
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- ▶ LTC Chris Gibson—*Translating Battlefield Victories into Strategic Success: The Path Forward in Iraq*

Full-Spectrum Analysis: A New Way of Thinking for a New World

Adrian Wolfberg

*We relied as usual on
our own Soviet experts.¹*

—Sherman Kent, commonly referred to as the “father of modern day intelligence analysis,” commenting in 1964 on some of the reasons why the U.S. intelligence community missed the deployment of Soviet missiles into Cuba.

*...actions we undertake
as individuals are closely
related to survival, more
importantly, survival on
our own terms.²*

—John Boyd, military strategist, commenting in 1976 on how we create mental models to understand the world.

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THIS ESSAY PROPOSES a new cognitive frame of reference for the intelligence community to use in thinking about the world. Such mental frameworks can be double-edged swords. We cannot think without them, but if they create an inadequate paradigm for useful thought, or if we use them uncritically or without appropriate adjustment to square with the prevailing realities of current circumstances, they hedge us into thinking in limiting ways that result in faulty conclusions. This article contends that the prevailing mental framework in the intelligence community is flawed in just this way and must be changed.

We in the intelligence community aren’t receiving the education and training we need to enable us to think effectively about the world’s current security environment. The way we have been taught to think is overly simplistic; in many ways it is disconnected from reality, a fact made all the more apparent by our recent failures to understand the behaviors and motivations of Middle Eastern peoples. Still operating under ways of thinking formulated during the cold war, we are tied to a cognitive framework that is no longer a useful construct; in fact, it is in many cases misleading and destructive.

To develop this discussion further, consider the way we thought about warfighting until just recently. Combat operations—in this case, regime change—were a series of linear events to be dealt with in turn, one after the other: first, pre-combat equipping and training; then combat operations; then actions aimed at providing essential services and promoting stability; then civil-military governance; and finally, establishment of economic pluralism. Underpinning this old, linear cognitive framework were assumptions about the propensities of adversaries who, we assumed, thought like we did about achieving social and political goals via war. We expected these adversaries to behave in a manner consistent with the Western conventions of war, in phased approaches, and in compliance with the conventions and rules of war. That our adversaries did not is not news. The non-state adversaries we face in Iraq and elsewhere do not think or behave in accordance with a framework based on assumptions about war’s conventions and rational conduct in conflict. As a result, our conceptual approach has proven ineffective.

Similarly, since 9/11, intelligence experts have been constantly surprised by adversaries who have been not only more ruthless and unpredictable in their actions than intelligence assessments previously forecast, but also more strategically adept than was thought possible. In short, our intelligence failed because the cognitive framework with which we operate did not allow for our adversaries’ irrational, blatant disregard for the established conventions of

war or for their street-smart adroitness at exploiting the media for strategic gains.³

We need to change the way we think if we want to succeed in this new kind of war. Those in the operational field have already begun doing so, and we in the intelligence community can follow their lead to improve our performance.

Moving Toward a New Approach

Currently, the concept of full-spectrum operations is being introduced (albeit painfully) into the warfighter community.⁴ This concept asserts that certain actions are required of the warfighter—not sequentially, as before but simultaneously—prior to, during, and after the unfolding of events associated with any particular conflict. Thus, the warfighter now operates along many lines at once and across a full spectrum of possible actions, either diplomatic, intelligence-driven, military, or economic in nature.

To address shortcomings in the intelligence community, this essay proposes that we move to “full-spectrum analysis,” the intelligence analog to full-spectrum operations. Full-spectrum analysis calls for the development of a mindset that recognizes the need to simultaneously deal with multiple intelligence challenges in an integrated fashion in support of a broad range of focused interests. This approach aims at creating intelligence synergy among disparate intelligence organizations and data banks to produce faster, deeper, more detailed analysis for customers.

Full-spectrum analysis is much more than just a convenient analog to its operational cousin. It is vitally needed to keep the intelligence community relevant and to ensure full-spectrum operations ultimately succeed.

Obsolescence in Action

Although the intelligence community lives and works in 2006, it largely operates—almost 5 years after 9/11—with a mental model of the world as it existed in 1985. In other words, the shared mental frameworks that developed our intelligence infrastructure in response to the cold war still influence our intellectual approaches to collecting and evaluating intelligence. In addition, we still use the same compartmented and stovepiped organizational design that distributed finished intelligence to consumers during the cold war. That such an obsolete mindset

and supporting structure persist post-9/11 testifies to the self-perpetuating nature of bureaucracies and should be a cause for concern, if not alarm, for those with a vested interest in intelligence products.

Hitting the snooze button. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should have served as a warning of what can happen when there is misalignment between how the intelligence community perceives reality and the hard reality of reality itself. Unfortunately, although the attacks should have stimulated immediate adjustments in many areas of the intelligence community, relatively little has actually been done. Movement to reapportion or retrain personnel to address the current Middle Eastern threat has been glacial; in fact, much of the intelligence community has resisted efforts to restructure national intelligence organizations to fit the realities of the current security environment.

A disingenuous apology. Some have claimed that the intelligence community should be excused for being largely surprised by a world security situation that moved almost instantaneously from the bipolar state-versus-state engagement of the cold war to a multiple, highly networked, asymmetric engagement with agile, flexible, often hidden networks of many types of non-state threats (figure 1). This excuse does not wash. The two broad types of threats—state versus state and non-state versus state—were widely recognized within the intelligence community well before 9/11. However, those who warned of the ascendancy of non-state threats to U.S. interests after the collapse of the Soviet Union were in the minority, and their views were largely discounted or ignored by the majority. Consequently, immediately prior to 9/11, more than a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union, most of our intelligence community’s attention and resources were still focused on prospects of interstate conflict in ways reminiscent of the cold war.

Comfortable blindness. This framework for seeing the world persisted primarily because it was what the intelligence community knew, what it had worked with for generations, and what it was most comfortable using. This mindset was so entrenched that even mounting attacks, including those against U.S. embassies in Africa and against the USS *Cole*, were largely dismissed by most of the intelligence community as little more than annoying, albeit tragic, anomalies.




Figure 1. Evolution of threats, cold war to Global War on Terrorism.

A good example of what's wrong with the old framework can be found in the current state of intelligence analysis. Because we still frame today through yesterday's lens, we are unable to identify significant trends. We simply do not have the right mental framework to tell us what is really going on. There does, however, seem to be general agreement within the intelligence community that, (1) we need to change the highly fragmented way we view the world, and (2) we must reorganize. In fact, it is time to break rice bowls, knock down stovepipes, and pull the disparate pieces of the intelligence community together. To begin this process in earnest, we first need to reframe how we think in a way that will lead to sweeping change in the intelligence culture.

Convergence of Focus

As we retool our thought processes, we need to admit two things: There has been a dramatic lessening of the likelihood of "normal" state-versus-state conflict and a corresponding increase in the likelihood of conflicts described under the rubric of "low intensity"; and there is a need to converge a broad spectrum of intelligence requirements on a flattening plane of policy concerns that now overlap in many different ways.

Obstacles to convergence. The primary obstacle to achieving intelligence convergence is lack of interagency cooperation. Although this shortcoming is widely understood in the intelligence community, there has been little real effort to make the adjust-

ments necessary to create a mindset and a culture that encourage habitual, substantive cooperation between intelligence agencies. Among the most commonly voiced remedies is that the intelligence community must become more integrated. It should, but merely voicing what ought to be done has resulted in little real action, perhaps because there are too many well-entrenched and politically protected fiefdoms in the intelligence community.

Cold war hangover. Perhaps the old adage of "what you see depends on where you sit" is a suitable metaphor for describing the highly divergent mindset our intelligence community inherited from the cold war. During that time, intelligence was regarded as a specialized commodity for discrete, often stovepiped, purposes. Intelligence organizations serving military decisionmakers focused primarily on acquiring data of purely military interest such as troop strengths, states of training, weapons systems capabilities, and analysis of enemy doctrine. Law enforcement officials asked for and got specialized intelligence on criminals and criminal syndicates. Diplomats and statesmen required intelligence of a completely different nature not formerly considered germane to the parochial operations of military and law-enforcement officials.

What must be done. In today's security environment, military, law, and government officials need much broader intelligence to deal effectively with non-state adversaries or with other national-security issues. Those who deal with the insurgency in Iraq require intelligence assessments that address not




Figure 2. A convergence of focus.

only adversary troop strengths, but also adversary associations with criminal networks and funding from criminal enterprises, as well as economic and cultural data explaining the non-state actor's relationship to populations potentially sympathetic to terrorist activities. The intelligence community must understand that intelligence requirements in the tactical-to-strategic continuum overlap and are, in fact, interdependent (figure 2). This understanding must shape the internal intelligence culture; it will promote the convergence of operations needed to produce integrated products for use by policymakers, operational commanders, and others dealing with national security.

To begin transforming itself, the intelligence community needs to instill through training and practice an ethos of integrated, collective effort. Two imperatives should drive transformation: the need to move the intelligence community along the continuum from fragmentation toward integration and the need to move from divergence to convergence in actual collection and processing. The first imperative emphasizes the requirement for connectivity among all sectors of interest within the intelligence community, while the latter stresses

the necessity of a broader focus on collating intelligence in more diverse categories of relationships.

Two Different Ways of Thinking

With these new intelligence imperatives in mind, how should we, the intelligence community, begin to prepare ourselves to think more effectively about our current world? Before showing how full-spectrum analysis might improve intelligence processes, we must first consider the nature of two different analytic processes: puzzle-solving and mystery-solving.

Puzzle-solving. Most of us in the intelligence community viewed the intelligence problems of the 20th century as a set of puzzles, each puzzle by nature having only one right answer. Thus, those who focused on the former Soviet Union and its allies tried to explain the world by filling out the parts of a sophisticated matrix possessing an internal logic of its own. The pieces included hard technological data and articulated behavior patterns based on our understanding of Soviet doctrine and other sources. Having a puzzle solver's mentality, we took it as an article of faith that if we could just collect enough data and observe enough samples of

all possible behavior, we would be able to fill in the puzzle blanks of the matrix to produce an accurate model of the Soviet menace, which we could then use with great surety to predict Soviet behavior. Eventually, we persuaded ourselves that we had conceived of virtually all possible scenarios and, by having observed a wide range of the pieces of the scenario, that we could effectively extrapolate a behavior that was underway or being planned. This was the puzzle approach we used in an attempt to understand the cold war world.

Unfortunately, great confidence in the model and the prognostications it generated did not enable anyone in the intelligence community to foresee the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union. What kept us from seeing clearly was a lack of healthy respect for the principle of uncertainty. Taking uncertainty into account—approaching a problem as a mystery and not as a puzzle—is at the heart of full-spectrum analysis (figure 3).

Mystery-solving. Why should we emphasize uncertainty so much that it drives how we approach our understanding of the world? John Boyd, an American military strategist best known for creating the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) Loop, provides insight.⁵ According to Boyd, the fundamental dynamic that motivates individual and group behavior is survival. Uncertainty results from recognizing the extraordinary complexity of human relations as people work with and against each other, both individually and in groups, each

individual being driven by his own perception of what it takes to ensure survival.⁶ For Boyd, how we compete against or cooperate with each other can be considered not as contradictory behaviors, but rather as techniques adapted to survive.⁷ As a result, it is not incongruous when we observe individuals competing on one level and cooperating on another, sometimes in very high stakes situations.

Human behavior should therefore be perceived as being multifaceted, not binary; moreover, we must recognize that the variables associated with behavior are so varied and complex that they might not reveal themselves until a threat of conflict arises. In Boyd's formulation, the world of human behavior is essentially a dynamic mystery, not a static puzzle.

The boundary-less environment. For the analyst, the notion of expanding our horizons and then focusing into a conclusion over an iterative process without being constrained by boundaries (analysis and synthesis) is the primary method for solving a mystery (figure 4).

When the analyst adopts a full-spectrum mindset, any initial question, whether self-generated or not, opens up a universe of possibilities. Some of these possibilities can be envisioned immediately, while others cannot; thus, an iterative approach of successive questioning and surmising is necessary. The next step is to come to an initial conclusion about the question. But the analyst should then expand and deepen the set of possibilities to question and refine




Figure 3. Approaching the world as a mystery (not a puzzle).




Figure 4. The new analytic process: iterative mystery-solving.

his analysis, eventually resulting in a refined deduction. At every step, he assesses his interim and final conclusions from multiple perspectives to ensure that he does not miss a less obvious interpretation.

In full-spectrum analysis, the analyst not only examines multiple, possibly interrelated intelligence problems simultaneously, but also considers contextual and influential factors that could affect the interim analysis of information and its interpretation. He constantly seeks to expand the intellectual box from which he draws his tentative conclusions. This step is not necessarily observed in the more static process employed to analyze puzzles in matrixed depictions of the world. In that approach, all assumptions about a problem or mission are built into the matrix at the start, thereby limiting the range of eventual deductions.

From All-Source to Full-Spectrum Analysis

How then do we do create useful intelligence products by solving mysteries while simultaneously avoiding the temptation to solve puzzles with matrixes? To help answer that question, we must quickly review the evolution of our current process, known as “all-source analysis.”

All-source analysis. Generally, all-source analysis is defined as “consideration of every type of

available information that helps in understanding a specific problem, recognizing that there has not been, nor will ever be, a single perfect piece of data that will reveal everything one wants to know about something.” All-source analysis requires drawing upon as many data sets or sources as one can to arrive at conclusions in a given time frame. That analysts actually use “all” available data sets is far from the reality, but it is a guiding ideal.

All-source analysis isn’t a new idea; it grew up in the cold war, when analysts used multiple sets of data collected from sensors and human sources. The data and the conclusions drawn from them were generally kept classified. The most well known of these data sources were SIGINT (signals intelligence—electronic and voice intercepts), IMINT (imagery intelligence), and HUMINT (human intelligence).

All-source analysis evolved into its current incarnation when it expanded to include other types of data, most prominently from unclassified or “open” sources such as public media (print, radio, television, the Internet), and data collected by private and public organizations.

All-source drawbacks. Although the expansion marked an improvement over specialized, stove-piped intelligence collection and analysis, contemporary all-source analysis was effectively shaped

and reinforced by the matrix mindset, to which it remains shackled. The matrix the intelligence community created using this process is the equivalent of linear combat operations among warfighters: It doesn't share the simultaneous multiple-actions mindset of full-spectrum operations. Therefore, intelligence analysis tends to be viewed within the community as a puzzle-solving process undertaken in a phased linear sequence. This mindset results in analysis that is relatively slow and not conducive to addressing multiple complex intelligence problems simultaneously.

Full-spectrum analysis. If we adopt Boyd's suggestion and view the world not as a puzzle but as a mystery, we need to move from all-source to full-spectrum analysis. The latter method is more comprehensive and better able to develop intelligence to meet the broad, interrelated requirements of the current security environment. The full-spectrum analytic approach begins by assuming that we cannot construct a meaningful matrix in the first place. It regards whatever conclusions are drawn at each step of data collection as suspect and considers all data to be pieces of a rapidly changing intelligence landscape. Conclusions are therefore permanently tentative and subject to repeated challenge and reexamination.

Broadening the analyst's mindset. Full-spectrum analysis avoids a mindset and methodology that approach intelligence as a linear sequence of puzzles to be solved. Having such a mindset compels the analyst to assume that he is looking for only one possible explanation, which he must find before moving on to the next puzzle. In full-spectrum analysis, the analyst assumes from the outset that there are multiple interrelated mysteries that must be solved simultaneously across a broad spectrum of intelligence requirements; he understands that the solution for each mystery might lie in many possible explanations or in overlapping pieces of explanations. Moreover, one must assume from the outset that for some of the mysteries being explored, no data for a plausible explanation may be available before the analyst has to produce conclusions needed for a decision.

The downside to full-spectrum analysis is greater risk due to the admission of large segments of uncertainty. The upside, however, is that full-spectrum analysis can create a broader intelligence picture

faster with data that has been repeatedly challenged and refined and is, hence, more reliable.

Implementing full-spectrum analysis. How do we move full-spectrum analysis from concept to practice? It is vitally important to conceptualize a problem or process anew, but it is quite another thing to design a learning strategy to implement the resulting product. The usual approach is to offer classes, but that's not a good short-term answer to changing the way we think and do business. Right now, with a war going on, our main challenge is to ensure that full-spectrum analysis is introduced, tested, and then applied by actual practitioners.

Make the Move Now

Some skeptics might assert that the intelligence community doesn't need to change, that the legacy mental framework for thinking about the world and the intelligence process will eventually identify the dynamics behind terrorism, much like we eventually understood, for the most part, the threat presented by the former Soviet Union. Put another way, what is now unknown will eventually be known given patience and enough time to organize ourselves.

Such an argument is untenable. We should never adopt passive "wait-and-see" complacency as an intelligence strategy. To the contrary, the intelligence community must actively pursue a better, more aggressive mental paradigm, one that facilitates a more assertive approach to providing analytical intelligence products that keep pace with the initiative intrinsic to full-spectrum operations.

Some warfighters might react to the proposals in this essay by saying, "It's about time for intelligence to come around." In response, it is useful to observe that full-spectrum operations have not been warmly received by all quarters of the warfighting community. Both full-spectrum operations and full-spectrum analysis will take a while to gain full currency.

For the intelligence community, the proposal laid out here is an invitation to test and experiment with full-spectrum analysis. Critical thinking is an essential ingredient in the practice of full-spectrum operations.⁸ It is equally vital for full-spectrum analysis. The intelligence community has long conceived itself to be an activity that supports the warfighter, but we need to move beyond that. We

need to forge a genuine partnership in the building of two full-spectrum concepts that should work in tandem. Creative thought can be a major venue where we interface, connecting and applying our best minds to the problems we all face. In contrast to our enemies, we currently do not do a terribly good job of connecting.

The initial conceptualization offered in this essay may not finally lead in the direction we eventually find we must go, but it does provide an initial tipping point for getting “unstuck.” **MR**

NOTES

1. Sherman Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived,” *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays* (CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994). This essay was initially published in *Studies in Intelligence*, V36:5-111-119 (Spring 1964), <www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/9crucial.html>, accessed 5 Nov 05.
2. John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” 3 September 1976, <www.bellisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/boyd/destruction/destruction_and_creation.htm>.
3. Those who have grown up with a linear conceptual framework have been very resistant to change; thus, linear thinking remains a deeply entrenched feature of American doctrine. See Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 4.
4. Chiarelli, 16.
5. Boyd.
6. Frans Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd* (The Netherlands: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2005), 3.
7. Boyd.
8. Chiarelli, 15.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

The Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is looking for an individual to fill the new **“Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair of Counterinsurgency.”** This position will be the focal point for the diffusion of counterinsurgency knowledge in the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and CAC. The chair-holder will interact with national and international governmental and private agencies and collaborate with the CGSC commandant, deputy commandant, school directors, staff and faculty, course and lesson authors, curriculum developers, and various CAC agencies in the development and delivery of instruction addressing counterinsurgency subject matter. He or she will serve as a professor, sit on thesis committees, and advise and assist student monograph development. The chair-holder will also provide recommendations on CAC’s and CGSC’s role in changing Army culture through experimentation and the creation and sharing of knowledge and experiences.

POSITION REQUIREMENTS:

Applicants should have a mastery of counterinsurgency concepts, theories, and studies; should possess a combination of academic and/or military experience in education at senior levels; must have an earned Ph.D. in a research discipline in the social sciences or the humanities; and will have a strong background in counterinsurgency studies. Operational counterinsurgency experience is a plus, but not required. Strong interpersonal and communications skills will be required to interact effectively with the elements of CGSC, CAC, and external audiences. Applicants should have proven teaching ability; demonstrated academic achievement, to include publication in the field; knowledge of national security issues; and have made active contributions in the on-going discussions on counterinsurgency. The successful candidate must hold or be eligible for a high-level security clearance.

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USAF Relevance in the 21st Century: A First-Quarter Team in a Four-Quarter Game



Major Andrew S. Kovich, U.S. Air Force

THE RISE IN TERRORISM perpetrated by non-state actors is a primary threat to U.S. national security. It also challenges the relevance of air and space power. Although the United States has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to achieve decisive effects using air and space power in conventional war, it has not mastered the use of these tools against terrorists and guerrillas.¹ Without the ability to perform decisively in all areas of the conflict spectrum, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) is like a football team that comes out scoring touchdowns in the first quarter only to lose its tremendous lead by the fourth. To become a four-quarter team, the USAF must address some fundamental challenges to the way it prefers to fight.²

When Americans think of war, they envision great battles and campaigns such as Gettysburg, Normandy, and Desert Storm. “Yet,” as retired General Anthony Zinni puts it, “the purpose of war is not battle at all. It is a more perfect *peace*.”³ Destroying the enemy’s army in battle is only a means to an end.⁴ In some cases, the phase following major combat operations is decisive, not the combat itself. According to the *Washington Post*’s reporter Dana Priest, in Iraq and Afghanistan “[w]e are now seeing that the hardest, longest, and most important work comes after the bombing stops, when rebuilding replaces destroying and consensus-building replaces precision strikes.”⁵

This is not a revelation. The majority of conflicts the United States has fought in its 200-plus-year history required more years of peaceful engagement post-hostilities than years of force application during hostilities. But because low-level conflicts or reconstruction operations are often characterized by a low threat to national survival and/or a smaller force commitment, military institutions often dismiss them as second-rate activities.

The current culture throughout the Department of Defense is still overly focused on “big war.” As military analyst Carl Builder has argued, “The dominant concepts of war held by military institutions have a significant effect upon the kinds of forces they acquire and train and, therefore, upon the kinds of wars they are prepared to fight.”⁶ Today’s U.S. military has been designed for, and prefers to focus on, fighting big interstate conflicts. From World War II through Operation Desert Storm, America built and refined a force to counter a peer or near-peer competitor. In the 1990s, despite being involved in numerous non-combat operations, U.S. Armed Forces continued to improve their warfighting capability by focusing on destroying the forces and/or leadership of enemy nation-states. This mindset meshed with the Caspar Weinberger/Colin Powell doctrine, which held that wars should be fought only for vital national interests, and then only with overwhelming

This article is a revision of a paper submitted to the Air Command and Staff College in 2005. The full paper is available at <<https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2005/acsc/4491%20-%20Kovich.pdf>>.

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force and clearly articulated objectives and exit strategies. Thus, the armed forces have tended to resist operations not related to combat.⁷

The Icarus Syndrome

The USAF has been at least as culpable as the other services, perhaps even more so, in resisting the change from pure combat operations to nation-building operations.

Traditionally, the USAF holds “flying and fighting” as its reason for being, and its “identity is based largely on its organizational and conceptual history and the primacy of the technology over warfighting theory. These lead to a culture in which small, often technology-based, subcultures flourish.”⁸ In this environment, bomber pilots (and later fighter pilots) became the senior leaders of the USAF. Under their control, Builder notes, the USAF has “identified itself with the air weapon, and rooted itself in a commitment to technological superiority. The dark side of this commitment is that it becomes transformed into an end in itself when aircraft or systems, rather than missions, become the primary focus. In fact, one’s identity in the Air Force is usually associated with a specific airplane rather than the institution or military art, with a resulting weaker sense of community than the other services.”⁹

Further, the USAF sees “war as science, not art, and is disposed to treat it as such. Despite using terminology stressing strategic effects, the service

still tends to focus on outputs (keeping score on targets) instead of on outcomes (the effects it seeks to achieve).”¹⁰

A transformed Air Force where by necessity airlifters, special ops pilots, or even non-rated officers could ascend to leadership of the service would also require a significant cultural change. Furthermore, while senior leaders may recognize the necessity to champion all capabilities where the service excels, they will find it difficult to see the USAF’s primary contribution being different from “flying and fighting.” Donald Mrozek’s description of gunship development during the Vietnam War illustrates the USAF’s parochial mindset: “Slower aircraft implied subordination to the ground effort and ground commanders; faster aircraft implied more autonomous air operations.... The challenge was to improve performance today without damaging doctrine and the service’s interests tomorrow.”¹¹

Effects of Icarus

The USAF’s preferred way of war has resulted in doctrine that limits the way its personnel view the contributions of their service. “Airpower doctrine has lagged behind fast-moving developments in the U.S. OOTW [Operations Other Than War] experience,” John Hillen writes.¹² Builder adds that although “we’re accustomed to seeing doctrine grow, evolve and mature, particularly where doctrine applies to what we care about—our traditional



U.S. Air Force

A B-2 Spirit bomber is followed by two F-117 Nighthawks during a mission. The B-2 is a multi-role bomber capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions.

roles and missions in the mainstream of the Air Force—we seem to have more difficulty...with nurturing doctrine off the mainstream roles and missions.”¹³

This is not a new problem for the USAF. In 1986, William Olsen described a problem with Air Force low-intensity conflict doctrine that still holds true today: “Tactical air doctrine and the attending force structure are designed for conventional wars against conventional enemies.... The use of high-speed, high-performance aircraft and heavy ordnance, like the indiscriminate use of long-range artillery, is counterproductive.... What are [sic] needed are slow planes that can be directed discriminately by ground observers who have an understanding of the situation. The air platform needs to be stable, tough, inexpensive, and easily maintained and operated in an austere environment.”¹⁴ Olsen clearly points to the bias toward hi-tech combat forces at the expense of capabilities needed in other parts of the conflict spectrum.

If most USAF efforts are geared toward conventional war doctrine, what is the result on doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)? Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, mentions MOOTW only in the context of the service’s ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict.¹⁵ Further, the document focuses on battle or supporting battle. A clear indication of this battle focus is that the document includes the principles of war but excludes MOOTW principles.¹⁶ The current AFDD 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*, does a better job describing how air and space power contribute to MOOTW missions; however, only 9 pages of AFDD 2 address conflict termination, peacetime engagement/crisis response, and deterrence/contingency actions.¹⁷

The only USAF doctrine document specifically focused on a MOOTW mission is AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.¹⁸ AFDD 2-3.1 provides more detailed guidance for conducting FID operations and identifies the air and space



U.S. Air Force

Airmen from the 36th Airlift Squadron and Combat Mobility Element unload supplies and equipment at Paya Lebar Air Base, Singapore, 1 June 2006. The C-130 Hercules mission brought humanitarian relief aid to Indonesia after an earthquake killed more than 6,200 people and injured thousands more.

power functions needed for FID. Chapters on planning and employment offer detail on the conduct of operations. Unfortunately, the detail included in AFDD 2-3.1 for FID has not been duplicated for any of the other MOOTW missions. Moreover, there is no USAF document that focuses on mindset creation and change, like the Marine Corps’s *Small Wars Manual*.¹⁹

The USAF does not do any better when it comes to educating its personnel about MOOTW. James Corum, former instructor at the USAF School for Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), indicts all the services, the USAF among them: “U.S. military schools are mired in curricula better suited for conventional war than the types of unconventional wars likely to be fought in the next decades. There is very little history, theory, or doctrine on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism taught in the U.S. military staff colleges today.”²⁰ The Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) currently provides a solid foundation in national security and strategy; however, that’s only part of the skill set USAF officers require to meet today’s challenges. In academic year 2004-2005 at the ACSC, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom examples were used primarily for their combat lessons learned. In many cases, these operations were discussed in the past tense and not as ongoing operations. The

“Strategy and War” and “Airpower” courses spent only one lesson each on small wars. The national security course used Bosnia as an example of coercive airpower rather than as a historical example of effective U.S. peacekeeping operations.

The SAASS appears to be doing better in educating MOOTW. Its students receive a 15-day course on low-intensity conflict as part of their year-long program. Unfortunately, SAASS only educates about 40 officers a year, and so has a limited effect on the MOOTW education of the force.

Pulling Icarus from the Sea

During the cold war, the USAF maintained numerous bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases in preparation to fight a nuclear war. When the Soviet threat evaporated, U.S. leaders chose to retain a limited nuclear capability as a hedge against a nuclear-armed opponent while the vast majority of the armed forces’ technology and organizational structure focused on conventional warfare. As a result, the USAF retained only three nuclear bomber bases and three ICBM bases. Just as the USAF realigned its nuclear and conventional force structure in favor of conventional forces, the service must now tailor its conventional forces for both major combat operations and MOOTW.

For the USAF to stay relevant in the 21st century, it must embrace both the flying and non-flying, the combat and non-combat contributions of air and space power. “[A]ir power,” Builder has argued, “must somehow be defined as more than force, airplanes, or pilots.... air power will require the projection of infrastructures such as security, medical care, communication, and transportation.”²¹

Fortunately, the Air Force will be able to meet the requirements of both missions, but only if it will allow much needed innovation to occur. Airlift, special operations, unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence capabilities, and space systems have been fielded; the challenge now is to leverage these capabilities to contribute to the overall fight. The USAF should also focus on the history of MOOTW with an eye toward creating new doctrine and educating the force. As Antulio Echevarria notes, “Military leaders must habituate themselves to thinking more thoroughly about how to turn combat successes into favorable strategic outcomes.”²² Education and training will enable that process.

Recommendations

In the 21st century, the contingency operation has become the USAF’s primary means of protecting and projecting U.S. national interests.²³ The service must drop its fixation on major combat operations and begin to take MOOTW seriously. It must identify needed changes in concepts, education, organizations, and capabilities, and then implement them expeditiously.

What the USAF needs most today is a theory of air and space power that includes all USAF disciplines and embraces a range of military operations. Based on strategic bombing, the current theory gives the service no room to grow as it transitions from conducting mostly air combat operations to doing mostly MOOTW. Robert Pape diagnoses the problem as follows: “The most important institutional interest of air forces is the maintenance of institutional independence and autonomy. Of the three main air combat missions—air superiority, tactical bombing, and strategic bombing—strategic



After supporting the Global War on Terror for 3 years, Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle number three (UAV-3) received its official homecoming when its wheels touched down at Edwards Air Force Base, CA, on 20 February 2006.

bombing serves this interest best because it is an inherently independent mission, requiring little coordination with other services.”²⁴ The challenge for the USAF, then, is to remake itself into a service that provides robust, joint-oriented capabilities across the range of military operations.

The latest USAF mission statement attempts to provide some needed new direction by declaring that “the mission of the USAF is to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.”²⁵ But while this new mission statement attempts to capture the full-spectrum requirements of the USAF, it still focuses the service on combat flying and a technological approach to warfare.

A better approach should include Robert Poyner’s view of a future USAF that “provides service to the Nation: *the application of long-range, short notice, strategic influence*” [emphasis in original]. For Poyner, “[m]any of the non-traditional taskings the Air Force has been involved in recently (humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peacemaking, counter-narcotics, and so forth) nestle quite well under the framework of projecting influence.”²⁶

Poyner suggests that the USAF “can apply many sophisticated tools of influence and utility—not just bombs and bullets—and can do so not just for the Air Force, but for all the military services and indeed, the Nation.”²⁷ The literature suggests that airlift; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and close air support are the most appropriate for projecting influence and contributing to the Global War on Terrorism. Yet the USAF still emphasizes major-combat capabilities. To make a stronger contribution to the Nation, the service must shift its focus to capabilities that can support special operations, military police forces, and civil affairs teams. There is no doubt the USAF has the technology to accomplish these new missions. Its challenge, rather, is to acknowledge that airlift, special operations, unmanned vehicles, space



An A-10 Thunderbolt II takes off on a combat mission as A-10 crew chiefs, weapons loaders, and an avionics specialist ready others for another mission. The A-10 was the first Air Force aircraft designed for close air support of ground forces.

U.S. Air Force

platforms, and information operations capabilities have become more critical to fighting terrorism than fighters or bombers.

Another step in the march to relevance would be to realign large conventional combat forces. Swapping combat air forces with air mobility assets from the National Guard or reserve units might be a viable course of action. Combat air forces will still be needed to provide a hedge, alongside nuclear forces, against a future peer competitor, and just as nuclear forces can increase their capability in a crisis, conventional forces will have to be flexible enough to surge for large conventional conflicts. Overall, though, the USAF should focus more on the war we are fighting today and less on nonexistent peer competitors and hypothetical future wars.

The USAF must also retool its professional military education (PME). PME should be aimed at teaching officers how to make intelligent decisions across the spectrum of conflict. USAF schools need to do a better job examining and teaching the history of U.S. experiences with constabulary, nation-building, and counterinsurgency operations. Educating USAF officers in MOOTW will one day provide a force that is organized, trained, and equipped to be as decisive in those operations as it is in major combat.

In the end, the effectiveness of the USAF in combating non-state terrorists will be tied to its ability to leverage the capabilities of the entire institution as it reorients to the current security reality. Only by

thinking in broader terms than fighter and bomber capabilities will the Air Force remain relevant.²⁸ Put another way, the Air Force fields a team that

can win the first quarter of a game handily, but the Nation—and the USAF itself—need a service that can be decisive in all four quarters.²⁹ **MR**

NOTES


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2005-2006 Writing Contest Winners

Combined Arms Center Commanding General's Special Topic Writing Competition: Countering Insurgencies

Military Review is pleased to announce the following winners of the Combined Arms Center Commanding General's Special Topic Writing Competition: Countering Insurgencies:

◀ **1st Place:** "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations," by LTC Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant and 1LT Eric D. Chewning - \$1,000

◀ **2d Place:** "Unit Immersion in Mosul: A Tactical Case Study for Establishing Stability in Transition," by MAJ Paul T. Stanton - \$500

◀ **3d Place:** "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': Learning Lessons from the British Experience in Northern Ireland," by Brian J. Jackson - \$250

◀ **4th Place:** "The Paradox of Logistics in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies," by LTC Marian E. Vlasak - \$250

We were gratified by the number and uniform high quality of the manuscripts received, and wish to commend all who submitted entries. We would also like to express our deep appreciation to our panel of expert judges:

Mr. Dale Andrade

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

LTC Jan S. Horvath

Dr. Thomas A. Marks

LTC John A. Nagl

Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

Dr. James H. Willbanks

These are nationally recognized authorities and published authors on counterinsurgency. We thank them for their hard work and the credibility they lent to the competition.

The 1st and 2nd place essays appear in the following pages. The 3rd and 4th place winners, along with other manuscripts singled out for having special merit, will be published in upcoming editions of *Military Review*.

The General William E. DePuy Writing Competition

The Combined Arms Center and *Military Review* are pleased to recognize the following winners of the 2006 General William E. DePuy Writing Competition:

◀ **1st Place:** "Hezbollah's Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980's: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic," by CPT Daniel Isaac Helmer - \$500

◀ **2d Place:** "Evolving U.S. National Security Policy—A Framework for Pre-emptive Strategy in the 21st Century," by MAJ Todd Schmidt - \$250

◀ **3d Place:** "Statistics, Real Estate, and the Principles of War: Why There is No Unified Theory of War," by Jan S. Breemer - \$250

An annual event, the DePuy competition is intended to stimulate original research on any topic of concern to the U.S. Army by providing incentive and recognition to those who desire to contribute meaningfully to the body of professional military literature. This year we received 29 entries.

We commend all those who submitted manuscripts. We would also like to express our deep appreciation to the following distinguished members of the CAC staff who spent hours evaluating and selecting manuscripts:

COL Kevin C. Benson

Mr. Gregory Fontenot

Dr. William Robertson

Dr. Lon R. Seglie

Mr. Denny Tighe

The 1st-place essay, "Hezbollah's Employment of Suicide Bombing during the 1980's: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic," by CPT Daniel Isaac Helmer, appears in the following pages. The other prize winners will be published in future editions of *Military Review*.

Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant, U.S. Army,
and First Lieutenant Eric D. Chewning, U.S. Army Reserve

Sunrise over Baghdad finds a maneuver battalion executing several missions. Two platoons are on patrol, one sweeping a main supply route for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the other escorting "Team Trash"—a dump truck and bucket loader—through a poor Shi'a neighborhood. A third platoon is still at the brigade detention facility in-processing several insurgents captured the previous night, while a fourth escorts the battalion medical platoon for a medical outreach in one of the battalion's assigned neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the battalion commander and a company commander prepare to attend a neighborhood council meeting; the executive officer updates the agenda for the weekly fusion-cell meeting; and the operations officer meets with the district police chief and an Iraqi Army representative to discuss security for an upcoming holiday. Shift change is taking place for both the American platoons and the Iraqi Security Forces guarding the U.S. forward operating base (FOB), and the American military liaison officer—an assistant operations officer—accompanies a squad-sized Iraqi patrol to clear the FOB's perimeter. The headquarters company commander and the battalion logistician are negotiating a local contract for a crane to help reposition barrier materials in the neighborhood to respond to an emerging threat. The battalion intelligence officer (S2) reads the previous night's patrol reports before meeting his Iraqi counterpart for tea at the FOB's civil-military operations center (CMOC). Later in the day, the civil affairs team leader and a company executive officer will join the assistant S2 and a local sheik at the CMOC to discuss the merits of a proposed reconstruction project. Finally, yet another platoon prepares to conduct a precision raid against an insurgent cell after dark, based on intelligence gathered from a walk-in informant and confirmed by a local cleric's security chief. So begins another day in Baghdad.

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Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant is the chief of plans of the 1st Cavalry Division and previously served as the operations officer for the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment in Baghdad, Najaf, Fallujah, and North Babil. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University and is a graduate of the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies.

OUR THESIS IS SIMPLE: The combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Only such a battalion—a blending of infantry, armor, engineers, and other branches, each retrained and employed as needed—can integrate all arms into full-spectrum operations at the tactical level.¹

Smaller conventional forces might develop excellent community relations, but they lack the robust staff and sufficient mass to fully exploit local relationships. Conversely, while brigades and divisions boast expanded analysis

BACKGROUND PHOTO: "Baghdad Sunrise," courtesy of CPT Danjel Bout, U.S. Army.

and control capabilities, they cannot develop the street-level rapport so critical for an effective COIN campaign. Unconventional forces are likewise no panacea because the expansion of Special Operations Command assets or the creation of stability and reconstruction or system-administration forces will not result in sustainable COIN strategies.² Recent experience in Iraq affirms previously forgotten lessons: “Winning the Peace” requires simultaneous execution along the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic operations.³ While political developments in Iraq and the United States might have moved past the point at which our suggested COIN solution would be optimal, we argue that the maneuver battalion should be the centerpiece of the Army’s future COIN campaigns. This paper examines why the maneuver battalion is the premier organization around which to build COIN doctrine, and it identifies current obstacles and future improvements to such a battalion-centric strategy.

Back to the Future

Upon returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we began to search older works on COIN, hoping to find hints of a larger framework in which to ground our observations. The work we both (independently) found indispensable was *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, a 1964 book by David Galula. Based on his firsthand knowledge of insurgencies in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, Galula derives numerous lessons, several of which reflected our own experiences.



U.S. Army

Children in Najaf display stickers with the MNCI-New Iraqi government slogan “Progress, Iraq, Prosperity”.

Galula's Lessons for COIN Operations

1. **Successful COIN operations require assistance from the community.**
2. **A static unit with responsibility for a specific area of responsibility is preferable to a mobile unit moving from area to area.**
3. **No one approach can defeat an insurgency.**
4. **The principle of unity of command is even more important in COIN than it is in conventional warfare.**
5. **Effective COIN requires a grid of embedded units.**

The first lesson is that successful COIN operations require assistance from the community. To earn such support, the counterinsurgent must sell the host-nation population on an idea. As Galula writes, “[O]n the eve of embarking on a major effort, the counterinsurgent faces what is probably the most difficult problem of the war: He has to arm himself with a competing cause.”⁴

To realize the cause—in Iraq’s case, liberal democracy and free-market capitalism—the counterinsurgent must develop the institutions responsible for its materialization. While the counterinsurgent must create, the insurgent need only destroy. Galula argues, “[T]he insurgent has really no cause at all; he is exploiting the counterinsurgent’s weakness and mistakes.”⁵

Herein lies a vexing problem: The Army fights and wins America’s battles through land dominance, not by establishing civic, security, and economic institutions in failed states. Such nation-building requires the strategic and operational application of national power (a subject well beyond the scope of this paper), but at the tactical level, COIN and nation-building tasks are the same: Both call for grassroots support and require Soldiers to win popular approval by solving practical problems: turning on electricity, keeping the streets safe,



Residents of Najaf celebrate the ending of the Madhi Militia uprising in Najaf, August 2004.

getting fathers and mothers to work and sons and daughters to school.⁶

Galula's second lesson is that a static unit with responsibility for a specific area of responsibility (AOR) is preferable to a mobile unit moving from area to area. While military planners like to task-organize and shift boundaries, these behaviors are antithetical to effective COIN. As Galula writes, "The static units are obviously those that know best the local situation, the population, the local problems; if a mistake is made, they are the ones who will bear the consequences. It follows that when a mobile unit is sent to operate temporarily in an area, it must come under the territorial command, even if the military commander of the area is the junior officer. In the same way as the U.S. ambassador is the boss of every U.S. organization operating in the country to which he is accredited, the territorial military commander must be the boss of all military forces operating in his area."⁷

Galula's third lesson is that no one approach can defeat an insurgency. To surrender any single line of operation, be it military, security, political, information, or economic, is to concede the overall fight: "[T]he expected result—final defeat of the insurgents—is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they all are essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero."⁸ Collectively, these operations impact each demographic in the AOR differently. Some groups require significant

kinetic coercion, while others benefit from less. It is the counterinsurgent, living among the population and working with local security forces and opinion-makers, who must integrate the operations to achieve the desired effect.

The fourth lesson is that the principle of unity of command is even more important in COIN than it is in conventional warfare. To haphazardly approach an insurgency guarantees defeat. One single headquarters must, within an area, synchronize security, physical and institutional reconstruction, and the information environment. Again, quoting Galula, "[M]ore than any other kind of warfare, counterinsurgency must respect the principle

of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end."⁹

Finally, we saw in Galula's work our own hard-learned experience that effective COIN requires a grid of embedded units, which we believe should be maneuver battalions. These battalions must be interlocked, must coordinate with each other—often across the boundaries of their parent brigades and divisions—and must see themselves as the ultimate authority in their respective AORs. The grid must encompass the entire nation to prevent the development of insurgent safe areas and to give the counterinsurgent a 10:1 or 20:1 ratio over the insurgent in every locality.¹⁰

Again we found ourselves relearning what Galula had discerned 40 years earlier: "The area will be divided into sectors and sub-sectors, each with its own static unit. The subdivision should be carried out down to the level of the basic unit of counterinsurgency warfare: the largest unit whose leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. This is the most important unit in counterinsurgency operations, the level where most of the practical problems arise, and in each case where the war is won or lost."¹¹

With our own experiences reinforced by this COIN classic, we began to examine just what it was about the maneuver battalion that had made it, in our observation, the key headquarters for a successful COIN campaign.

Maneuver Battalion Primacy

The current manifestation of COIN warfighting is a chimera of military, intelligence, and government agencies. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, maneuver units, Special Operations Forces, civil affairs specialists, psychological operations detachments, international development agencies, and intelligence and advisory elements all operate simultaneously along the same lines of operation without synchronizing effects among parallel units or commands. In violation of a basic COIN principle, this independence leaves no one person or unit completely responsible for COIN operations in a given community. At the local level, only the maneuver battalion can execute across the full spectrum of COIN tasks, harmonizing disparate units toward a common effect and capturing synergies that larger commands are unable to duplicate.

Combat and security operations. The maneuver battalion alone is capable of providing sustained security operations within a given community. Active security patrolling provides presence that deters or reduces violence by increasing the possible costs to criminals and insurgents.

The kinetic COIN fight mostly plays out at the squad and platoon levels. But COIN does not guarantee low intensity. As combat operations in Najaf and Fallujah in 2004 (inter alia) showed, counterinsurgent forces need to be able to transition to high-intensity conflict.¹² This show of force is the fundamental key in the information operation that sets the baseline for the maneuver battalion's success. By being the provider of security or, conversely, the implementer of targeted violence, and by being able to surge or reduce presence in various neighborhoods or around various structures, the



U.S. Army

With local national police and army units, a 1-5 CAV Bradley secures a traffic control point near the Imam Kadhum Mosque, March 2004.



U.S. Army

Soldiers of 1-5 CAV prepare to clear the Najaf Cemetery of Madhi Militia and weapons caches, August 2004.

maneuver commander begins with a certain core of political power in his AOR that no other force can duplicate.¹³

As Galula suggests, “[U]nits must be deployed where the population actually lives and not on positions deemed to possess a military value.”¹⁴ For the local people to feel secure and provide intelligence, they must have 24-hour access to the counterinsurgent force. Units with control over an AOR should live in that neighborhood; indeed, every part of an insurgent-plagued country needs to fall under a battalion’s control. Having a fortress mentality simply isolates the counterinsurgent from the fight.

Ideally, the maneuver battalion operates from a self-sustaining battalion-sized patrol base co-located with a local security-force headquarters. Such forward basing creates several positive outcomes. First, the counterinsurgent force projects power through its proximity to the community. Integration with the community creates obvious benefits for intelligence collection, information operations, reconstruction, and community outreach. Second, spreading units out creates fewer troop concentrations, thereby reducing the “Mega-FOB” rocket or mortar magnet. Third, several smaller, integrated battalion-sized bases reduce the outside-force footprint and enhance community relations. And lastly, a maneuver bat-

talion joined to a local police station or an indigenous army post not only visually and physically reinforces the counterinsurgent’s intent to assist the local government, but also aids his ability to shape new security organs and coordinate actions.

Training local forces. Traditionally, the training of indigenous security forces is a Special Forces mission. But when the operational scale jumps from providing support to a host country to rebuilding a host nation’s entire military, the conventional Army must get involved. Our security commitment to Iraq, for example, requires the creation of 10 light infantry divisions of some 160,000 Soldiers. Only the “big Army” has the resources to accomplish such an undertaking. As a result, maneuver

battalions are tasked to conduct training. Involving more than just putting an Iraqi face on task-force missions, the animation of new security institutions is critical to the Iraqi Government’s success and a U.S. exit strategy.

As seen in Iraq and Vietnam, new local security forces fight better when accompanied by their U.S. counterparts.¹⁵ Knowing they have the resources and experience of the U.S. Army right behind them, in a battalion they share space with, instills better morale, confidence, and discipline in newly organized forces. It also allows U.S. maneuver leaders to be better mentors and to identify local leaders willing to get the job done. Ultimately, local security forces make real and irreplaceable contributions.¹⁶ Indigenous troops act as de facto covert information collectors and subject-matter experts on local culture. They also are able to undertake sensitive site exploitation, like mosque raids, and act as a bridge between the counterinsurgent force and the community even as they set the conditions for an eventual exit strategy.

Economy and reconstruction. The United Nations Office of Project Services and International Labor Organization recommends the implementation of a local economic development (LED) approach for economic stimulation in conflict areas. This bottom-up method is preferred to centralized, top-down strategies because “the best



U.S. Army

Looking out for the small businessman, a 1-5 CAV patrol checks in on a local propane distributor.

knowledge regarding local problems, local needs, local resources, local development potential, as well as local motivation for promoting change, exists on the local level [and] it is of fundamental importance that the local community sees its place in the future.”¹⁷

Also stressing the importance of local economic actors, a World Bank report notes that “support for micro and small businesses is an appropriate early step in a post-conflict situation because these businesses are resilient and nimble, adapting quickly to new circumstances.”¹⁸

The maneuver battalion plays a central role in LED strategy during COIN operations. Optimally, not only does the battalion have its own reconstruction monies, but it also facilitates international development agency access to small businesses, trade unions, local governments, and entrepreneurs. The counterinsurgent, the community, and aid agencies all benefit from local coordination of the economic, political, and security dimensions of reconstruction.

Even with the support of Army combat engineers and outside construction firms, reconstruction work must still leverage the support of local contractors.

Through daily interaction with the population, the battalion is able to gauge the real impact of ongoing reconstruction and better allocate resources. If the campaign has yet to reach this level of sophistication, the battalion remains the only element able to provide sustained security for reconstruction projects. Such development should focus on employing military-age males, enfranchising repressed minorities, stimulating the local economy, and co-opting local leaders. All of these are critical parts of a successful COIN strategy.

Fostering political institutions. For Galula, “the counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.”¹⁹ Political decapitation, as the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and OIF proved, is a relatively simple matter for a superpower such as the United States. But a regime is far more than just a few high-ranking officials; rather, a regime consists of all who benefit from the current political arrangement. Even those not in formal offices profit from the distribution of political power and must therefore be considered, at least peripherally, as

part of the regime. Additionally, any consideration of the regime must account for the existing “modes and orders”—family ties, religious commitments, financial interests, and the like—that will set the stage for the installation or reshaping of the new government.

The ultimate goal of COIN warfare is to “build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward.”²⁰ Initially, the counterinsurgent must empower, through elections or appointment, local provisional leaders.²¹ The battalion provides security, trains local security forces, and drives economic development, so a certain measure of paternalism is unavoidable. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of local leaders rests on their ability to solve their constituents’ problems. The counterinsurgent is a political operative, offering responsibility and resources to those leaders who prove capable, allowing them to build a base of popular support. As the work proceeds, tested leaders will emerge in each locality. These proven leaders become the nucleus of national and regional parties. The formation of national-level parties can only progress after their development at the local level.²² As representatives of the emerging government, the local leaders, with the critical assistance of the maneuver battalion and indigenous security forces, must exert hegemony over hostile tribes, militias, religious movements, and the remnants of the pre-existing regime in order to pave the way for a new political order.

Tactical Synergies

The scale and scope of the maneuver battalion can generate tactical synergies that no other unit can duplicate during COIN operations.²³ Underlying this observation are two key points. First, as an organization’s modified table of organization and equipment expands, it can undertake a wider range of missions over a larger battlespace, but this increase in size makes it harder for decisionmakers to understand the population intimately, and it makes the organization less adaptive. Generally, the larger a military echelon, the less often (if ever) its commander is in direct contact with the average man on the street. While recent transformation empowers the brigade as the Army’s primary unit of action, COIN operations require an even greater powering down of assets. As Galula recommends, the basic unit of COIN warfare is the largest unit whose leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population.²⁴ This basic unit is the maneuver battalion. Brigades, divisions, and other higher headquarters must establish objectives, coordinate actions, apportion terrain, and allocate national resources among subordinate units. These higher commands are responsible for establishing the channels and means that allow locally embedded maneuver battalions to engage in decisive, practical problem-solving.

The other point is that COIN operations require leaders to be pentathletes. Staffs and troop commanders must be able to juggle the simultaneous outcomes of small-unit actions, humanitarian assistance missions, and intelligence collection. Successful COIN campaigns are the product of multiple lines of operations. As such, synergies develop when a unit is able to execute along several of these lines. These synergies benefit both the counterinsurgent force and the community.

For the counterinsurgent, a Soldier who trains local security forces will understand the culture better, which should aid him when he conducts combat patrols. A commander who attends city council meetings to promote reconstruction projects shapes the battlefield for security operations. For the community, the local counterinsurgent force respon-



U.S. Army

A 1-5 CAV soldier serving as a liaison/mentor to the battalion’s attached Iraqi Army company joins them on the firing line, October 2004.

sible for combat operations is also the unit able to compensate for property damage and provide information about detained individuals. The unit responsible for coordinating with the local security forces also manages their recruiting and training. Conducting security operations, promoting economic development, training indigenous security forces, and fostering political institutions work together collectively to deny the insurgent access to the population.

The counterinsurgent force must be large enough to conduct an array of focused activities simultaneously, thereby capturing the synergies from their collective employment. At the same time, however, it must be small enough and flexible enough to bond with the local population and adapt to changing circumstances. The maneuver battalion meets both these criteria.

Other Implications

A battalion-focused COIN strategy offers many benefits, but perhaps the two greatest have to do with civil-military operations (CMO) and intelligence collection.

CMO. Civil-military operations are green-tab issues. Reconstruction, economic development, and community relations are not phases in war planning; they are principles of COIN. As such, the commander responsible for the security of a specific area must also be able to determine reconstruction priorities and control assets responsible for their implementation. An increased Army-level emphasis on CMO does not necessarily mean (and, in our opinion, should not mean) more civil affairs Soldiers or the creation of special reconstruction and security forces. Instead, we must acknowledge that money is the power behind CMO. Many vital non-kinetic actions—reconstruction, community outreach, information operations, and intelligence collection—are not possible without putting targeted cash into the local economy.

Higher headquarters must resource maneuver commanders with dedicated reconstruction budgets and operational funds.²⁵ A process through which requests are sent up for laborious and uncertain review inhibits the commander by not allowing him to quickly or confidently commit resources to a fight.²⁶ Reconstruction funds are combat power. It would be foolish for a commander to enter a

conventional fight not knowing how many tanks or infantrymen he could commit, and it is just as unwise to send him into a negotiation with a local leader not knowing what money he has been budgeted to allocate within his AOR. The successful maneuver commander uses civic reconstruction or initial construction to contour his area of operations. He can use money to reinforce his presence in the area or to mitigate risk in areas where he is practicing economy of force in terms of security patrols. The commander employs projects to co-opt community leaders or to create new opinion-makers by funneling money through them.

Civil affairs units assist maneuver commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander's AOR to lessen the impact of military operations. In certain small-scale or domestic operations, civil affairs Soldiers should retain their independence. But the objective of COIN operations is for the maneuver commander to shape the conditions under which a civilian population lives. As a result, civil affairs Soldiers should be attached to the maneuver commander, acting more as staff proponents and subject-matter experts than as primary actors.

In this environment, separate reporting channels and rating schemes that dilute and confuse the chain of command are also counterproductive. As the institutional Army gradually recognizes the importance of full-spectrum operations, maneuver commanders will realize the need to integrate kinetic and non-kinetic targeting. Community relations are the main effort of the entire counterinsurgent force, not just a specialized unit.

Tactical intelligence collection. Other than the tactical Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a scout platoon, the maneuver battalion does not own dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Experience from Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that human intelligence (HUMINT) is by far the most valuable intelligence source for commanders engaged in COIN warfare.²⁷ While the Military Intelligence School has belatedly tried to implement an "every Soldier a collector" mindset, internal policies stand in the way of effective HUMINT collection. For example, suppose a local national comes to a checkpoint and tells Soldiers that his neighbor conducts attacks against U.S. forces. None of the Soldiers in the battalion,

the S2 included, are allowed to task the informant to provide additional information that would make the target actionable (for example, a ten-digit grid and/or a guide to a house, a means to positively identify the target, and sufficient legal evidence to detain the target if captured). To ask the informant to return with this information would cross a legal line and subject the well-intentioned troopers to possible action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Soldiers must instead defer to a tactical HUMINT team (THT) to run the source. THTs, however, seldom operate under battalion control (unlike Marine human exploitation teams), leaving maneuver commanders in the undesirable position of outsourcing their most valuable collection platform.

Tactical HUMINT collection would benefit from a closer relationship between THTs and maneuver units. THTs are in short supply and on their own can be ineffective, because the information they gather loses value unless it is acted on quickly by the maneuver unit owning the ground. Additionally, because the maneuver commander maintains order and controls funding in his AOR, significant personalities will want to speak to him. The THT can be useful for interrogating detainees, but it is folly to believe that a prominent sheik, imam, or businessman would want to speak with a sergeant E-5. Indigenous populations understand our rank structure and have definite ideas about who their social peers are. Any potential source with truly significant influence will likely want to be handled by someone who can provide incentives, both tangible and intangible. To prevent information fratricide and to leverage local leaders' spheres of influence, the maneuver commander should be the one who manages all the key relationships in the battalion AOR. This again reflects Galula's call for a "single direction."

Acknowledging that source operations require specialized training, these missions should be managed by the battalion S2 and executed by one of the battalion's intelligence officers or by a THT under the S2's direct control. Such an arrangement would also facilitate field interrogations and on-site document exploitation. The interrogators would benefit from participating in the targeting process from the onset. Understanding the battalion's reasons for targeting a suspect and how the suspect fits into the

S2's view of the enemy situation would assist the interrogator in gleaned actionable information.

In a HUMINT-rich environment, battalions need an organic collection capability. Most information requirements will never be satisfied by driving a tactical vehicle past a suspect's house or by flying a UAV overhead. Such overt collection often warns the target and may compromise a promising lead. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan bears out what Galula saw in previous COIN campaigns. Everyone, not just the specialists, must participate in HUMINT collection. Therefore, the bureaucracy surrounding intelligence collection must be constructed with moderation and restraint.²⁸

Final Thoughts

Our Army must plan for the COIN fight. Not only are we currently engaged in such a battle on strategic terrain, but our difficulties have surely not gone unnoticed by potential adversaries. We must expect this kind of fight again.

We have argued that the combined arms maneuver battalion should be the basic unit in COIN operations. Not only do we believe in the battalion's inherent abilities to conduct tactical full-spectrum operations, but we believe that other alternatives are impractical or carry a significant downside. The creation of pure nation-building, stability and reconstruction units, or system-administration forces, would divert Department of Defense dollars to forces that could not fight when (not if) we are again called on to engage in mid- to high-intensity conflict. Beyond this inefficiency, it is difficult to see these forces ever coming into existence. For all the talk of joint interagency task forces, it would be a monumental victory were we even able to embed representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Justice in each divisional headquarters. Were we serious about truly implementing such interagency task forces in 2015, we would have seen platoons of diplomatic, economic, and legal trainees entering the system last year. We did not—and therefore the Department of Defense must plan to have its personnel continue to be the primary implementers of all aspects of reconstruction for the foreseeable future.

This responsibility will require a quantum shift in mindset for Army leaders. While Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster may have overstated the problem

in a recent critique of U.S. Phase IV operations in *Military Review*, the problems regarding organizational culture that he brings to light certainly ring true to these authors.²⁹ The stateside and garrison Army, in particular, has been especially reluctant to transform, because transformation implies that many of the systems and modes of proceeding that the Army used to redefine itself as it recovered from the “hollow Army” of the 1970s may have outlived their usefulness. It will be difficult to abandon mental models, systems, and institutions that have become central to the Army’s self-conception.

And in a final caveat, proposing the maneuver battalion as the decisive headquarters is handicapped by a stubborn fact. Due to the Army’s generational cohort system, much of the current senior leadership of these battalions—commanders, executive officers, and operations officers—have never before served at the tactical level in a counterinsurgency. It will require an exceptional level of flexibility—and even humility—for these leaders to rely on, and perhaps defer to, their more expert company-grade officers, many of whom have had two or three

tours in Southwest Asia. However, if these leaders embrace Lieutenant General David Petraeus’s key observation that “a leader’s most important task is to set the right tone” and embrace the themes of COIN even if they do not fully understand them, then their lower-level leaders can drive the fight.³⁰

These ifs notwithstanding, we maintain that the battalion ought to be the primary unit in COIN. While we cannot transform our hierarchical Army into a fully networked organization overnight, powering down to the lowest practical level will enable the most adaptive commanders to implement a Galula-like solution. The war in Iraq may now have moved beyond this possible solution; with the ceding of battlespace control to Iraqi Security Forces, U.S. units will be required to take a subtler, more indirect approach. But when we fight the next counterinsurgency—by engaging along all lines of operations through a nationwide grid of locally embedded maneuver battalions—we can bring American strengths into play against the insurgents and demonstrate that we have learned and recovered from our stumbling start in Iraq. **MR**

NOTES

1. The current heavy combined arms battalion includes two mechanized infantry companies, two armor companies, a company of combat engineers, and a forward support company. Depending on the tactical environment these forces trade M2A3s (Bradley) and M1A2s (Abrams tank) for M1114s (up-armored HMMWVs). Experience has shown that other types of battalions (engineer, artillery, air defense artillery) can serve quite admirably in lieu of combat arms battalions, and our use of “combined arms battalion” should in no way be viewed as a slight to their performance. However, terrain permitting, we believe that optimally this maneuver force should be equipped with at least a company-size element of armored vehicles, with the M2A3 Bradley being the currently optimal solution. See also, Major (now Lieutenant) General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis, and Major Geoffrey A. Norman, “Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler,” *Armor*, March-April 2005, 7-12.

2. For a discussion of stability and reconstruction forces, see *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, ed. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2004). For a discussion of “system administration” forces, see Thomas P.M. Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005), especially xix.

3. See also LTG (then MG) Peter Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirements for Full-Spectrum Operations,” *Military Review* (July-August 2005).

4. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, reprinted 2005), 101.

5. *Ibid.*, 101.

6. *Ibid.*, 95.

7. *Ibid.*, 93.

8. *Ibid.*, 87.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, 32.

11. *Ibid.*, 110-111.

12. The authors were members of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, during its participation in the Battle of Najaf Cemetery in August 2004 and the Second Battle of Fallujah in November 2004.

13. See also Ralph Peters, “A Grave New World,” *Armed Forces Journal* (April 2005): 34. Peters touches upon several ideas also articulated here. He argues for the importance of presence but also the need to reform military intelligence to emphasize tactical human intelligence for maneuver commanders. Peters also contends that money is a vital component of non-kinetic combat power.

14. Galula, 111.

15. See also John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 156-158.

16. See also Robert M. Cassidy, “Back to the Street Without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and other Small Wars,” *Parameters* 34 (Summer 2004): 73-83. Cassidy points to the success of the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program and argues that this strategy led to greatly improved tactical intelligence collection by greatly enhancing security for the local population.

17. United Nations Office of Project Services and International Labor Organization, *Economic Rights and Opportunities-Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability*, UNOPS/ILO, 19 October 2000, <<http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/employment/led/publ/unops.htm>>.

18. The World Bank, Middle East Department, Report No. 27602, *Interim Strategy Note of the World Bank Group for Iraq*, 14 January 2004, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIRAQ/Overview/20193777/Iraq_%20Interim%20Strategy.pdf>, access restricted.

19. Galula, 79.

20. *Ibid.*, 136.

21. *Ibid.*, 127-133. Here Galula outlines the establishment of local political institutions and their relationship to the counterinsurgent.

22. *Ibid.*, 133. Galula contends that national parties can only emerge after they have been vetted locally by the counterinsurgent.

23. Counterinsurgent operations, like commercial manufacturing, derive efficiencies from their respective economies of scale and scope. In economic terms, economies of scale refer to a firm’s efficiencies associated with increasing or decreasing the quantity of production, whereas economies of scope are synergies associated with increasing or decreasing the types of products produced. In counterinsurgent operations, economies of scale apply to the echelon of command responsible for controlling daily operations, while economies of scope refer to efficiencies associated with increasing or decreasing the number of lines of operations that unit executes.

24. Galula, 110-111.

25. See also Max Boot, “The Struggle to Transform the Military,” *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 2005): 113. Boot speaks to the limitations of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) used in Iraq and the need to reduce the considerable bureaucracy associated with the use of money at the tactical level.

26. Galula, 131.

27. See also Jeremiah Pray, “Kinetic Targeting in Iraq at the Battalion Task Force Level: From Target to Detainee,” *Infantry* (July-August 2005): 30-33.

28. Galula, 119-120.

29. Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” *Military Review* (November-December 2005): 2-15.

30. Lieutenant General David A. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” *Military Review* (January-February 2006): 9.

Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in Transition

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PHOTO: CPT Paul Stanton, Commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, briefs Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, COL Joseph Anderson, Commander of 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and MG David H. Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, during a patrol in the center of Mosul, Iraq, 21 July 2003. (DOD)

AS CONVENTIONAL U.S. FORCES transition from full combat to stability operations, they will likely assume responsibility for areas that have suffered significant war-related damage. In the wake of combat operations, the local people may be demoralized by their nation's defeat, by the apparent lack of economic opportunity, and by shortages of critical needs such as electricity, water, and fuel.¹ The establishment of any governmental authority supported by our military may also contribute to the disillusionment. Such situations are ripe for the development of an insurgency and must be quickly and decisively defused. Experience has proven that immersing tactical units in their assigned areas of responsibility offers the best chance for achieving stability.

The growth of an insurgency relies heavily on unstable conditions. A few disgruntled community leaders can spark interest and offer financial backing to fuel insurgent recruitment efforts. Insurgent cadre will actively garner support for any effort contrary to that of the fledgling government while attributing desperate conditions to the "occupation" of the foreign military. When faced with such situations, U.S. forces must immediately begin counter-operations that simultaneously provide an accurate picture of the situation to the people, demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the government, and publicly defeat the insurgent element with direct action. U.S. forces must "arrest [an insurgency's] growth before it is able to gain initial traction" by installing and maintaining a constant, authoritative presence within neighborhoods to provide basic security.² Defeated forces cannot initially provide this authority; thus, a strong initial U.S. presence is necessary.

The potential for success in these operations is significantly enhanced by immersing tactical units in their operating environments as they transition to assume responsibility. The daily interaction and relationships between Soldiers and host-nation civilians form the foundation of a stability operation. Working together and developing relationships at the grassroots level bolster opportunities for success by demonstrating the potential for improvement through deeds and by humanizing Soldiers in the eyes of the local population. Living within the assigned area of operations (AO), among the people for whom U.S. forces are providing stability, promotes the development of these critical habitual relationships.

During a recent interview with the *Washington Post*, Colonel Chris Short, commandant of the forward-deployed Counterinsurgency Academy in Iraq, emphasized the need to break the "big-base mentality" and mix with the population. He said that "classic counterinsurgency theory holds that troops should live out among the people as much as possible, to develop a sense of how the society works and to gather intelligence."³ Such immersion increases

the opportunities for Soldiers and civilians to interact in a positive manner while simultaneously helping Soldiers develop a very detailed knowledge of their operational environment. Immersion provides units a greater flexibility to effect each tenet of stability operations, whether gathering and disseminating information, influencing host-nation political development, or neutralizing threat activity.

The remainder of this paper will illustrate the positive impact of company-level immersion during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Analysis and examples are drawn from my own experiences while commanding Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry (B/1-502) of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during the transition to stability operations in Mosul.


Bravo Company arrived in Mosul in April 2003 after the city had seen some limited fighting, but significant looting. Most public buildings were gutted down to their foundations; no government agencies were functioning; there was no running water or electricity; and fuel was in critically short supply. Over the next 10 months, the company lived in and operated from three separate locations within the heart of the city to stabilize and secure the city's center, an area that included city hall, the courthouse, the central bank, several police stations (to include the citywide headquarters), the bus station, the train station, the commercial epicenter with the central open air market, and thousands of residences ranging from the wealthiest to the poorest in the city.

Theoretical Framework

As defined in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, there are three critical dimensions in stability operations: information, political, and threat. A successful stability operation involves winning the information battle with the host population, helping rebuild and restructure the host political agencies, and defeating the threat element.⁴ Figure 1 depicts how small-unit activities can influence these dimensions.⁵

Information (at the base of the triangle) serves as the foundation for mission success since it is impossible to affect the other dimensions without gathering substantial, credible information. The proper dissemination of information also serves to increase host-population support by keeping people abreast of activities that will positively affect them as individuals. Offensive information operations promote legitimacy, eliminate confusion, and reduce bias and ignorance through persuasion and education of the indigenous population.⁶ Such influence helps to combat local perceptions of the U.S. military as an occupation force and deters nationals from accepting without question any anti-American messages presented by an insurgency.

Only after gathering sufficient information regarding their areas of operation can leaders make informed decisions about the restructuring of political agencies. Almost immediately, however, they must begin rebuilding the host nation's infrastructure. This must be done to increase economic



Legend: HPT, high pay-off target; ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; NGOs, nongovernmental organizations.

Figure 1. Stability Operations.

activity, to restore order, and to give the local population hope. While these efforts should be initiated quickly, units must be cautious in offering support so that they do not alienate portions of the local population. Insufficient knowledge of an individual's history or lack of a full understanding of ethnic considerations in the region can result in a deleterious perception of favoritism. Units must constantly gather information and monitor political activities to ensure reconstruction efforts proceed in a positive direction for all of the people. Exercising tactical patience to collect information that identifies the right person to place in a critical position can save significant time and energy in the long run.

Information is also the foundation for direct action against enemy elements. Direct action requires a source to inform units of insurgent activities and locations. Moreover, units must be able to react quickly to capitalize on time-sensitive information. The threat element is flexible, necessitating friendly forces that can act almost instantaneously upon receipt of credible intelligence.

Units must simultaneously address all three of these dimensions of stability operations—win the information battle, rebuild the political apparatus, and defeat the threat—to provide a secure environment, legitimize political agencies, and defeat an insurgency. Overlooking any one of these may jeopardize the mission. It is the synergistic effect of the daily activities addressing each dimension that provides the best opportunities for success. Units need the authority and the ability to act quickly and constantly with regard to any and all of the dimensions. Immersing units into their AOs immediately upon transition empowers them to affect stability operations in the most significant manner.

Information Operations

Gathering information is a multifaceted problem with no simple solution. Experience has shown, however, that decentralizing command and immersing units in their own areas helps to quickly develop an accurate picture of the situation. With a permanent, dispersed footprint in the AO, we can use multiple patrols that can act simultaneously to provide a constant intelligence-gathering presence over a wide area. As doctrine accurately points out, “timely and accurate intelligence depends on

As Soldiers become familiar with back alleys, streets with restricted mobility, and unlit roads, moving through the area becomes second nature.

aggressive and continuous reconnaissance and surveillance.”⁷ This patrol presence naturally results in substantial information that helps leaders make sound decisions.

Learning the terrain. One facet of the information battle comes from knowledge of the environment, specifically, the proper use of terrain, which is a combat multiplier. Generally speaking, the element that knows the terrain the best has a distinct advantage during a fight. The situation in a stability operation is no different.

If units are afforded the opportunity to live in their AOs during stability operations, they can learn the terrain as well as, if not better than, the enemy. Since the operational area is their own backyard, every patrol increases the Soldiers' awareness and understanding of the environment. This familiarity increases their own maneuver capabilities while reducing the threat's advantage of operating on their own turf. As Soldiers become familiar with back alleys, streets with restricted mobility, and unlit roads, moving through the area becomes second nature. They soon find that they don't need maps or satellite imagery.

More importantly, Soldiers will develop knowledge more detailed than they can derive from a map. B/1-502 was responsible for securing a portion of Mosul's inner-city marketplace where the satellite imagery suggested that there were multiple vehicle-sized corridors. What the imagery did not show, however, was that every day between 0900 and 1600 hours the area was so congested with vendors and shoppers that even dismounted movement was nearly impossible. Since the marketplace was within view of our rooftop surveillance points and was a focal point of our patrols, we quickly learned that there were two to three dismounted routes that supported rapid movement through the market, and that vehicular movement wasn't even an option

until late in the evening. We learned to budget 15 minutes for a vehicle convoy to move a quarter of a mile during peak periods.

In addition to improving mission execution, knowledge of the terrain enhances leader planning. When conducting counterinsurgency missions in support of stability operations, leaders are often forced to develop orders with little or no planning time. The immersed commander's ability to grab his subordinates and speak off of common checkpoints and landmarks without looking at the map while still clearly communicating the mission creates opportunities to act decisively on time-sensitive information. Soldiers learn the names of coffee shops, hotels, streets, and other details that minimize the requirement for terrain analysis and map orientation.

In one particular instance, we received a mission to apprehend a suspected insurgent who had allegedly been operating out of one of the local coffee shops. A brigade informant had provided intelligence consisting only of local names: "Subhi Affer was organizing activities from the Al Dur coffee shop and staying at the Fordus Hotel on Nebashid Street." When I relayed the information to my subordinates, one platoon leader instantly said, "They probably mean the Al Durra coffee shop and the Fordhaus Hotel on Nebasheed Street. The coffee shop is the one with the mural of a boy on it and the hotel is on the 2d floor of a building halfway between checkpoints 2 and 3." Without a recon and without satellite images, the Soldiers were capable of translating cryptic messages from informants into meaningful information. Moreover, they knew the area so well that we could instantly plan a mission and respond to time-sensitive information because we weren't trying to decipher 10-digit grid locations and guess which building was the one of interest from a satellite image—we knew it. We knew it as well as the informant who had originated the intelligence because the information didn't refer to just our AO, but also to our neighborhood.

Knowing the people. Detailed knowledge of the AO certainly facilitated operations, but successful direct action against the enemy also depended on information about specific people and locations. The best source of this information was the people who lived in the area and overheard conversations in the coffee shops. Insurgents concealed their activi-

ties in the presence of American forces so that U.S. Soldiers rarely saw any suspect behavior firsthand; the locals, however, were privy to what was really going on in the neighborhood.

From the outset, we needed to tap into this source, but the locals would not openly risk their lives to pass information to American forces. Many were skeptical of our true intentions in the area to begin with. Since they had been raised to hate Americans, it took only one disgruntled individual to persuade an entire coffee shop of listeners that Americans were in Iraq as an occupation force to steal oil and corrupt Muslim beliefs. Citing the previous "liberation" of Baghdad in 1917 by the British, the insurgents had a historical perspective to demonstrate how "liberators" enjoyed the benefits of Iraqi oil reserves.⁸ Additionally, insurgent cadre could easily point out the absence of critical services like electricity to demonstrate the Americans' supposed inability to restore order.

We had to understand this context and approach the local people accordingly; we needed to understand the history and background of the area to relate to the people. The average citizen didn't care about the Coalition's strategic advances in developing the country; the amount of oil flowing through the pipeline in Baji didn't interest the average Iraqi citizen. Whether or not there was propane available for cooking dinner or electricity for powering fans were the true concerns.

We soon recognized that we had to address their concerns if we were going to persuade the locals that we were in Iraq to help. They needed to see action, not hear rhetoric. If we wanted to earn their trust and eventually persuade them to offer us information, then we had to legitimize our presence by focusing our activities on real solutions to their immediate requirements.

We also had to win the street-level information battle with the insurgency during the transition period. The longer we delayed in producing tangible evidence of our intent to help, the more we risked losing the local population to the insurgents. In his book *Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War*, Anthony Shadid conveys the opinions of many Iraqis during the transition period. Most citizens were guarded but open-minded about U.S. intentions; however, they all wanted to see tangible evidence of our claim to

help.⁹ While the insurgency sent its cadre into the streets to pay average citizens to fight us, we had to convince the same people to support the Coalition-backed reconstruction efforts instead. This couldn't be done with rhetoric or from atop a vehicle. It required activity in the marketplace, on the street corner, and in the local coffee shops with a persistent, tangible message delivered through habitual relationships and via small-scale direct action targeting local concerns. It also had to be initiated immediately upon transition to prevent the insurgent message from taking root.

Soldiers walking the streets and talking to the people were the ones who knew what the individual Iraqi wanted and needed. As British Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster has noted, "Routine foot patrolling [is] a key means of interacting and thus gathering HUMINT [human intelligence]"¹⁰ Soldiers could not gather this information while mounted on a vehicle; they had to get off and walk. They had to shake hands, drink chi, and eat rice with their fingers when invited to "have a lunch" if they expected the people to open up to them.

Soldiers also had to understand Iraqi customs and history and be able to speak a few words of Arabic to earn the people's respect. Colonel H.R. McMaster, commander of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, understood this and trained his unit accordingly prior to deployment. He ensured each squad-sized unit had someone who knew elementary Arabic, and he had his officers read about and study the region.¹¹ Basic steps like these help the force to demonstrate "strength and resolve without being perceived as threatening."¹²

In Mosul, developing habitual relationships was critical to earning trust. In fact, relationship-building was the decisive point of the stability operation. If the same Soldier stopped and talked to the same gas station attendant on a routine basis, the two developed a relationship. The Soldier came to understand the daily rituals of the Iraqi civilians through experience; he knew what a day in their life was like and he learned what problems they faced.



U.S. Army

While on patrol in Mosul, 24 April 2003, a squad from B/1-502 walks with a large group of excited local children yelling "George Bush."

The Iraqi civilians, in turn, got to know the Soldier as a human instead of as an imposing, rifle-wielding warrior in body armor. The Iraqis learned that the Soldier had a wife and two kids at home and other details that were seemingly insignificant in terms of mission success, but critical in humanizing the Soldier. Such exchanges helped us take a monumental step toward winning the hearts and minds of the local population—the locals no longer viewed us as occupiers, but rather as individuals.

One of our platoon leaders built such a relationship with two local propane salesmen, whom we nicknamed the "Smash Brothers" based on their uncharacteristically large physical stature. The two routinely invited the platoon leader to have chi and they often stopped by the platoon command post (CP) simply to visit.

As propane salesmen, the Smash Brothers were very concerned with black market sales of the coveted resource. At the time, propane was in short supply and was one of the largest concerns among local people since they required it for cooking. We were also concerned with black market activity since we were attempting to regulate sales to avoid price gouging and to ensure equal distribution through all of the neighborhoods.

During one of their routine visits, the Smash Brothers informed the platoon leader of multiple locations where people were conducting illegal

propane sales at four times the regulated price. The result was that propane was only available in the wealthier neighborhoods, and less fortunate citizens were forced to do without. Not coincidentally, insurgent recruiting efforts were focused on the destitute neighborhoods without propane. Disgruntled people who could not get propane were the ones who would accept quick cash for emplacing an improvised explosive device (IED). The Smash Brothers' intelligence resulted in the arrest of several black marketers and the confiscation of hundreds of bottles of propane, and it enabled us to properly regulate sales. It also helped to inhibit insurgent recruitment of bombers.

Gathering information like this wasn't possible without maintaining a consistent presence in the area. Simply patrolling was very different from having Soldiers patrol their areas to develop contacts. Because they lived in the neighborhoods they were responsible for, Soldiers were much better able to develop these contacts. Proximity thus provided a high degree of flexibility and gave small-unit leaders opportunities to exercise initiative. Additionally, locals saw our permanent presence as a deterrent to criminal activity.¹³ Immersing units from the very beginning of stability operations helped to develop relationships before the locals could be negatively influenced by insurgent cadre.

...locals saw our permanent presence as a deterrent to criminal activity.

Centers of influence. We quickly realized the tremendous potential of local relationships and sought ways to expand and capitalize on our contacts. One initiative involved a company-wide plan for building what we termed centers of influence. We wanted to build a network of contacts throughout our AO that we could rely on, whether it be for intelligence regarding insurgent activity or just to be in tune with the community's opinion of our efforts. Each leader from squad to company level was responsible for developing at least one new center of influence each week. The centers were tailored to a level of responsibility such that

squad leaders focused on coffee shop owners and street vendors; platoon leaders approached more influential people like bank managers and police station chiefs; and I, as the commander, contacted even more prominent individuals like the regional police chief and the head of the city's municipal works. Echelons of responsibility were important because the Iraqi people wanted to deal exclusively with the most senior Soldier they knew.

Our immediate goals were to learn what the people's problems and concerns were and then work with the people to develop joint solutions. We knew that we needed to act overtly, but we also needed to know where to focus our efforts. I often challenged subordinates to make themselves "more useful to the Iraqis alive than dead" to motivate them to find and fix problems plaguing those Iraqis who had yet to decide between supporting U.S. forces or the insurgency. The long-term goal was to develop trust so that we could move the whole city in a positive direction by sharing information and working toward mutually beneficial goals. In practice, we addressed the entire gambit of local concerns, from simple tasks like fixing potholes to complicated projects like designing a garbage-collection system and rebuilding a police station.

B/1-502's experience with "Butchers' Row" highlights the potential impact of developing centers of influence. When we were assigned the city center in Mosul, it was a cluttered mess of sidewalk vendors and shops that served thousands of pedestrian shoppers hourly. In the absence of authority, the vendors disregarded any sanitation standards in order to save time and money. This was especially true in Butchers' Row, a series of 22 brick-and-mortar shops selling every imaginable portion of a cow or goat.

Butchers capitalized on the lack of authority to bypass traditional regulations that mandated buying meat exclusively from the slaughterhouse. In the traditional scheme, a farmer would take the live animal to the slaughterhouse where it would be slaughtered, packaged, and stamped prior to being loaded on a special vehicle for transport to butcher shops throughout town. The butchers paid a fee for the process. In the absence of supervision, the butchers saved the fee by buying the animals directly from the farmers and slaughtering them in the street in front of their stores. Each morning the

streets were red with blood as the butchers busily slaughtered and skinned the animals.

To compound matters, the butchers did not want to pay disposal fees for cleaning up the animal carcasses, so they simply swept the remains into a centralized pile in front of Butchers' Row. The smell alone could turn your stomach from 100 meters, never mind the danger of disease. I had spoken multiple times with members of the city's trash department (the beladia) and with members of the local medical community who had expressed concern about the unsanitary conditions. Through my translator I began speaking with the butchers to find out why the situation had deteriorated and to develop a solution.

I explained that the situation was entirely unacceptable, but told the butchers I wanted them, along with the veterinary specialists, the beladia, the slaughterhouse, the local police, and the transport drivers, to develop their own solution. I told them I would help mediate the process and would assist the police and veterinary office with enforcing the rules that they jointly established, but that the solution had to be theirs, not mine—if I dictated the solution, it might not hold for the long term. Over the next 2 weeks, we held 4 joint meetings to which we invited the senior butcher from all of the butcher markets across the city. We developed a three-page document with rules explaining the entire process, from the farmers delivering animals to the slaughterhouse to the beladia cleaning up



U.S. Army

An Iraqi veterinarian accompanies the author as he visits vendors on "Butchers' Row" at the city center in Mosul. The veterinarian is explaining the rules established to improve sanitation and implement standard procedures for handling meat.

the butchers' scraps at the end of a day. All of the participating members signed the document with the understanding that enforcement would begin after a 1-week grace period.

From that point on, I always made it a point to stop by and talk with the butchers along Butchers' Row, the veterinary officials, the police, and the beladia employees. From simple conversations about the weather to more detailed discussions of progress in the marketplace, we spoke daily. We all quickly began to see the benefits of the program we had jointly developed, and we were satisfied that we were fixing a real problem that affected each of us. Through our efforts, we developed mutual trust.

At this point I began to see the second-order effects of our hard work. While the streets were considerably cleaner, the greater benefit was that the local nationals now trusted me. During one of my patrols, a butcher slipped me a note along with a pat on the back. He communicated through my translator, Muhammad, not to look at the note until I was in a safe place. After the patrol, I had Muhammad translate the message, which indicated that one of the other butcher's sons was dealing weapons to suspected insurgents. After about a week's worth of investigative work, we were convinced that the tip was accurate and we arrested the individual. We would never have known about the activity without the information. I am convinced that our success



U.S. Army

A butcher in the Gazlani Market in Mosul proudly displays his certificate of compliance with sanitation rules.

was a direct result of the trusting relationship I had developed through close personal interaction.

Street-smart intelligence. By regularly patrolling their area, our Soldiers learned about the people who live and work in the neighborhood. Not only did this help them develop a rapport with the locals, but it also made them cognizant of anomalous and potentially dangerous activity. In the marketplace, we became accustomed to seeing the same people at the same location every day. Even though vendor stands in the market weren't regulated, the same vendors occupied the same locations daily. We learned their faces and we came to expect to see the daily routine. If that routine was in some way different, we became suspicious. On one particular patrol, a sergeant noticed from across the street that the regular watermelon salesman had been replaced by a younger man. Curious, the sergeant crossed the street to ask why the regular man had relinquished his spot on the corner. As the patrol approached, the new vendor abandoned his stand and fled quickly into the densely packed area we referred to as the "Deep Market." The sergeant examined the stand closely and found three grenades hidden under the watermelons.

Soldiers cannot develop this level of awareness until they are intimately familiar with their environment; in other words, they can't identify subtle indicators until they know what "normal" looks like. Once they do, however, small changes to their area become noticeable.

Because the insurgents severely punish those who assist our Soldiers, law-abiding citizens may be scared to tell us about enemy activity. They can, however, provide information indirectly through small changes in their routines. On one particular mission, our company cordoned off a section of the market that had been covertly selling weapons and ammunition. With typical Iraqi curiosity, a large crowd developed along the edge of our cordon to watch. About an hour into the mission, an NCO noticed that several civilians he knew from the crowd had left the scene. Suspicious of the change, he ordered his men to take cover while he figured out why the locals had left. Within a minute of his issuing the order, a grenade landed and detonated in the vicinity of his platoon. This NCOs' experience in the marketplace had taught him that most Iraqis would never leave the scene while there was activ-

ity; their natural curiosity was too strong. The fact that many people he personally knew had departed the area served as an indicator that something was not right. His ability to detect such subtle behavior undoubtedly saved his platoon members from injury or death.

Rebuilding

When Soldiers move into a city that has been recently devastated by war and looting, they face an overwhelming number of problems that need to be fixed. In such a situation, a commander's ability to focus efforts on the most critical problems first can greatly enhance the people's perception of the reconstruction effort. Obviously, unit immersion in the AO can help to identify the most pressing problems, but it also can inject a sense of empathy and urgency into the reconstruction process. Soldiers immersed in the same environment suffer from the same shortcomings as the people they are helping: Lack of electricity, absence of drinking water, raw sewage flowing in the streets, and traffic congestion caused by fuel lines all directly affect the Soldiers' lives too. They are therefore more motivated to correct the problems, and do so in a prioritized fashion that promotes "citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity."¹⁴

While we never consciously want our Soldiers to suffer, being able to relate to the local people helps tremendously in earning their respect. Just as leaders lead by example within our Army, they need to lead by example in their neighborhoods during the move to stability. Many Iraqis logically questioned why a superpower could not provide generators to restore their electricity. What perception would it foster if we lived in an isolated base camp equipped with running water and powered by generators while we left the civilians to suffer in isolation? Shadid's interviews suggest that this very behavior fueled hatred of Americans among many Iraqis.¹⁵

In Mosul, we lived among the people so we could focus on real problems. Unit leaders sought out government leaders who were responsible for maintaining the city's infrastructure, and together they assessed the problems. Leaders didn't have to try to understand the problems from an outside perspective; immersion gave them insight and, at the same time, legitimized their efforts. Leaders

helped lead and focus the efforts of government employees with the support of the neighborhood residents. Upon determining an appropriate course of action, the leaders provided resources to support the implementation of the host nation's solutions.

The people of Al Mansour, a middle class neighborhood in our AO, lived without running water for long stretches of time. Our company CP was serviced by the same pipeline and we received water only intermittently. First Platoon was responsible for patrolling Al Mansour and its Soldiers became acutely aware of the water situation as everyone complained to them during their patrols. Ostensibly, it seemed that the solution was tied to a large water tower that sat atop a hill in the center of Al Mansour, so this was where we focused our efforts initially. We sought out the head of the city's water department and took him to the tower for an assessment. He explained in laymen's terms how he would rectify the situation by fixing the pump at the base of the water tower. Having personally attended his briefing, I felt confident that we could restore water flow quickly.

First Platoon continued patrolling through the area, and its platoon leader told the people what we were doing to fix their problem. They all seemed pleased that we were trying to help. Problems arose, however, when we saw no developments over the next week. The patrols targeted the water tower specifically to check on progress and provide oversight, but they never saw any workers. The people in the neighborhood questioned our efforts and seemed to doubt whether we were really going to help them. The situation was tenuous because saying you will do something and not following through can have a severely detrimental impact on your relationship with the people. As FM 3-07 notes: "Psychologically, the populace must be assured continuously and effectively that conditions are becoming better to counter insurgent propaganda."¹⁶

After a week without any action on the tower, I returned to the water department to speak with one



U.S. Army

During a foot patrol, the author pauses to assure an Iraqi civilian that running water will be restored to the Al Mansour neighborhood.

of the engineers. I was armed with many details provided by First Platoon's routine patrols of the area. An engineer explained that the man I had spoken with didn't know what he was talking about and that the water tower had not been operational in 20 years—water arrived in Al Mansour via a pipeline. The real problem was that Al Mansour was at the end of the pipeline and that people in other neighborhoods were adjusting valves illegally to divert water for themselves. By the time the water arrived at Al Mansour, the water pressure was played out.

As a result of our discovery, we recommended to brigade headquarters that we remove the head of the water department and replace him with a man who the Iraqi engineers felt would be the best choice. The new head developed a city-wide plan for controlling the pipeline by placing locked cages over the valves and monitoring them routinely. We offered support by adding the valve locations to our patrol routes, and within a week Al Mansour had running water for 6 hours each day. Through direct oversight, frequent patrols, and constant conversations with our Iraqi neighbors, we developed a temporary solution that directly improved the lives of many Iraqi civilians. Our ability to affect the situation only came through the habitual relationship First Platoon had developed with the water workers and the people

of Al Mansour. Walking across the street from the platoon CP to the neighborhood was central to this relationship. We gave the Iraqi engineers a sense of urgency, provided oversight of how Coalition funds were being used, and helped to put the right person at the helm of the government agency.

Defeating the Enemy

It is necessary to rebuild the host nation's infrastructure in order to restore stability, but establishing a secure environment is essential if reconstruction is to progress. U.S. forces should provide a "safe and secure environment at the local level and continuously [build] on the incremental success."¹⁷ Immersed units can enhance safety and security by maintaining a dispersed footprint from which they conduct multiple patrols. These patrols can provide a constant deterrent and can rapidly converge on a critical location in the AO.

Blinding the insurgency. Insurgents maintain constant surveillance on Soldiers' activities. In the absence of countermeasures, they can easily determine when Soldiers are on patrol and when they are not. They can then adjust their activities accordingly to conceal any illicit behavior and appear innocent when Soldiers are present. We can defeat this surveillance if we establish a constant presence that gives the enemy no opportunity for activity. Continuous patrolling along varied routes at varied times, combined with a permanent command post providing constant surveillance in the neighborhood, can deter enemy activity.

Maintaining a CP eliminates the overhead associated with movement to and from the AO. Because the company handles mission coordination, platoons can conduct more patrols with greater flexibility. With no need to coordinate boundary crossing or external support, a patrol leader simply has to walk out the door with his unit and a radio. Small-unit leaders maintain personal initiative. They can still adjust patrols based on the situation, as they must be able to do to seize otherwise fleeting opportunities. By contrast, operating from a large forward operating base (FOB) makes us overly reliant on vehicles and allows the enemy to monitor our activity. Regardless of how much we vary our routes and routines, all our missions will be canalized to the limited number of roads leading to and from the FOB. The enemy only has to have

a single operator with a cell phone at each exit to monitor our activity. In this environment, the enemy can always determine when Soldiers are coming; he will have ample time to hide his activity, and we will never be able to catch him.

Of equal importance, the enemy can affect our planning and thought processes by keeping us off balance. If we are forced to use a limited number of roads into and out of our AOs, the enemy can target these with IEDs, the deadliest and most effective weapon in their arsenal. We play into their hands by exposing ourselves to this weapon, which has accounted for 55 percent of U.S. military deaths in Iraq.¹⁸ If insurgents know when we come and go and along which routes, it is only a matter of time before they hit us successfully. Reducing our reliance on vehicles will give the enemy fewer opportunities to attack us. When units live in their AOs, logistics distribution is the only mission that requires mounted activity, and even this mission can be controlled to minimize the threat of IEDs.

Massing combat power. Unit immersion also enables leaders to mass combat power at the decisive point in a mission. Units dispersed at multiple locations throughout an AO can maneuver quickly to support each other because a unit in contact doesn't have to wait for help from a squad dispatched from a single headquarters 15 blocks away. "Dispersed" is really a misleading term: the fact of the matter is that all of the company's combat power is forward-deployed. Although it takes coordination and practice, subordinate units can converge on a single location very rapidly from various locations.

The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment's recent experiences in Tal Afar support this claim. One of the Regiment's battalion commanders has explained how the Regiment operated from 29 distinct checkpoints dispersed through the city, a deployment that

It is necessary to rebuild the host nation's infrastructure in order to restore stability, but establishing a secure environment is essential if reconstruction is to progress.

gave them “great agility to attack from two or three patrol bases instead of predictably rolling out of the front gate of [their] base.”¹⁹ This ability is critical because intelligence about insurgent activity is time-sensitive. There may not be time to muster units, load vehicles, and move to the designated location. If Soldiers are on patrol or in their dispersed CPs, they can move dismounted along separate avenues of approach to mass combat power without being detected by the enemy.

During one mission, B/1-502 cordoned off a section in the crowded Mosul market to search for weapons. We infiltrated the entire company from three separate CP locations along eight different dismounted and one mounted avenues of approach to arrive simultaneously and maintain the element of surprise. Knowing how crowded each route would be, knowing travel times along separate routes, and knowing which routes supported movement without arousing suspicion were critically important planning factors. We successfully moved 100 Soldiers into a confined area without tipping our hand. The significance of the mission lay not in the relatively small amount of weapons confiscated, but in the surprised faces of the locals who looked up to find themselves surrounded. They quickly understood what our forces were capable of and what it meant to the potential for conducting illegal activity in the area.

Counterinsurgent leaders also need the ability to respond immediately to threat activity. If Soldiers live in the AO, they do not have to be called on the radio to alert them to the situation; most will have heard or seen an incident firsthand and will already be prepared to move as orders are disseminated.

Moreover, Soldiers become aware of much more activity. Incidents that cannot be heard or seen from an FOB, and would thus go unnoticed, will be within earshot of a CP or visible from rooftop surveillance posts. Soldiers can react right away to restore order and perhaps catch those responsible. Consider the perception of the local populace if no one responded to an illegal act and contrast that with a rapid, overt response by Soldiers with whom the people are already familiar. Proximity enables units to aggressively influence threat activity.

Defeating the enemy constitutes only part of mission success. Units must address all tenets of stability operations simultaneously as they transition from combat operations, because that is the best time to win the hearts and minds of the local populace and to assert governmental control. To prevent a protracted war against a firmly embedded threat element, we must keep the insurgency from developing by maintaining constant presence and authority in transition. We must be in the back alleys and coffee shops where an insurgency breeds. We must provide the authority that discourages looting and other crimes that demoralize an otherwise neutral population, that builds resentment against our forces, and that increases the disgruntlement that fuels an insurgency. Immersing tactical units into their AOs is the best way for Soldiers to learn the AO, build relationships with the people, identify priorities for making overt improvements, and take the fight to any threat element that exposes itself. Immersion, in short, is the most effective means to address all dimensions of a stability operation. **MR**

NOTES

1. In a 20 September 2001 address to a joint session of Congress and the American people, President George W. Bush noted the environmental factors that shape an insurgency. The same information is contained in “The Nature of the Terrorist Threat Today,” *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003.

2. Direct quotation from Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” *RAND National Security Research Center OP-127-IPC/CMEPP*, June 2004. Dr. Thomas A. Marks explains the requirement for basic security and protection of the population in “Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for ‘Democratic Security,’” *Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International* 10, 4, July 2005.

3. Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S. Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a New Mind-Set,” *Washington Post*, 21 February 2006.

4. FM 3-07 (FM 100-20) *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2003), Chapter 1.

5. Figure developed by CPT Luster Hobbs, January 2005.

6. FM 3-07, 2-19.

7. FM 3-07, 2-3.

8. See Anthony Shadid, *Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005). Iraqis made these claims

in multiple interviews Shadid conducted in March 2003.

9. *Ibid.*, chapters 3 and 4.

10. BG Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” *Military Review* 85, 6 (November-December 2005): 6.

11. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” *Washington Post*, 16 February 2006.

12. FM 3-07, 1-5.

13. See Vance Serchuk and Tom Donnelly, “Nation Building, After All with the U.S. Military in Afghanistan,” *The Weekly Standard*, 11 April 2005. Serchuk and Donnelly describe the negative perception Afghans have of the U.S. military if Soldiers only periodically visit neighborhoods.

14. Department of Defense Directive, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” Number 3000.05, 28 November 2005.

15. Shadid, 150.

16. FM 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), 2-3.

17. *Ibid.*, 2-6.

18. *USA Today*, 26 January 2006.

19. Ricks, 16 February 2006.

Hezbollah's

Employment of Suicide Bombing During the 1980s: The Theological, Political, and Operational Development of a New Tactic

Captain Daniel Helmer, U.S. Army

The shahid (martyr) can be compared to a candle whose job it is to burn out and get extinguished in order to shed light for the benefit of others. The shahada (martyrs) are the candles of society. They burn themselves out and illuminate society. If they do not shed their light, no organization can shine.

—Iranian Ayatollah Morteza Mutaharri¹

Civilization does not mean that you face a rocket with a stick or a jet-fighter with a kite, or a warship with a sailboat. . . .

One must face force with equal or superior force. If it is legitimate to defend self and land and destiny, then all means of self-defense are legitimate.

—Lebanese Ayatollah Hussein Fadlallah²

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THE POST-9/11 Western world seems to regard suicide bombing as a traditional Islamic phenomenon in which repressed, underprivileged Muslims act out their frustrations by exploding themselves in the midst of civilians. This is, however, a misperception. The shahada are not merely frustrated human bombs embracing a time-honored tradition. Use of the tactic by Hamas and other Palestinian groups, by Jemmah Islamiyah in the Philippines, and most recently by members of the Fedayeen Saddam, might seem to suggest that suicide bombing is somehow embedded in Arab and Islamic culture, but it isn't. When Hezbollah adopted the tactic in 1983, it was the uniqueness of the method that in many ways directed the world's attention toward the newly formed group.³

Hezbollah's initial suicide bombings had little precedent in Arab, Islamic, and even world history. In 1983, an attack in which the attacker killed himself while killing others was simply extraordinary. According to Jeffrey Goldberg, "The organization [Hezbollah] virtually invented the multipronged terror attack when, early on the morning of 23 October 1983, it synchronized the suicide bombing, in Beirut, of the United States Marine barracks and an apartment building housing a contingent of French peacekeepers. Those attacks occurred just 20 seconds apart."⁴ Three hundred Multi-National Force (MNF) soldiers perished in the twin attacks. This use of suicide bombing as a military, highly organized, effective tactic set Hezbollah apart from other extremist organizations, both Islamic and non-Islamic.

Had Hezbollah's bombing missions been simply its signature method of attack (as other terrorist groups in the 1980s had signature attacks), the tactic would be worthy of historical exploration only as an anomaly. Indeed, many authors do not view Hezbollah's suicide attacks as noteworthy. Ann Mayer, for example, claims that other Islamic organizations and terrorist groups throughout the world used similar tactics to secure similar political goals.⁵ If the Western press gives Hezbollah any thought at all, it is only to consider it a Shi'ite terrorist group with ties to Iran, and part of a highly irrational and dangerous pan-Islamic threat. When Hezbollah actually carried out its suicide attacks, Western reporters saw little more than the "villainy" of the perpetrators.⁶ But other Islamic groups before Hezbollah did not use suicide bombing in the 1980s, so the supposedly inherent villainy of the Islamic threat does not sufficiently explain Hezbollah's move to suicide bombing.

Any theological dimension that might give suicide bombing a veneer of legitimacy also tended to be discounted. Even many Arab writers dismissed the Islamic rationale behind Muslim extremism and labeled groups such as

Hezbollah “misguided” in their proclamations of jihad.⁷ The Lebanese writer Saad-Ghorayeb is one of those skeptics. He believes Hezbollah’s claims to Islamic inspiration result from a complicated moral utilitarianism in which all actions can be justified in an Islamic framework.⁸ However, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Hezbollah’s spiritual guide (and a supporter of its suicide bombings), took a resolute stand against the organization’s use of kidnapping. This suggests that Hezbollah did not use Shi’a Islam to justify just any action and that its theological justification of suicide bombing was well thought-out and truly believed.⁹

None of these explanations suffice to explain Hezbollah’s employment of suicide bombing. The specific, rational choice of suicide bombing as a militarily effective, theologically justified means to achieve political ends distinguished Hezbollah from any other group in the 1980s. For that reason, Hezbollah’s suicide bombing warrants systematic historical study.

Theological Underpinnings of Self-Destruction

As a result of the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis, the suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s seizure and execution of Western hostages, the Western world regards Islam as an extreme and irrational religion and sees Shi’ite Islam as even more extreme than Sunni Islam. However, for many centuries the Shi’ites concerned themselves mostly with survival in a Sunni-dominated world: “For centuries it [Shi’ism] cultivated the ideal of suffering and endurance. The Shi’ite prototype was that of the quietly enduring martyr (*shahid*) and not the insurgent revolutionary.”¹⁰ The suicide bomber, “chaperoned by a cleric and operationally supplied and directed by a Hizbullah agent,” was a far cry from the passive sufferer that marked most of Shi’ite history.¹¹



U.S. Marines search through tons of rubble for their missing comrades after their barracks were destroyed by a Hezbollah suicide bomber, 23 October 1983. 239 Marines were killed in the blast.

AFP

The most important religious event on the Shi’ite calendar occurs during the first 10 days of the month of Muharram, when Shi’ites celebrate the lives and mourn the deaths of their greatest martyrs. On Ashura, the 10th day of Muharram, Shi’ites march through the streets of their cities, many flagellating themselves and weeping to mourn the death of Imam Hussein, whom they regard as the third legitimate successor to Muhammad. The crowds bemoan Hussein’s death and Shi’ite oppression.¹² Shi’ites believe Hussein died a martyr to uphold “justice against oppression.”¹³

In the past, Shi’ites respected and mourned Hussein, but did not feel compelled to emulate his martyrdom. Believing that rightful rule vanished from earth with the “occultation” (disappearance from view) of the Hidden Imam in 874, they awaited the day when the Imam would return to liberate them and establish God’s rule on earth. Until then, they employed *taqiyya* (dissimulation), practicing as Sunnis in public and hiding their Shi’ite identity so the Hidden Imam would have a cadre of followers to help establish God’s rule on earth.

In a sense, *taqiyya* represented the imams’ desires to achieve an ideal Islamic polity, if not by launching the revolution contingent upon the appearance of the Hidden Imam as the leader of the

community, then at least by preparing the way for such an insurrection in the future. In the meantime, Shi'ites avoided enmity by not publicly expressing their opinions about the shortcomings of Muslim governments.¹⁴

For Shi'ites, religion and politics remained separate. True political power belonged only to God and the Hidden Imam; all temporal power was usurped and false. Shi'ite imams accommodated political rulers out of necessity, but remained mostly outside of politics. They and their followers mistrusted politics as a human endeavor and rarely used war as a political tool. As author John Kelsay explains, "The idea that wars should be fought for 'secular' purposes—for example, the defense of a nation-state (as opposed to a state defined in Islamic terms)—is viewed with some suspicion, as opening the door to indiscriminate resort to and conduct of war."¹⁵ Any military activity to attain political goals, let alone suicide bombing, was outside the canon of accepted Shi'ite thought.

Although their Sunni enemies persecuted them after the occultation, the Shi'ites had a traditional abhorrence of suicide. A Shi'ite story relates how one group of persecuted Shi'ites discussed mass suicide as a way out of their predicament, but rejected the idea. One of them was quoted as saying: "By God, if I knew that my suicide would free me of my sin and reconcile me with my Lord, then I would kill myself! But," he continued, "what was permitted of the Israelites was—regrettably—denied the Muslims."¹⁶

New Shi'ite thought that emerged from Iraq's Najaf seminaries and from Iran in the 1960s challenged Shi'ite quietism and political disengagement. Contemporary thinkers asserted that remembering the sacrifices of martyrs was not enough; only by achieving martyrdom oneself could one help bring about the coming of the Hidden Imam.¹⁷ This claim effectively politicized Shi'ism, ending its quietism. Inspired by clerics such as Sayyed Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini of Iran and Musa al Sadr of Lebanon, a people that had thrived on their own afflictions now espoused a revolutionary ideology of activism. Other leaders soon used Khomeini's and Sadr's ideas to justify suicide bombing as well.

The ideology that led to the Iranian Revolution de-emphasized taqiyya and politicized *shahadat* (martyrdom). According to Khomeini, "stating the right is obligatory," even when doing so put

a believer in danger and was unlikely to effect change.¹⁸ In fact, the entire focus of Shi'ism changed with these revolutionary thinkers. No longer was one to protect oneself through taqiyya; now, one was obliged to die a martyr unless Islam would gain nothing through one's death.


This was a paradigm shift. The new Shi'ite doctrine said: "[D]issimulation is a personal affair, and [it] pertains to individuals placed in a position of weakness in the face of powerful enemies; they dissimulate insofar as they consider that if dissimulation is not made, not only do they lose their lives, but also *no positive advantage is derived from their being killed* [*italics added*]."¹⁹

Contemporary thinkers asserted that remembering the sacrifices of martyrs was not enough; only by achieving martyrdom oneself could one help bring about the coming of the Hidden Imam.

After the Iranian Revolution, the defense of political Shi'ism became paramount. Shi'ites put protection of the ideals of the Iranian Revolution ahead of self-protection. Khomeini believed that protecting the ideals of the revolution would bring about the Hidden Imam's arrival.

Formerly, Shi'ites had looked upon the call to jihad with skepticism. War for self-defense was always permitted, but more traditional Shi'ite thinkers preferred to look at such a war as *defaa* (defense), not jihad.²⁰ Only the Hidden Imam could declare jihad when he came out from occultation.²¹ Khomeini agreed that defensive wars are *defaa*, not jihad; however, he lowered the threshold for such military actions and said participation in them was mandatory for true believers:

- "If the enemy invades the cities of Moslems and their borders, it is obligatory for all Moslems to defend those by any means possible, forsaking life and belongings. And in this case the permission of the religious ruler is not needed.



AFP

Musa al-Sadr with members of his community in Beirut. Sadr established the Amal movement, which played a major role in Lebanon's 1975–90 civil war before the creation of Hezbollah.

- If the Moslems fear that the foreigners have a plot to subjugate their cities, either directly or through their agents, from outside or inside, it is obligatory that they defend the Islamic countries by any means possible.

- If, within the Islamic countries, plots have been laid by foreigners, with the fear that they may dominate Islamic countries, it is obligatory for Moslems to foil their plot by any means possible and to obstruct the spread of their influence.”²²

The mere premonition that foreigners *might* overly influence, let alone attack, an Islamic state justified using “any means possible” to fight them. Shi’ism had once been a religion of private belief, but in the hands of Khomeini, it became a religion with political goals. According to Khomeini, clerics should run all government functions and there should be no separation of religion and politics.²³

In Lebanon, Musa al Sadr also politicized Shi’ism

in an effort to mobilize Shi’ites to seek greater political power and fairer treatment. Sadr’s followers did not subscribe to the radical ideas espoused by Khomeini; they “wanted improved material conditions, government protection, equal opportunity, and a better future for their children.”²⁴ However, by including political and religious goals in a single sphere of action, Sadr, like Khomeini, declared that a theologically legitimate defense by “any means possible” was a political affair, and acceptable. Fighting for justice now instead of waiting for justice later, when the Hidden Imam reappeared, became a Shi’a mantra in Lebanon.²⁵ According to Gilles Kepel, an expert on the modern Middle East, “[Sadr] turned Hussein’s martyrdom into the doctrinal template for a general mobilization against social injustice, which for the first time raised the despised Shi’ites of Lebanon to the level of a real political force by giving them a sense of personal dignity.”²⁶ Sadr created a politicized Shi’ite movement in Lebanon before the Iranian Revolution occurred. Then, in 1978, he disappeared.

Sadr’s disappearance, like Hussein’s martyrdom, sowed the seeds of resistance against occupation and control of Lebanon by foreign powers. The charged political atmosphere he had created and the political vacuum left by his disappearance became a fertile breeding ground for Khomeini’s revolutionary ideas. A new group of Shi’ite activists formed Hezbollah, the “Party of God.” They developed a doctrine in which self-martyrdom through suicide bombing for the sake of political gain became the ultimate expression of piety. Khomeini had politicized martyrdom, but the leap from political martyrdom to self-martyrdom required considerable theological development by Hezbollah’s clerics.²⁷

Hezbollah developed a doctrine of suicide bombing and put it to great use militarily and politically in defeating what it perceived to be foreign invaders of Lebanon. But while the need that gave rise to the tactic was clearly political, Hezbollah developed the doctrine of self-martyrdom within the framework of the highly politicized Shi’ite jurisprudence emanating from Iran. Hezbollah’s connection to the Iranian revolutionary clerics and in particular Khomeini is evident in its Open Letter of 1985: “We, the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic state, abide by

the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini . . . ”²⁸

Even so, a doctrine of suicide bombing required a significant leap from the Iranian culture of martyrdom. Ayatollah Morteza Mutaharri, who helped inspire the Iranian Revolution, has explained the difficulty in developing a theological rationale for suicide bombing. In defining suicide and shahadat in an Islamic treatise, Mutaharri illuminates the oxymoronic nature of suicide bombing: “Self-murder: In this case, the death itself constitutes a crime, and hence, *it is the worst kind of death* [italics added]. Suicidal deaths and the deaths of those who are killed in motor accidents because of their own fault come under this category. The same is the case of the death of those who are killed while committing a crime. But shahadat is the death of a person who, in spite of being fully conscious of the risks involved, willingly faces them for the sake of a sacred cause, or, as the Qur’an says, *fi sabil Allah* (in the way of God).”²⁹

According to Mutaharri, suicide was the worst kind of death and martyrdom the best. This assertion posed a quandary for Hezbollah’s theologians, so Fadlallah developed a theological argument based on the politicization of martyrdom that overcame Shi’ite prohibitions against suicide.

During the Lebanese Civil War, Fadlallah underwent a profound religious transformation when the town in which he worked was shelled for days by the Maronites. In his 1976 *Al Islam wa Mantaq al Quwa* (Islam and the Logic of Force), Fadlallah argues for strength and force to establish justice. He says that without power, Shi’ites could neither spread the words of God nor uplift His people; therefore, God loved all who used violence to fight for His sake. This use of violence in the name of Islam did not, however, include suicide bombing.³⁰ Fadlallah’s understanding was more in line with that of Khomeini, Sadr, and the other revolutionary clerics of the time. He would need other sources of inspiration to develop a sound theological argument to permit suicide bombing.

Shi’ism recognizes reason as a source of Islamic jurisprudence.³¹ This tradition paved the way for Fadlallah’s theological justification of suicide bombing. As did Khomeini, Fadlallah subscribed to the notion that any means was justified when fight-

ing in defense. This was an extraordinary notion, but one shared by many. According to Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, “When unbelief threatens the existence of faith . . . even customary rules of warfare may be suspended.”³² Fadlallah asserted that this belief was not so different than one held by many in the West. According to Fadlallah, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with their vast tolls of human life, were examples of the belief by many that desperation justifies the use of weapons not customarily accepted as normal in warfare.³³

Fadlallah proclaimed that Lebanon’s occupation by foreign powers, most importantly the MNF and the Israelis, and the attempt by those foreigners to preserve a Christian-dominated government in Lebanon, created a defensive situation in which all means of warfare were legitimate. Hezbollah went even further than Khomeini. In its Open Letter it called the resistance a jihad instead of just a defaa.³⁴ As a result, it was mandatory for believers to participate in the resistance, and they were to use any means necessary. Martyrdom was the highest form of death, and circumstances required believers to commit acts of martyrdom and self-sacrifice.

Another argument held that because Imam Hussein had known of his impending martyrdom at Karbala but still chose to fight there, suicide bombing was acceptable.³⁵ Just as Hussein had known of his impending martyrdom, so, too, would the suicide bomber, and because his suicide was a means of jihad against foreign dominance, it was theologically acceptable. It was not really suicide but warfare in God’s name: “Suicide,” Fadlallah said, “is not an absolute value. It is an option left to a people who are without options, and so the act is no longer considered suicide but martyrdom in the name of self-defense. This is part of the logic of war.”³⁶

According to Fadlallah, it was the self-sacrifice, not the suicide, that mattered. Fadlallah used Hussein’s death at Karbala, as well as Sadr’s disappearance, to provide historical models of emulation to justify the sacrifice of the young men who would blow themselves up.³⁷ As an added incentive, martyrs who died in a legitimate act of jihad would go to heaven without their other deeds on earth being scrutinized by God.³⁸

It was the Iranian clerics who finally cemented a doctrine of self-sacrifice and martyrdom into

The decision to use suicide bombing was a direct result of Hezbollah's understanding of the weapon's military value and the belief that such bombings could effect political change.

Shi'ism. Ali Shariati, whose ideas helped form the basis of the Iranian Revolution and who was assassinated by the Shah's secret police in 1977, wrote, "*Shahadat* is an invitation to all generations, in all ages, if you cannot kill your oppressor, then die."³⁹ In 1983, Khomeini called for Shi'ites around the world to continue to engage in acts of self-sacrifice to ensure the export of his Revolution.⁴⁰

From all of this, Fadlallah assembled what he thought was a rational argument for suicide bombing based on—

- The belief that extraordinary challenges to Islam authorized the use of extraordinary measures to combat threats to the faith.
- The belief that Imam Hussein had prior knowledge of his martyrdom.
- The politicization of martyrdom.
- Khomeini's call for self-sacrifice in order to export the Revolution.

Thus, the theological justification of suicide bombing was based on rational thought within the scope of radical Shi'ite jurisprudence. This justification was in place before Hezbollah sent out its first suicide bombers. Even so, Fadlallah's justification of suicide bombing was not reason enough to use this new method; it simply made the weapon available. The decision to use suicide bombing was a direct result of Hezbollah's understanding of the weapon's military value and the belief that such bombings could effect political change.

A Practical Tactic

In October 1983, when Islamic Jihad (one of the pseudonyms used by the then-relatively unknown Hezbollah) used suicide bombers to blow up the Marine barracks and the French peacekeepers' compound in Beirut, most Westerners deplored the bombings as pointless acts of violence carried out

by Muslims intent on little more than killing. This first impression was a long lasting one, and even as Hezbollah turned the focus of its suicide bombings toward other targets after the MNF left Lebanon, Westerners continued to view such events as evidence of senseless Islamist fanaticism. However, Hezbollah's decision to use suicide bombing was anything but irrational. After justifying the practice theologically, the group carefully weighed the military and political consequences of the tactic as compared to other tactics they could employ. With a thoughtful understanding of the capabilities of this weapon and the political goals it might help attain, Hezbollah carefully timed suicide-bombing operations to make their enemies pay significant military and political costs.

Hezbollah's leaders identified early on the political goals they hoped to achieve in Lebanon. Abbas Mussawi, the founder and leader of Hezbollah until the Israelis assassinated him, emphasized these goals. Hezbollah, he said, aimed to "boot colonialism out of Lebanon, repulse Israel (from southern Lebanon) and set up an Islamic republic" through armed struggle and social action."⁴¹

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, an early Hezbollah leader who became the group's secretary general after Mussawi's assassination, also identified the political goals of the movement. In a 1984 sermon he announced: "We oppose the programs and platform of the illegal and non-canonical government of Amin al-Jumayyil [Lebanon's president from 1982 to 1988] or any other military individual dependent on the superpowers. We shall continue our struggle until the Al-Jumayyil government is toppled. America, France, and Israel are enemies of Islam. We declare here that we follow the path of the Islamic Revolution and do not accept any other government in Lebanon."⁴²

Clearly, the goals of removing the government and kicking out foreign powers, though couched in the language of Islam, were predominantly political. To achieve them, Hezbollah decided to resort to arms. According to Fadlallah, the goal of armed conflict was to lift the yoke of oppression from the Shi'ites of Lebanon; it was a "revolt for their freedom."⁴³ Fadlallah declared that armed conflict would continue "until [Israel] leaves the last border strip."⁴⁴ Thus, Hezbollah's decision to use suicide bombing was a practical one: The group believed the tactic

would be useful in achieving its political goals.


Hezbollah demonstrated military pragmatism by using what worked and discarding what did not. Even though it could not take on the Israelis in conventional fighting, the organization determined to “face force with equal or superior force.”⁴⁵ This entailed the use of unconventional, asymmetric tactics—specifically, the suicide bomber. When Israel used new tactics or weapons to counter Hezbollah’s tactics, Hezbollah developed new, sometimes more successful tactics of its own.⁴⁶ According to a political spokesman for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Hezbollah was the only one of the many militias in Lebanon that reviewed its military actions to determine what it could do better the next time around: “These guys learn from their mistakes.”⁴⁷ Hezbollah’s constant review of the results of its military actions underlines the practicality of their military decisionmaking. In short, they conducted operations for their military value. Their decision to use suicide bombing was a practical one based on the military capabilities of this form of attack.

Hezbollah was certainly able and willing to carry out other forms of attack. In 3 hours in December 1983, in locations from Tyre to Sidon in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah (this time calling itself the Lebanese National Resistance) attacked the Israelis with rockets, machine guns, grenades, and remotely controlled roadside bombs.⁴⁸ Clearly, suicide bombing was not the only weapon or tactic Hezbollah had at its disposal; rather, the group favored suicide bombing because it provided a number of military advantages over more conventional tactics, such as ambushes and grenade attacks. David Benjamin and Steven Simon provide some key insights into these advantages: “[Using a suicide truck bomb] meant that if the driver stayed with the truck bomb, moving it as close to the target as possible, the attack would maximize the number of casualties. The driver himself would not be around afterward to name accomplices, minimizing the damage to the organization.”⁴⁹

The determined suicide bomber could almost always do some damage to the

enemy in his attack. Dressed as a civilian, not fearing death, and determined to take as many of the enemy with him as possible, the suicide attacker was tremendously effective. One Israeli general in southern Lebanon described it best when he said simply that suicide bombing “is a phenomenon which is hard to fight.”⁵⁰

Hezbollah was careful in how it employed suicide bombing. Although the tactic meant that the attacker could not be captured and give information to the enemy, the attack diminished the combat power of the organization through the bomber’s death. Too many suicide attacks that did not cause significant enemy casualties would erode Hezbollah’s already small numbers while providing little military advantage. Furthermore, the tactic was one of diminishing



Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi, founder and leader of the Hezbollah (the Party of God) movement, poses 10 July 1985 in front of a portrait of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini, in Baalbeck, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah stronghold in Bekaa Valley.

returns. If Hezbollah used it too often, the Israelis would adapt to it, and if the attacks stopped causing casualties and yielding political benefits, it was less likely that there would be a corps of suicide bombers willing to participate. Fadlallah understood this: “We believe that suicide operations should only be carried out if they can bring about a political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb. As such, the operations launched by Moslems against Israeli intelligence centers in Tyre or Metulla were successful in that they significantly harmed the Israelis. But the present circumstances do not favor such operations anymore, and attacks that only inflict limited casualties (on the enemy) and destroy the building should not be encouraged, if the price is the death of the person who carries them out.”⁵¹

Hezbollah used suicide bombings in a limited set of circumstances where it could hope to make serious gains. Often, Hezbollah’s judicious use of the tactic clearly resulted in the successful accomplishment of political-military goals. The clarity with which one can infer the intended political-military objectives from the timing and success of individual attacks testifies to Hezbollah’s understanding of the political situation, and its knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the suicide attack.

By April 1983, the United States and Israel had moved to establish Maronite dominance in Lebanon and to secure a Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty.⁵² The signing of such a treaty was antithetical to all that Hezbollah stood for. It gave Israel permanent political influence in Lebanon, allowed its forces to remain in south Lebanon, and gave the Maronites international legitimacy as Lebanon’s political rulers. Hezbollah had to act.

The organization’s first suicide attack came during the afternoon of 18 April 1983, when a suicide bomber from “Islamic Jihad” blew himself up in a car near the U.S. Embassy, killing and wounding a number of Lebanese Army soldiers and Americans (including Robert Ames, the CIA station chief) and collapsing a portion of the embassy compound.⁵³ The bombing was a tactical success because it succeeded in killing Americans and severely damaging the embassy. It also resulted in some strategic benefits for Hezbollah: It so disrupted the peace talks that both the Israelis and the

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Americans felt the need to declare that the talks were still ongoing despite the bombing.⁵⁴ According to an American source quoted by Beirut Voice of Lebanon radio, the Americans quickly understood that the bombing had been “specifically aimed at frustrating President Reagan’s initiative on Lebanon and the Middle East.”⁵⁵

Of course, the centerpiece of this initiative was the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty. Hezbollah achieved a moderate success with this first attack. A treaty that many thought would be signed quickly took another full month to negotiate, and it took even longer to get the Lebanese Parliament to approve it. This was an omen of things to come.

On 23 October 1983, Hezbollah seized the world stage with the Marine barracks and French compound bombings.⁵⁶ It revealed the intended outcomes of this double suicide bombing a month later, in a radio broadcast justifying the attacks and threatening more to come: “It has become certain to us that our enemies will not leave our country unless we fight them. . . . At-Tufayli made an oath by God that death will reach them at the hands of the believers [al-mu’minin] even if they are in lofty fortresses.”⁵⁷ By establishing a clear political objective, Hezbollah was letting the allies know it sought specific goals through the use of this weapon. The violence was not just random; Hezbollah wanted the members of the MNF to know that. It gave the MNF a choice: Leave Lebanon, or die.

Hezbollah continued to use threats to pressure the MNF to leave. By March of the next year, Hezbollah was warning Lebanese citizens to stay clear of French positions because the positions would be targets until the French left Lebanon.⁵⁸ The organization wanted the foreigners to know it had the means and the will to kill soldiers, and nowhere would be safe. Such messages were meant

to undermine public support in the United States and elsewhere by making the mission seem too risky. The tactic worked: “Hezbollah calculated correctly that the United States could be prompted to act in a certain way if the costs of its current policy were too high.”⁵⁹ Hezbollah’s political message—with the exclamation point of the double suicide bombings—was heard loud and clear. The MNF pulled out of Lebanon.

Within a few days of the October bombings, on 4 November, Hezbollah used the suicide attack again. This time the target was the Israeli Security Services (Shin Bet) base in Tyre. The bombing injured and killed a number of Israelis even though the Israelis had been alerted to the threat by the barracks attacks. Hezbollah’s political goal quickly became clear. Once again identifying itself as Islamic Jihad, the organization announced that its operation had abrogated the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty and that suicide attacks would continue until the treaty was done away with.⁶⁰

The Tyre attack also achieved military gains. When Hezbollah succeeded in bombing a major Israeli target despite the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF’s) knowing that such attacks were likely, it unsettled the Israelis, forcing them to question their ability to protect themselves from an enemy who seemed to have an unstoppable weapon. The bombing also forced the Israelis to move out of population centers, with the result that Hezbollah could move freely among the populace and limit collateral damage to civilian bystanders when they carried out attacks against the Israelis.⁶¹ Hezbollah had learned from earlier Palestinian-Israeli battles that collateral damage could turn a civilian populace against the cause of liberation, as it seemed to have done not only for the Palestinians but also for the Israelis. Therefore, driving the Israelis to outposts where they could have little influence over the civilian populace, and where Hezbollah could attack them without hurting civilians, was a major military success.

Operations after 1983 demonstrated the sophistication of Hezbollah’s suicide attacks and their harmonization with political and military goals. A suicide car-bomb attack against the British Embassy on 20 September 1984 almost succeeded in killing both the American and British ambassadors to Lebanon.⁶² The attack demonstrated that not

even the ambassadors of foreign powers seeking to influence Lebanon could operate with impunity. Hezbollah also showed it could develop and execute such attacks quickly. On 8 March 1985, a bomb, likely planted by the CIA but at the time believed to have been planted by the Israelis, blew up outside Fadlallah’s residence in Beirut, killing numerous people but leaving Fadlallah unharmed. Just two days later, on 10 March, Hezbollah responded with a suicide bomber who attacked an IDF convoy, killing 10 soldiers.⁶³ Hezbollah sought to demonstrate that no military act against them would go unanswered, and that its answer would always entail the deaths of its enemies.

By the end of 1985, Hezbollah had succeeded in driving out the MNF and in forcing the IDF to withdraw from Beirut and a large portion of southern Lebanon to a small sliver of land in the south. Trying to hasten Israel’s pull-back and eject it altogether from Lebanese soil, Hezbollah staged at least 12 suicide bombings from the middle of the year until November. Several of the attacks were carried out by bombers on donkeys.⁶⁴ These bombings were unambiguous political and military messages that Israeli soldiers would continue to die until their withdrawal from Lebanon was complete.

In 1986 and beyond, as suicide bombings began to yield fewer enemy casualties, Hezbollah used them less frequently, although they remained a potent threat. One suicide bomber blew himself up in October 1988, killing eight IDF soldiers. Knowing that this would provoke an Israeli counterattack, Hezbollah threatened to execute two Israeli soldiers captured in February 1986 if the Israelis mounted a ground attack against them.⁶⁵ These asymmetric tactics—a suicide bombing followed by a threat to execute prisoners—demonstrated Hezbollah’s ability to adapt and innovate in pursuit of its military and political objectives.

Legitimacy via Suicide Bombing

The political landscape during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) was utterly chaotic. Not only were warring factions almost too numerous to count, but for almost 2 decades Syria, Israel, the United States, France, Italy, Great Britain, and a handful of Iranians took part in military action in Lebanon. Israel and Syria sought to dominate the country (only Syria succeeded). Within this landscape, people

naturally became cynical, viewing most militias as groups of thugs, one group not much different from the other. In this environment, Hezbollah rose above the crowd as a pious defender of a true ideal. On top of its religious and military implications, Hezbollah's use of suicide bombing was the avenue through which it pursued legitimacy both within the country and abroad. Hezbollah claimed to be the protector of Lebanon, intent on ending factionalism and driving out foreigners—at least non-Syrian ones—who sought to dominate Lebanon. Suicide bombing would be their proof.

According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, "Religious fundamentalism thrives on a sense of embattlement..."⁶⁶ Hezbollah did not have to do anything to create that sense of embattlement among disenfranchised Shi'ites in southern Lebanon and the slums of Beirut. These Shi'ites lived in war zones where warring parties wreaked havoc on their homes and places of work and where the government sought to deprive them of the power that their majority status should have yielded. A sense of embattlement had caused earlier generations of Shi'ites to join the ranks of Musa al Sadr's Amal. After al Sadr died, Amal lost much of its popular appeal and seemed to be little different from the other groups vying for dominance. When Mussawi sought to swing Amal to an Islamic path in line with the Iranian Revolution, he was booted out of the organization. In response, he created Islamic Amal in 1982, the precursor to Hezbollah.⁶⁷ Islamic Amal sought legitimacy through resistance to the Israeli occupation and through Islam.

But for an incident that took place in Nabatiya on 16 October 1983, Mussawi's new group might have remained just another face in the crowd of thugs that dominated the country. But on that day, an Israeli convoy in Nabatiya drove into the middle of a Shi'ite procession marking Ashura. The Shi'ites responded by overturning several Israeli vehicles and throwing rocks at the soldiers, who then fired into the crowd, killing and wounding several Shi'ites. The Shi'ites saw this as a sacrilege, and the entire community turned against Israel and the MNF, which it perceived to be Israel's lackey.⁶⁸ Amal and other Shi'ite organizations responded mostly with words. Shams al-Din, the head Shi'ite in Lebanon, responded to the incident by calling for civil disobedience against the Israelis, forbidding

cooperation of any sort with Israeli troops, demanding an end to factionalism, asking that the government pay attention to the plight of the Shi'ites, and calling for the unity of Lebanon.⁶⁹

While Amal and Shams al-Din responded with words, Hezbollah responded with action: the bombings of the Marine and French quarters and the Shin Bet building in Tyre. Shams al-Din asked the population to employ civil disobedience and wait "years before we achieve our final objective."⁷⁰ Hezbollah sought to achieve that final objective as quickly as possible through military action.

Suicide bombers represented altruistic resistance to foreign occupation in the eyes of many Lebanese, not just Shi'ites. In a country torn by corrupt, greedy factions, the selflessness of the suicide bomber gave Hezbollah the moral high ground and, thus, a measure of legitimacy. That legitimacy was increased by bombings undertaken after Hezbollah's 1985 Open Letter. The sincerity of the letter, which espoused piety and dedication to the cause of freeing Lebanon from foreign domination and factionalism, was proven to the eyes of a once-skeptical public by the selfless actions of Hezbollah's martyrs.⁷¹

Hezbollah's bid for legitimacy proved extremely successful. Augustus Richard Norton writes that by 1985, "[Amal] was profoundly challenged by the more radical Hizballah.... Hizballah supplanted Amal in the environs of Beirut..."⁷² Hezbollah's success in legitimizing its cause through suicide bombing was underlined by the rush of its competitors, especially the Syrians, to use the tactic. In response to the growing popularity of Hezbollah, other groups began to advertise the number of suicide attacks and guerrilla operations in which they were involved, often inflating the number to give themselves more credibility as resistance fighters. Various groups called international and local news organizations to claim as many suicide bombings as they could.⁷³ Clearly, other groups thought that suicide bombing and claims of attacking Israelis and other foreigners was an effective path to legitimacy.

Hezbollah's suicide bombers served as models, inspiring others to join the fight. Martyrs had long been a source of inspiration, if not emulation, for pious Shi'ites, and the suicide bombers seemed to have lived and died deaths worthy of the 12 Imams and the other great heroes of Shi'ism.⁷⁴ Pious

Shi'ites extolled the bombers' sacrifices and sought to inspire other young men to emulate them. Indeed, young children "play[ed] martyr" under the eyes of approving teachers.⁷⁵ Throughout the south Lebanon countryside, signs commemorated the heroism of the suicide bomber. One such sign read: "On October 19, 1988 at 1:25 p.m. a martyr car that was body-trapped with 500 kilogram of highly exploding materials transformed two Israeli troops into masses of fire and limbs, in one of the severe kicks that the Israeli army had received in Lebanon."⁷⁶

Hezbollah turned suicide bombing into the paradigm of resistance. Others, inspired by the group's dedication, sought to resist on their own. Several women who were not Hezbollah members conducted suicide bombings, as did a would-be suicide bomber from Mali (who was foiled in his attempt).⁷⁷ Accolades showered on Hezbollah's self-martyrs caused others to follow in their footsteps and inspired international recognition of Hezbollah as the legitimate resistance in Lebanon. Writers as far away as Tripoli extolled the virtues of Hezbollah and the suicide attack.⁷⁸ The attack developed into an effective propaganda tool, became the symbol that defined a movement, and to many who supported its goals, legitimized Hezbollah members as the bearers of the resistance.

Last Words

Although Westerners, at least initially, viewed suicide bombing as pointless violence done in the name of Islam, they were mistaken. Hezbollah thought deeply about the theological implications of the weapon, its capabilities and limitations, the political and military goals that it could help

achieve, and its propaganda value. Hezbollah's favored tactic was far from being illogical; in fact, given the political situation and the culture, it was quite rational and perhaps even moral.

Had suicide bombing been the work of an irrational, irresponsible organization, the goals the organization sought to achieve would not have been so clear, nor would the organization have achieved as much militarily or politically as Hezbollah did in the 1980s. Combining suicide bombing with other guerrilla tactics, Hezbollah achieved the greatest possible military effect. The organization also understood that suicide bombing could function domestically as an effective propaganda tool, one that could legitimize Hezbollah within the Lebanese political scene.

In a world that now abounds with human bombs, from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to the war in Chechnya, to Afghanistan and Iraq, understanding suicide bombing as a multifaceted phenomenon is vital to developing counter-tactics. Although some will not use suicide bombing as wisely or judiciously as Hezbollah, suicide bombing has become an omnipresent threat on the modern battlefield and a threat that, to be countered, must be understood for what it really is: an effective, time-tested tactic that in competent hands can be used to achieve political-military objectives. Further study will determine whether the framework of analysis used here to explain Hezbollah's use of suicide bombing in the 1980s applies equally to other groups who employ the tactic. If this analysis is applicable, then counterterrorist organizations must develop tactics that seek to undermine the religious, military, and political logic of the weapon. **MR**

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
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A Dragon in the Andes? China, Venezuela, and U.S. Energy Security

Daniel P. Erikson

IN AUGUST 2005, the Venezuelan daily *El Universal* published an interview with Ambassador Ju Yijie, the Chinese envoy to Caracas. When asked if China's demand for Venezuelan oil could push the United States out of Venezuela's market, the ambassador asserted that "China has the potential to do it." He then quickly added, "Though I don't see the necessity for any of the countries involved."¹ The exchange highlighted the growing tension between China, the United States, and Venezuela over the fate of Venezuela's oil reserves as China's influence in the Western Hemisphere continues to expand.

Does China's increasing role in South America's energy sector represent a threat to U.S. interests? In recent years, this question has provoked unease among U.S. policymakers who see a dangerous convergence of three worrisome trends. The first is the rise of China as a global economic power that may seek to challenge U.S. dominance over the next quarter-century. Second, U.S. influence in Latin America appears to be in flux as a number of the region's leaders, led by Venezuela's left-leaning President Hugo Chávez, have embraced populist politics and adopted anti-American stances. Third, ensuring access to energy sources has become a central U.S. security concern because a tight global oil market has caused crude oil prices to soar to more than \$70 per barrel. Against this backdrop, China's increased efforts to tap into energy reserves in the Western Hemisphere have reverberated throughout the region, with potentially profound consequences for U.S. energy security.

The Global Oil Squeeze

China's need for oil has surged dramatically since the country first became a net oil importer in 1993. By 2003, China had overtaken Japan to become the second largest oil importer in the world (after the United States). According to the U.S. Energy Department, China now accounts for 40 percent of the global growth of oil demand since 2001. In fact, China's oil consumption is increasing 7 times more quickly than that of the United States, at a rate of 7.5 percent annually.² The Paris-based International Energy Agency predicts that, by 2030, Chinese oil imports will equal imports by the United States today.

Meanwhile, the United States, which consumes 25 percent of the world's oil despite accounting for only 3 percent of world production, continues to rely on global oil markets, a fact that has created an enduring source of vulnerability.³ Today, for the first time since the 1980s, the balance of economic bargaining

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power has swung toward oil-producing countries, thanks mainly to increased demand as developing states such as China and India replicate the United States' dependence on imports. How long this situation will last is anyone's guess, but it appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

While China continues to import a majority of its oil from the Middle East—and that percentage is due to rise in the coming decades—it has increasingly focused on finding other suppliers, especially in the Western Hemisphere. One result

has been the consummation of numerous oil and gas deals with Canada and countries in South America, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Consequently, some in Washington are becoming apprehensive about China's attempts to tap into the hemisphere's energy sources, and bilateral tensions threaten to grow over time if competition for oil becomes more acute.

Beijing's Southern Thrust

In an effort to reduce Venezuela's dependence on the United States, Hugo Chávez has aggravated U.S. concerns by declaring his desire to seek major alternative markets for his country's crude. China has responded to his overtures by sending mixed signals about its eagerness to serve as an alternative market. On the one hand, China is seeking to portray itself as a rising power with significant interests in the hemisphere, but on the other, its officials continue to suggest that the United States has nothing to worry about.

Despite China's ambiguous public posture, it is clear that its relationship with Latin America generally, and Venezuela specifically, is rapidly expanding. Just a decade ago, China was viewed as a peripheral actor in the region; today, though far from being a dominant player (China only accounts



Chinese President Jiang Zemin, left, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez exchange signed agreements in Caracas, Venezuela, 17 April 2001. Jiang and Chavez signed accords on agriculture, taxation, and energy.

for 1 percent of current overall foreign investment in Latin America), it has nevertheless become a relevant influence in hemispheric affairs.

This growing influence results from China's effective economic penetration of Latin America over the past 10 years, a phenomenon that has intensified since 2001. In that year, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's landmark visit to the region was followed by a wave of exchanges by Chinese and Latin American senior officials and business leaders to discuss political, economic, and military concerns. Jiang's successor, Hu Jintao, traveled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba in 2004 and visited Mexico in 2005. The presidents of all of these countries (and several others) have subsequently paid reciprocal visits to China.

Growing political engagement accompanied the skyrocketing volume of trade between China and the region. In the past 6 years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than sixfold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated \$50 billion in 2005. China has become a principal consumer of food, minerals, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the region's commodity-producing countries (particularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile). China has also become a strong competitor with the



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Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner and China's Hu Jintao drink a toast 28 June 2004 during a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Hu and Kirchner agreed to step up economic and trade ties.

United States in manufactured goods, making deep inroads into markets in Mexico and Central America and, more recently, in Brazil and Argentina.

To provide perspective, it is important to note that although half of China's overseas investments in 2004 were made in Latin America, the total only reached a relatively modest \$6.5 billion. However, China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to \$100 billion by 2014. (With several investment pledges already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere, the Chinese have begun to suggest that this figure was taken out of context.) Overall, China's economic engagement in Latin America dovetails well with the trade requirements of a booming economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent a year for the past 25 years.

Rising Chinese influence in Latin America has prompted some U.S. officials and members of Congress to view China as the most serious challenge to U.S. economic and security interests in the region since the end of the cold war. U.S. policymakers cite concerns about continued allied access to the Panama Canal, the deployment of Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti, China's support for Cuba's Fidel Castro, and Beijing's growing claims to Venezuelan oil.

Although these concerns may be overly alarmist,

Chinese competition for Latin America's energy resources has clearly created a new and uncertain dynamic for U.S. policymakers. Even the most benign interpretations of Chinese penetration into Latin American markets—that China is growing and needs resources, while the region is searching for new customers—implies a potential loss for U.S. business interests. The more ominous view, however, posits the eventual emergence of an anti-American alliance led by China and Venezuela that might include other energy-exporting nations in Latin America and elsewhere. Such an alliance could potentially isolate and undermine the U.S. economy. Some analysts worry that if emboldened or threatened, this new alliance might seek to engage in a form of asymmetric warfare against the United States by cutting off vital oil supplies. Given current constraints, however, such drastic action would be difficult to carry out and would inflict greater harm on the perpetrating countries than on the United States itself.

U.S.-Venezuela Tensions

Setting aside the security concerns raised by China's larger regional role, Venezuela has independently evolved to become a major preoccupation of the United States. Elected in 1998 with overwhelming popular support, Hugo Chávez has since been re-elected under a new constitution in 2000, survived a short-lived coup in 2002, withstood a strike by employees of the state-owned oil company PDVSA in 2003, and triumphed in a referendum on his rule in 2004. He seems well-positioned to retain power in a presidential election scheduled for later this year. Since 1998, Chávez has consolidated his control over most major institutions of government, and domestic opposition to his regime has withered.

The United States is particularly concerned about Chávez's openly stated policy to use Venezuela's resources and influence to undermine the U.S. both regionally and globally. In support of such policy objectives, Chávez has gradually embarked upon a program of outreach to such avowed U.S. enemies as Cuba and, more recently, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Venezuela has also adopted a hawkish position in OPEC and has backed policies to maintain high oil prices.

Chávez has been particularly active in the Americas. Working with Cuba, Venezuela has spearheaded a regional social and investment pact known as the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America, or ALBA, a rejoinder to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas. Bolivia has now joined ALBA, led by its president, Evo Morales, who was elected overwhelmingly last December following a campaign critical of U.S. influence in the region. Morales's recent decision to nationalize Bolivia's vast gas reserves is thought to have been mentored by Chávez.

Venezuela's ties to Iran have provoked even greater unease among U.S. policymakers. Former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami has visited Caracas three times, signing a range of economic cooperation agreements. Venezuela's support of Iran has extended to publicly defending Iran's nuclear energy program with an expressed interest in collaborating on nuclear technology. The possibility of Venezuela claiming a seat on the U.N. Security Council at a time of increasing confrontation over Iran's nuclear program is now keeping U.S. diplomats awake at night.

U.S.-Venezuelan relations were already tense when the U.S. Department of State appeared to endorse the overthrow of Chávez in 2002. Since then, relations have deteriorated to a historic low with Chávez now regularly launching public criticism, personal insults, and barbs against the Bush administration and its members. U.S. officials have found it hard to resist responding. During her Senate confirmation hearing in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice characterized Venezuela as a "negative force" in the region. More recently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld likened Chávez to Hitler.

Despite all the bitter public rhetoric, the U.S. and Venezuela remain locked in a mutually beneficial relationship based on oil. Venezuela continues to

sell 1.5 million barrels per day to the United States, making it the U.S.'s fourth largest oil supplier and accounting for about 14 percent of total U.S. imports. More than half of Venezuela's oil exports go to the United States, with much of it processed through the PDVSA-owned company CITGO, which has 6 oil and asphalt refineries in the U.S. able to refine 860,000 barrels per day, a storage capacity of 24 million barrels, and a network of 13,800 service stations across the U.S.⁴

Given existing technological constraints, it would be extremely difficult for Venezuela to replace its sales to the U.S. market. Venezuela's crude oil has a typical sulfur content of 4 to 5 percent, which is much higher than the sour crude from the Middle East/Gulf region. The light, sweet crude of the Middle East yields 95 percent finished fuel products such as gasoline and aviation fuel.⁵ By comparison, Venezuelan heavy crude yields 65-percent-finished fuel products, and only after a complex refining process. (Otherwise, the crude is used as asphalt.) Therefore, perhaps the most crucial factor sustaining the U.S.-Venezuelan oil relationship is that U.S.-based CITGO refineries have an unmatched capacity to refine heavy Venezuelan crude.

Technological factors notwithstanding, the U.S.-Venezuela oil relationship is driven by strong market logic based on supply and demand and low transportation costs due to geographic proximity. Oil sales to China, on the other hand, translate into much greater shipping costs and narrower profit margins for the Venezuelan suppliers. In other words, market factors and the U.S.'s unique ability to refine large amounts of Venezuelan oil guarantee, at least in the foreseeable future, a stable energy relationship no matter how high the political tensions.

Venezuela-China: Increasing Links

Venezuela is now the largest single recipient of China's overall investment in Latin America. This investment is mainly concentrated in two oil fields under development by the China National Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec). By 2000, trade between China and Venezuela had already hit \$351 million, which represented an 86 percent increase over the previous year, while Chinese investment in Venezuela totaled \$530 million.⁶

When Jiang Zemin visited Venezuela during his six-country swing through Latin America in



The sun sets behind an oil field of Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) in Cabimas, Venezuela, 500 km (300 miles) west of Caracas, Venezuela.

AP

April 2001, he found a willing ally in Chávez, who proclaimed his admiration for Mao, backed China's effort to host the 2008 Olympics, and most importantly, pledged to oppose a U.N. resolution to censure China for its human rights record. Chávez declared that "we don't believe any country in the world has the right to condemn another.... We are going to vote against the resolution."⁷ He also announced that he would write a letter of condolence to the family of a Chinese fighter pilot killed in a collision with a U.S. spy plane earlier that month. The agreements signed during Jiang's trip included a \$60 million investment in a tractor factory and a number of accords on energy, mining, agriculture, and taxation. Chávez also said that the two countries discussed the joint manufacturing of Chinese K-8 and Y-12 military training and cargo planes in Venezuela.

In May 2001, Chávez returned to Beijing for 5 days, during which Jiang remarked that China had "a positive attitude towards formulating a 10-year plan of cooperation between the two countries."⁸ Chávez presented Jiang with Venezuela's top honor, the Liberator's Medal, and a deal was struck allowing China to buy Venezuelan oil in exchange for a crucial loan to Venezuela's farming sector. The two countries also signed a Strategic Energy Plan that extends to 2011. The plan provides for Venezuela to increase oil exports to China while boosting its own agricultural production. Jiang endorsed this 10-year plan of cooperation.

A Chinese press release issued during Chávez's visit underlined the two countries' desire to work to create a "multi-polar" world order. Jiang was quoted as saying that "the process of multi-polarization will

be a tortuous and long one, but it is an irreversible historical trend" and "it is important for the Chinese and Venezuelan people to carry out cooperation in the economic and trade, science and technological areas in a down-to-earth and step by step manner."⁹ China has since designated Venezuela a "strategic partner," and the Chávez government has reciprocated by granting coveted "market economy" status to China.

Perhaps mindful of Washington's growing sensitivity to Chinese overtures in the Western Hemisphere, Hu Jintao chose not to visit Venezuela during his 2004 tour of Latin America. Nevertheless, Venezuela remains a central component of China's strategy to enhance its economic and political links with the region.

For its part, Venezuela sees China as a crucial market for its commodity exports, including not only oil and gas but also steel, aluminum, chocolate, and coffee. As it has with other countries in the region, China has proven willing to invest in improving infrastructure to help facilitate exports (for example, developing railway lines and selling train cars). In December 2004, Chávez made a third visit to China, signing oil and gas deals that allowed Chinese companies to invest \$350 million in 15 eastern Venezuelan oil fields, as well as an additional \$60 million in natural gas projects. In turn, Venezuela sought to acquire Chinese radar to improve security along its border with Colombia. This kind of security cooperation is sure to continue. Venezuela and China are already collaborating on building a Simon Bolivar satellite to be launched into space in July 2008, and Chávez vowed close cooperation, saying that "there will be no Chinese secrets from Venezuela in this project."¹⁰

In January 2005, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong signed 19 cooperation agreements with Chávez during a visit to Caracas. Accompanying Zeng were 125 officials and businessmen. China is clearly seeking long term stakes in Venezuela's oil and gas fields. In early 2005, Venezuelan energy minister Rafael Ramirez moved to calm U.S. anxieties about Chinese interests in Venezuelan crude: "The United States should not be concerned. This expansion in no way means that we will be withdrawing from the North American market for political reasons."¹¹

However, in August 2005 PDVSA opened a representative office in China, and in November Sinopec signed two contracts with PDVSA for crude and heating oil. Imports of Venezuelan oil are going up: China's customs administration has reported that the country imported 1.93 million tons of Venezuelan sour and heavy crude in 2005, nearly 6 times more than was imported in 2004. Venezuela has set a goal of selling 300,000 barrels per day of petroleum and petroleum derivatives to China. Caracas is also building up its oil shipping fleet for sales to Asian countries, in particular China. These moves have aggravated suspicions among some observers that China and Venezuela may be conspiring to cut off oil supplies to the United States, thereby dealing a body blow to an American economy already anxious about high fuel prices.

China is also moving to improve its ability to use and refine Venezuela's sour oil. The nation's refineries have begun blending sour with lighter sweet crude produced domestically to make a refinable hybrid. China has also steadily increased its ability to process straight sour oil. By 2004, capacity had climbed to 43 million tons per year, or 863,500 barrels per day, just over 12 percent of China's total refining capacity of 7 million barrels per day. China plans to add between 400,000 and 500,000 barrels per day in refining capacity annually up to 2010, with a significant portion of this targeted toward heavy and sour crude.¹² These developments suggest that China and Venezuela may be moving towards deeper systemic cooperation on energy issues. However, the case for this interpretation is by no means airtight.

Evidence to the Contrary

While Venezuela and China are clearly draw-

ing closer, U.S. policymakers can take comfort in the fact that there is little credible evidence that China and Venezuela (perhaps with tacit support from other U.S. antagonists like Iran) are really conspiring to choke off the flow of oil to the U.S. market. The apparent threat indicators cited above are somewhat misleading. For one, the 1.93 million tons China imported in 2005 represent only 1.5% of its total crude imports.¹³ Nor is China's increase in refining capacity really so ominous. The move to blend sour with light sweet crude will not result in a significantly greater ability to use Venezuelan oil because only China's coastal refineries can process sour with more than 3% sulfuric content; her inland refineries cannot process oil with greater than 1 percent sulfuric content. Thus, any blending will necessarily contain a low proportion of sour.

The new refineries coming on line are not expected to help much either. Most of the crude to be refined by the new plants will come from Saudi Arabia, which has taken a 25 percent stake in Sinopec's Fujian refinery project, while another planned expansion of the Qingdao refinery is also expected to take Saudi oil. These preexisting agreements with Saudi Arabia leave little room for processing sour Venezuelan oil in large enough quantities to displace the U.S. market.

Similarly problematic is Caracas's attempt to build up its tanker fleet to increase export to Asia. Geographic realities present the major obstacle to this ambition. Venezuela's three main transport options—shipping through the Panama Canal, building a pipeline across Colombia to the Pacific Ocean, and transporting the oil around Cape Horn at the southern tip of the Americas—are all expensive and unwieldy. For heavy crude oil, the unfavorable weight-to-value ratio means that higher transportation costs do not favor long distance shipping. Oil is a fungible commodity in the world oil market, and Chinese investors are keenly focused on the bottom line. If Venezuela seriously sought to bypass the United States and send its oil straight to China, Venezuela would have to cover the difference in transportation costs. The short-term trade disruption could mean that Chávez would have to pay an exorbitant political price as a result of the economic fallout.

Another obstacle to any Chinese-Venezuelan attempt to use oil as a weapon against the U.S. is

the Chávez administration's mismanagement of the oil industry and its failure to invest adequately in infrastructure. In February 2006, Venezuela's energy minister announced plans to double oil exports to China to 300,000 barrels-per-day from 150,000 barrels-per-day, but most observers doubt that this pace of growth is sustainable.¹⁴

To be sure, both China's growing energy needs and Venezuela's management of its petroleum sector have important implications for U.S. energy security. But the effects are more likely to be found in the long-term supply and demand for oil on the global market, not in a sudden shock to U.S. energy supplies resulting from a cut-off of oil by conspiring parties. For one, U.S. oil consumers would have time to adjust to any sharp change in trade and could purchase oil from providers who had been displaced by China's agreement with Venezuela. In addition, even if China and Venezuela sought to spook U.S. oil markets (a highly speculative scenario), the hazardous logistics of the global oil trade would quickly extinguish any ambition to forge a sustainable oil alliance to isolate the United States.

Setting aside Hugo Chávez's far-fetched fantasies of holding American "imperialists" hostage to his oil reserves, under current conditions any disruption of oil exports to the United States would devastate the Venezuelan economy and perhaps pose a mortal threat to Chávez's regime. For its part, China is extremely sensitive to U.S. perceptions that it represents an emerging rival. It has taken great pains to avoid political provocations in the Western Hemisphere, instead focusing on purely economic objectives.

Finally, Beijing is searching for stable energy suppliers over the long term, and few high-level Chinese officials appear willing to bank heavily on a partnership with the erratic and potentially volatile Chávez. During a recent meeting with other South American presidents in April, Chávez threatened to blow up the country's oil fields in response to a possible invasion by the United States.¹⁵ Such wild rhetoric is hardly reassuring to Chinese investors, especially when they have access to more conveniently located, better quality oil from partners in the Middle East.

A Prudent Approach

The existing relationship between China and Ven-

ezuela may not be a cause for immediate alarm, but this hardly signifies that U.S. policymakers should lapse into complacency. Indeed, China may eventually seek to establish itself as a major power and a conventional regional rival to the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Even if this does not come to pass, China is sure to continue pursuing its objective of securing the necessary commodities to sustain its economic growth and feed its large and increasingly restless population.

Competition for Latin America's energy supplies will undoubtedly intensify at a time when many nations are seeking to exercise greater control over their oil and gas reserves. Venezuela has sought and obtained a controlling stake in crucial oil ventures run by foreign companies and, as mentioned above, the Bolivian government has acted to nationalize its natural gas sector, even sending in troops with a dramatic flourish. Most recently, Ecuador cancelled the operating contracts of the U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Corporation, triggering a trade dispute with Washington. These rifts may create opportunities for China's state-owned oil companies to play a more sweeping role in the region's energy sector. U.S. policymakers need to be vigilant and proactive. The long-term outlook for U.S. energy security will be improved if they can fashion a compelling response to the new dynamic created by China's growing economic power and Latin America's resurgent nationalism. **MR**

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Castro's Tactics of CONTROL IN CUBA

José Ramón Ponce Solozábal

AFTER THE BERLIN WALL FELL and the Soviet Union collapsed, U.S. policy toward Latin America degenerated into a condition of smug complacency and benign neglect. The policy apparently stemmed from the assumption that Leninist-style socialism had failed and that democratic capitalism had permanently prevailed as the Latin American system of choice, able to come into full bloom without further nurturing. This was naïve and, for a nation that depends in large part on Andean Ridge oil to fuel its economy, also foolhardy and dangerous.

U.S. complacency went hand-in-hand with the apparent assumption that Cuba's Fidel Castro had shriveled into permanent irrelevance, having devolved into a mere anachronism of the cold war, an obsolete curiosity and relic of failed Socialism on the junk heap of history. Unfortunately, to the unpleasant surprise of many in the U.S. government, it is now quite apparent that Castro was cleverer than anyone had given him credit for. Not only has he survived the widespread collapse of global communism to become the virtual ideological world leader of what remains of the communist faithful, but he has emerged as the leading ideological leader in the Western Hemisphere. As such, he plays an increasingly dominant shaping role in hemispheric politics, aided and abetted in large measure by continuing U.S. indifference to the region. This is evidenced by resurgent regional interest in his methods for taking power and for governing, both of which are being emulated and promoted to ever wider and more sympathetic audiences as alternatives to "democratic capitalism" linked to "international trade agreements." The most notable current champions of Castroism are Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez and Bolivia's President Evo Morales.

Nevertheless, in the face of clear evidence that fledgling democracies in Latin America are foundering on the rocks of entrenched oligarchies, enduring class stratification, widespread official corruption, and persistent, widespread poverty, U.S. policy continues, as it has over the last 15 years, tepidly hoping for the best. Meanwhile, disillusioned with democratic capitalism as a solution to Latin America's social and economic problems, Chávez, Morales, and other prominent Latin leaders are closely studying how to incorporate major elements of Castro's ideology and methods for governing in their own nations. Today, they are actively seeking to promote alternative forms of socioeconomic and political systems that they assert will be better suited to Latin American culture and ethnic "temperament" than democratic capitalism. As a result, much of what Chávez is now doing, and Morales has openly committed to do, mirrors the measures Castro took to consolidate control not only over the government of Cuba, but over the hearts, minds, and souls of the people.

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As a former member of Castro's Cuban government apparatus charged with implementing measures of social and political control in the aftermath of Castro's takeover, my purpose here is to broadly outline what it takes to control populations in general, with special emphasis on the principles and measures which were implemented by Castro to consolidate control over the Cuban people, and which he still uses today to control every aspect of Cuban life. It is hoped that highlighting these will help alert U.S. policymakers and military leaders to the measures pro-Castro, anti-American leaders like Chávez and Morales can be expected to employ on the Andean Ridge in their attempts to implement similar social, political and economic programs of social and political control.

A Reality of Governance

Setting aside utopian egalitarianism governed by wishful thinking, the cold hard facts of life are that the art of politics in some way hinges to a lesser or greater degree on employing effective measures to guide, influence, and control populations. As a result, control over people as a legitimate objective of political practice has been the subject of multiple theoretic and philosophical studies throughout history.¹ Subsequent to such discussion, there is near universal agreement that all governments, if they are to effectively govern and regulate society, have a legitimate interest in exercising some form of population control—even democracies. Therefore, the circumstantial or incidental application of techniques of control in the interests of building or maintaining a democracy is not only legitimate, but essential. Consequently, gaining a thorough understanding and mastery of the principles and mechanisms of population control is indispensable for anyone aspiring to be a politician, community leader, or military officer responsible for managing, caring for, and leading large groups of people.

Control Must Be Cultivated

As a first observation, thorough and effective control of a population cannot be gained through spontaneous actions; it requires premeditation. Without a program aimed at asserting control, spontaneous events resulting in leadership over a polity merely generate spurious, temporary effects that ultimately produce ineffective, short-lived govern-

ments. Thus, effective control demands a calculated program of action based on scientific rigor that aims to identify and implement measures based on socio-psychological principles. Political leaders in general must understand and possess the ability to apply these principles, methods, and techniques in a flexible manner, which requires acute observation, ingenuity, and astuteness; general axioms and superficial application do not suffice.

Totalitarian Control

Totalitarian regimes, and those countries that throughout history have maintained dictatorial and personality-driven governments—such as Cuba—are totalitarian precisely because their leaders have developed the most refined and extensive procedures for controlling their populations. Currently, countries like Cuba are clearinghouses for socio-psychological techniques that aim at achieving the major objective of all totalitarian regimes: absolute political power by asserting total control over every aspect of a population's social, political, economic, and moral life.

Theoretical Premises of Control

In my experience, there are seven basic socio-psychological principles that must be employed to develop such an effective program of population control:

- *Systematic focus on developing an understanding of how national political and social systems work.* Nations or ethnic groups, developed or undeveloped, have to some extent an inherently stratified socio-political structure on one hand, together with established internal processes that modify that structure on the other. To control a society, one must first closely study and analyze the dynamics of the existing systems, both formal and informal, that govern that society. This enables the next step of formulating measures to exploit the dynamics of the systems to co-opt or effectively supplant them.

- *A detailed understanding of how individual identity is established at the micro and macro levels of social strata.* This starts with obtaining a knowledge of the cultural folkways and mores associated with how a person gains personal identity within a given society. It is essential to understand how individuals acquire their identity, followed by how individual identity then is socialized into broader

social structures at the micro level, such as how one is socialized into extended and nuclear family structures, occupational or trade groups, education systems (which in every society are powerful instruments of social organization and stratification), neighborhoods and local ethnic groupings, and religious or other social groups. In short, study must be made of every way in which people are connected at the micro level in close, face-to-face interaction. This in turn must be linked to studying and understanding the dynamics of individual identity and micro socialization as they apply to the formation of a collective national identity at the macro level. To this end, one must understand the relative importance of a national (country-based) identity as opposed to a pan-regional or community identity established by religious, ethnic, linguistic, or cultural affinity. Macro socialization does not usually occur as a result of intimate face-to-face interaction; it is formed and shaped by indirect means such as community links to a common literature and language, cultural history, religious liturgy, or the media.

- *Analysis of economic conditions and factors.* These must be understood because, to a great extent, they contour and regulate the social interaction that occurs at each level of society. Economic factors shape the educational and political systems and virtually every other aspect of social interaction. As such, they influence the nature of individual interactions, as well as the broader social and cultural interactions that produce important-to-understand cultural idiosyncrasies.

- *Understand how a specific society's formal and informal communication systems work.* The communication systems and networks that facilitate individual relations within a nation must be studied in great detail, since they constitute the nervous system of the body politic and are the bedrock of social interaction and intercourse that make the state viable. These systems range from informal networks of intimate direct interaction (face-to-face) to organized mass communications at a very impersonal level. Such communication networks vary in form and interconnection according to the social strata or region in which they operate. For example, communications reaching a family unit may be very different from nation to nation or culture to culture (i.e., different in a Latin American

region as compared to networks on the Arabian Peninsula).

- *Understanding of unique social conventions as factors of social influence that regulate and control the attitudes and behavior of populations.* Theory and tools developed for premeditated or spontaneous efforts to modify attitudes and behaviors are constrained by the dynamics of a society's unique set of social mores and customs. Therefore, communications must be developed that specifically have as their objective channeling and modifying existing mores, beliefs, feelings, motivations, and emotions in a manner that leads to cultural and psychological submission to the state.

- *Exploitation of charismatic leaders.* Changes in social systems are universally influenced and regulated by communications channeled through the nation's social strata by effective and charismatic leaders who are perceived as embodying the values of the movement they represent or over which they preside. Properly understanding and employing the unifying principle of charismatic leadership is essential to control a populace.

- *Understanding internal national and ethnic differences.* The measures employed for controlling the population must be applied according to national and ethnic differences. For example, the leadership imposed on Cubans, whose culture combines Spanish Catholic features with sub-Saharan African animist religious and cultural influences, entails a very different set of considerations and peculiarities than those that would be employed in developing measures aimed at controlling the populace of a rural area of Iraq where Sunni, Shia, and Kurd populations coexist uneasily, each having different cultural traditions, interpretations of Islam, and even languages.

A government program that effectively integrates measures based on the above seven principles creates in society a bastion of psychological conditioning very difficult to overcome by those seeking to challenge the regime in power later. Obviously, developing such a program requires a massive investment in research aimed at gathering, analyzing, collating, and utilizing information pertinent to each principle. Thus, a telling mark of totalitarian regimes is that they characteristically invest inordinate amounts of money and other resources in social research, and they usually prioritize social



On 10 October 1960, on the eve of the military trial of more than a hundred insurgents captured in the mountains, Fidel Castro warns, "He who lives by the sword shall die by the sword" to those who attacked his regime.

research above meeting the requirements of other pressing state needs. Such research is administered by government ministries that have been established specifically for the purpose of identifying and managing the complete psychological domination of their citizens. This is why totalitarian regimes like Cuba's often evolve into recognized world leaders in social research.

Control in Cuba

That Cuba has become a global symbol of totalitarian rule at the beginning of the 21st century is one of the great ironies of modern history. Motivated by a vision of egalitarian democratic rule and universal human equality, Cuba was the only Latin American country to fight continually against Spanish colonialism (for over 100 years) to gain its independence. However, following the end of Spanish rule, Cuba's attempts at establishing a democracy were constantly interrupted by political instability and civil unrest that persisted into the 1920's and early 30's (and which, unfortunately, was abetted by the U.S.'s ill-advised meddling).² During this process, the bloody, tyrannical government that assumed power in the early 20th century was ousted by a popular insurrection that aimed once more at establishing a democracy. However, the democratic forces were again thwarted in 1952 by dictator Fulgencio Batista, who seized power by coup d'état, promising to establish democracy.

Instead, he proved to be an especially cruel and exploitative tyrant. So onerous and corrupt was Batista's rule that his government fell easily in the late 1950s when challenged by the relatively modest but persistent insurgency led by Fidel Castro, another charismatic but utterly self-possessed dictator who, like Batista, came to power promising democracy, but on assuming power reneged on his commitment.

In contrast to the short-sighted venality that characterized Batista, Castro was a much shrewder analyst of the tide of human events. Unlike Batista, who lived to exploit the populace to support his own luxurious lifestyle, Castro lived for acquiring power. To this end, he followed a strategy of first consolidating power by currying favor with the Cuban middle and lower economic classes, followed later by implementing more extreme measures to consolidate total psychological and moral control over the rest of the population once power was firmly in his hands.

In this way, Cuba's century-old pursuit of liberty and democratic rule went by the wayside as it fell back into the pattern of trading one strongman for another. The current strongman has since successfully established a totalitarian dictatorship built around his own cult of personality under a thinly disguised façade of communism.

The Seven Principles of Control Applied in Cuba

Employing the seven principles previously noted, Castro has developed a unique system of population control through a sophisticated program of calculated psychological domination supported by targeted coercion. His program is not built on a form of repression characterized by indiscriminate bloodshed and mass coercion, as often depicted by outside observers and world media. Intimidation through state terrorism is used, but it is used only in a very selective and targeted fashion, in a way calculated not to unduly agitate the majority of the citizens. Nor is control obtained through what is popularly termed brainwashing, though socio-psychological manipulation of the population is one of the principal instruments in the system of control. Rather, the Cuban regime imposes a mental and spiritual yoke upon the population. It conditions the psychological outlook of the populace through

Cuba's program to dominate its populace has three major components:

- **Public opinion surveys**
- **Leader creation**
- **Propaganda**

a calculated policy that narrows expectations by limiting individual choices across the social spectrum. As a result, in practical application, Castro's regime has gradually habituated the Cuban population to accept, in large part unconsciously, a social, political, and economic environment in which lack of choice is the norm. Therefore, a life of limited choice that produces accepted dependence on the state has become the virtual psychological status quo; it is an element now entrenched in the national character of the Cuban population itself. Thus, Castro need not gauge the ultimate success of his population control by public expressions of popular support for his regime, but by evidence of mass resignation, as manifested in a general lack of significant organized resistance.

The Cuban government has imposed this psychological yoke over the population with a program that is characterized by a refined matrix of measures that specifically aim to habituate the average Cuban to accepting limited choice as the norm. Around this norm are grouped a variety of interrelated factors that form a pyramid of constraining factors.

The central vertical axis and spine of this structure of total dominance is the principle of exploiting the influence of a charismatic leader. At the base and foundation of the pyramid of control is Castro himself, as the Cuban people have been conditioned over time to accept his decisions as infallible and his authority as inviolable—so completely, moreover, that he can neither be successfully defied nor challenged. Consequently, mass psychological acceptance of Castro's infallibility effectively reifies in the public mind the perception that personal involvement in political choice for the average citizen is off the table. In other words, the majority of the populace has generally resigned itself to believing that participation in the government is simply not a personal option. This is the cornerstone

of Cuba's program for mass psychological domination. Once the masses have accepted as a principle that they are properly and severely limited in their ability to choose their own political leaders, this provides the foundation for further measures to promote psychological submission to the dictates of the state and its leadership.

The following pyramid of psychological themes and measures has been built on this foundation:

- Inculcation of governmental infallibility and omnipotence, and mass psychological acceptance of the impossibility of the government's removal, reinforced by propaganda designed to create this impression by mixing accounts of both real and misleading events intended to demonstrate the impossibility of successfully challenging the state.

- Acceptance of the state's absolute control of property and its strict regulation of individual liberties.

- Acceptance of the dominant and unbridled power of the police and secret service to monitor and control the activities of Cuban citizens. As a result, fear of the police and secret service permeates Cuban society, even at the highest levels (just below Castro) of the government, the Communist Party, and the military. Thanks to a vast network of local informants, fear and its corollary, suspicion, reach down into individual homes and families. This marks the successful implementation of what amounts to a scheme to keep the nation in a constant state of paranoia in which neighbors suspect and fear neighbors.

- Information control. In Cuba, all information reaching the population comes from state media. Typically, this information is highly textured propaganda. The importance Castro places on maintaining absolute control over information is apparent in his maniacal efforts to block all information from the outside world that might challenge state-purveyed information. Cuba, for instance, expends enormous resources to jam Radio and TV Marti broadcasts emanating from Miami, Florida.

- Emigration control. Cuba seeks complete control of its citizens' movements both inside and outside the country. Castro is cagey, however. Although the government officially maintains a policy of reprisal against anyone desiring to leave, in reality, departures are controlled in a way calculated to dissipate the strength of potential internal opposition. Put another way, Castro lets troublemakers leave.

- Behavior control created by instilling a sense of resignation and helplessness through legal sanctions imposed on all activities according to the government's dictates. Choice is closely circumscribed across a spectrum of activities, including what is acceptable for a person to hear in the news or to buy in a store, where a person can live, what he can do for a living, and where he can travel. Compliance with such measures is promoted as a necessary patriotic duty and is subject to state monitoring.

- Zero tolerance of political or social opposition. A key to totalitarian control is not to allow the opposition to mature into a critical mass that could call the government's authority into question. Repression of all opposition is abetted by government control of communications and by conscious efforts to sow mistrust and chronic intangible terror among potential opposition elements.

Principles and Tactics of Control

Cuba's program to dominate its populace has three major components:

- *Public opinion surveys.* The government spends an enormous amount of time collecting public-opinion information based on the premise that it cannot influence, control, or direct a population if it does not know what the people are thinking and doing. Analysis of this knowledge guides follow-on action. In a totalitarian society, such information is usually obtained by posting agents and informants in the community. The Cuban government sponsors two kinds of extensive data collection efforts: structured and incidental. The former describes collection from agents and observers who routinely circulate through communities to collect observations. The latter occurs when observers are sent to collect data associated with a concrete and current situation, normally one involving a conflict.

- *Leader creation.* It is not uncommon in less developed cultures for the population to see authoritarianism as the only solution to social and political instability. However, because authoritarian governments have a hard time identifying successor leaders once the leader dies or is removed, the legitimacy of the government he headed immediately comes

into question. The country may become disoriented and society might collapse unless another equally effective authoritarian ruler assumes control. For that reason—to keep the population under control—totalitarian regimes are particularly concerned with perpetuating authoritarian leaders.

In Cuba, where problems surrounding Castro's succession have long been anticipated, much effort has been expended to identify leaders at lower levels for indoctrination and training. It is hoped that when the time comes for Castro to leave power, these new leaders will continue to exercise authority in a manner calculated to ensure the continuity of the regime. Preparing this chain of leadership involves—

- ▶ Inserting agents and informants into the population to identify the best candidates for leadership.

- ▶ Selecting and approaching prospective leaders in whom the local people clearly show confidence.

- ▶ Identifying leaders who have independently emerged at the head of organizations sympathetic to the regime, as well as those involved in organizing mass demonstrations.

- ▶ Preparing selected leaders by providing indoctrination, training, and experience through assignment to positions of increased responsibility.

- *Propaganda.* In Cuba, as in all states governed by authoritarian regimes, propaganda is of incalculable importance for controlling the population. According to authoritarian theory, propaganda will only be effective if it is designed

Propaganda is of incalculable importance for controlling the population.

to support specific objectives stemming from concrete situations. (Propaganda used merely for propaganda's sake will actually be counterproductive; its banality will undermine the believability of all state-disseminated information.) Consequently, developing effective propaganda requires a thorough understanding of the specific conditions and idiosyncrasies associated with a specific situation. For example, content and messages will be significantly different depending on whether they are to be directed at farmers in Cuba, oil workers in Venezuela, or bazaaris in Iraq. To further illustrate, propaganda aimed at religious Cubans of Spanish-Catholic heritage who have been influenced by

long-standing secular-humanist policies and the national traits of Cuban pragmatism and tolerance, as well as other cultural factors, would not serve well if used on those who display the fanatical sentiments that occur in some non-Catholic, less secular, religiously intolerant Middle East populations.

Propaganda should generally be employed in two modes for distinct purposes:

- Information directed at buttressing public faith and confidence in the regime.

- Disinformation aimed at misleading adversaries. Such propaganda attempts to modify the opposition's psychological perceptions in order to minimize or alter its actions. It will usually take the form of regime messages juxtaposed against the opposition's arguments or convictions, and it will be transmitted by special technical means in a manner that seeks to modify the target audience's perceptions or beliefs without them realizing it.

There is also specialized political propaganda, which combines facets of information and disinformation with other important features. It must—

- Contain primarily emotional-affective content. Political propaganda will not be effective unless it elicits emotion as opposed to merely attempting to persuade with argument. Political propaganda must stimulate intense passion to emotionally agitate the masses into accepting governmental assertions, then acting as the government wishes.

- Help unify disparate groups into a single body around themes that produce passionate core attitudes.

- Showcase the leadership or the symbolic significance of a specific leader to buttress support for both as legitimate representatives of the targeted group's values.

- Constantly repeat basic themes using speeches, mass media, graphics, individuals, and whatever other means are available.

- Provide a unifying cosmic paradigm that satisfies all groups. For example, Nazism and Communism were distinct from other political ideologies because their proponents recognized that political ideology alone was unlikely to achieve much without the addition of "spiritual" content. Emulating this strategy, Castro's regime set itself apart from the relatively weak Communist movements of Eastern Europe, which abandoned any spiritual or emotional appeals to the masses in favor of rational persuasion.

As a result, those movements lost their fanatical adherents and leaders and then their general psychological hold over the people. (By way of comparison, similar emphasis on promoting the "spiritual" component of fundamentalist Islamic extremism appears to be a prime motivating factor for adherents of the faith that is fueling global terrorism.)

- Adapt to the audience at which it is directed. In the Middle East, propaganda must be based on the Koran, while in Cuba, appeals that are more secular, objective, and not exclusively religious in nature are more effective.

- Exploit the human herd instinct. Propaganda is best transmitted in a collective setting, where the effect of its emotional content is greater. Speeches to large groups of people are especially important. Propaganda transmitted directly to large numbers of people in close physical proximity to each other facilitates the formation and circulation of the desired opinions, sentiments, and behavior,

In the Middle East, propaganda must be based on the Koran, while in Cuba, appeals that are more secular, objective, and not exclusively religious in nature are more effective.

promoting the equivalent of a "group think" contagion among them. Under these circumstances, skillfully communicated propaganda (usually by a charismatic leader) can produce a monolithic bloc of supportive sentiment. The individual "spirit" of individuals in the group at which propaganda is being directed may be agitated to the point of producing a group emotional state of "ecstasy," which in turn heightens suggestibility for attitude and behavior modification.

- Present themes and talking points of propaganda as if they were already facts. Consider, for example, two possible ways to say the same thing: "You should live in a democracy" and "The Iraqi people clamor for democracy." The first statement

is conditional (“You should live”); it suggests that “you” haven’t accepted democracy yet. “You” can also be singular, focusing a listener inward and out of group-think, while “live” is a weak verb, connoting existence but not much else. On the other hand, “The Iraqi people clamor for democracy” makes a bold declarative statement—there’s no doubt about it; they *clamor*. The subject (“Iraqi people”) conjures up the masses and invites belonging, and clamor is an active verb that connotes arm waving and shouting. Hammered home on every occasion, such declarative, all-embracing claims begin to produce psychological effects on the populace. Individuals who feel excluded from what they perceive to be the majority opinion, and therefore marginalized, will end up joining the movement merely because they do not want to be left out.³

► Repeat slogans and mottos over and over until they reify, becoming established in the popular mind as axiomatic “common knowledge.”

► Create heroes and martyrs. The essence of propaganda is creating a mythos typified by people who can be held up to the masses as exemplars of the movement’s ideals.

► Create villains to serve as scapegoats and counterpoints to the heroes and martyrs.⁴ This exploits the natural human tendency to defend the herd from an external enemy. The identification of villains strengthens the cohesion and unity of the masses, stimulating and focusing their collective anger while sowing discord in the ranks of the movement’s opponents.

In a related vein, during actual armed conflict with a specific enemy, the propagandist must counter public reaction to each enemy strike by immediately publicizing some sort of success. Only in this manner will it be possible to maintain the morale of the sympathetic population while aggravating the enemy’s skepticism about his own cause.

The Cult of Charismatic Leadership

In the control of large groups, the influence of charismatic leadership cannot be overemphasized. As a result, totalitarian governments take on cult-like status. In Cuba, the personality cult built around Castro has been one of the key elements in population control. Cult appeal continues to be especially effective in Cuba because the population has largely

been rendered psychologically incapable of opposing the regime.

To create a cult following, the charismatic leader must make considerable efforts to understand the state of public opinion and to clearly and accurately assess the people’s most pressing needs. He must also have a good eye for estimating the support for a particular ideological movement.

After a careful analysis of public opinion and public needs, the charismatic leader must establish his presence and then be supported by intense, effective propaganda efforts focused on a program to satisfy the population’s needs and motivations. If the leader is challenging the government in power, the leader can be instrumental in creating a shadow of doubt among the general populace by pounding home propagandistic themes in mass speeches. Such public engagement must always be keenly attuned to the cultural sensitivities of the audience. And, assuming circumstances are calling into question the legitimacy of the government’s programs, or the government itself, although the public will be unlikely to initially fully support an opposition movement, it is also unlikely that they will openly reject it either.

To exploit this direct mass appeal, charismatic leaders should call meetings and demonstrations whenever an opportunity presents itself. They especially need to take advantage of incidental situations, no matter how few people are present, to convey the movement’s themes and programs. On such occasions, leaders should deliver impassioned, vehement speeches, especially if speaking in front of disorganized masses, which are ripe for psychological manipulation and shaping. Depending on the prevailing socio-economic conditions or events, repeated speeches repeating the same themes often convert small and large groups into devout followings. As part of his rhetorical strategy, the speaker should use such occasions to vilify accused enemies while holding up martyrs and heroes for emulation.

Street Demonstrations

Historically, the faction that seizes the streets is the one that seizes control of the population and, eventually, national power. Mass street demonstrations exploit crowd psychology to help move the people toward desired perceptions and behavior. Due to human herd instinct and a general tendency



Cuba's President Fidel Castro speaks to thousands of people gathered during International Workers Day at the Plaza of Revolution in Havana, Cuba, 1 May 2006.

to desire social conformity, individuals are increasingly drawn together by impassioned and vehement expressions that outline specific political objectives. In addition, concerted and repeated demonstrations inevitably place stress on the ranks of the enemy, sowing seeds of doubt, fear, and the feeling that they (the enemy) are becoming the minority. This is calculated to create cracks in opposition unity by generating apprehension in prospective opponents, the object being that they themselves will conclude that the majority opposes them. Although there are always fanatics in the ranks of opposition groups whose actions will not change even if they perceive public animosity toward them, many in the opposition can be expected to feel neutralized, so much so that they eventually may abandon the cause.

Demonstrations may have very few participants in the beginning of a movement, but they will continue to grow in numbers if they—

- Are organized frequently and repeatedly.
- Are led by effective leaders who have a strong vision predicated on the people's needs and concerns.
- Are supported and complemented by propaganda.
- Convey vehement intensity.
- Take place under the banner of martyrs and heroes.
- Aim to inspire a decision to oppose and fight opponents without respite.

Recent history is replete with examples of street demonstrations that grew rapidly into powerful tools for antigovernment movements. Some recent examples include massive street demonstrations in Iran in 1978 and 1979 that led to the downfall of the Shah, similar street movements supporting Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution and the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the mass demonstrations that led to Hugo Chavez's short-lived resignation in 2002. These highlight the political power generated through mass demonstrations by crowds in the street.

Cuba provides a number of case studies illustrating the power of public demonstrations to achieve public objectives. Chief among them is the one that was carried out against President Manuel Urrutia Lleó in 1959 after Castro allegedly resigned. Another significant demonstration was the mobilization called for by the government to neutralize the mass exodus from Mariel. In that instance, nearly one million people gathered to confirm support for the Castro regime.

Mass demonstrations are especially useful when one has superior coercive means to defeat or annihilate opponents. However, such demonstrations should not be organized if lackluster turnout or effective countermeasures by the opposition could increase the population's sense of helplessness.

Community Organizations

The organization and control of community institutions is another essential element of population control. A major role of community organizations is to police society for political correctness and continued submissiveness to the state. In Cuba, the net-

work of community organizations has proven very effective at helping the central government maintain control over the state. (Nazi Germany employed similar networks for the same purpose.)

These organizations are directed and controlled at different levels, some locally, some nationally, and some by the head of state himself. Community organizations active in Cuba include the Revolutionary Defense Committees (comprised of neighbors in each block who are willing to support the government and keep watch), the Federation of Cuban Women, trade unions (which in Cuba are formally chartered arms of the state Communist Party), the University Students Federation, and the High School Students Federation, among others.

Community organizations enable control over the population by—

- Rapidly mobilizing large numbers of people for mass demonstrations on behalf of the government.
- Conditioning behavior by compelling individuals to take part in events with which they might not agree.⁵ In Cuba, individuals often participate in community organizations to avoid government scrutiny and trouble.
- Providing a ready force that, through effective management of its emotions, can be launched against opposition demonstrations.
- Neutralizing any possibility of the rise of opposition groups.
- Complementing the government's ability to monitor what is happening in society even in obscure or insignificant locations.
- Providing a controlled and monitored outlet for organization members to express disagreement and feelings of helplessness. Unmonitored discontent could lead to recruitment of disaffected group members by opposition elements.
- Generating pro-government sentiments through affective association.
- Facilitating the government's ability to meet the needs of the population in real as well as paternalistic and disingenuous ways.

Zonal Security

Zonal security is a means of controlling the population by inserting agents and informants at the community level. Such collaborators are essential for complete control of a social order. They facilitate control of the population by—

- Collecting information on the general state of public opinion.
- Uncovering members of the opposition.
- Circulating rumors favorable to the government.
- Identifying new recruits for regime appointments.
- Verifying information by investigation.
- Creating divisions in the ranks of an emerging opposition.
- Acting to discredit the leaders of any opposition.
- Rendering covert support to government leaders as required.

Breaking Opposition Unity

All mass political action must have a common goal and unity of views. Unity of views demands at the very least a modicum of trust among movement participants. Consequently, any “virus” introduced into the political structure that promotes distrust can undermine the required unity of thought, trust, and action, and can, in turn, promote disintegration. In such a case, frustration and failure produce a progressive form of pessimism that extinguishes any passion for a cause.

The Cuban government has controlled the population and suppressed all opposition by effectively cultivating pessimism about the possibility of overthrowing the government. Without the possibility of success, no movement has arisen to contest the government's hold on power. In fact, this disabling pessimism has become a permanent feature of the national mindset.

The Cuban regime also forestalls opposition unity and inculcates mass resignation by—

- Sowing in the public consciousness paradigmatic political arguments that contradict opposing views.
- Publicly deconstructing any paradigmatic arguments potential opponents might make.
- Showing force and inflexibility in the face of opposition demands.
- Discrediting leaders it considers dangerous.
- Promoting pessimism with regard to the possibility of a successor.
- Splintering the opposition's ranks by bribing its members or co-opting them with the promise of individual benefits.

Spreading Rumors

Another effective tool for disrupting potential political opponents and consolidating a regime's

control over the populace is rumor. A rumor is a specific untruthful proposition that is passed from person to person without any available means to verify it.⁶ Politicians and military leaders have always employed rumors to create desired psychological states in given populations—friendly as well as enemy. The fundamental conditions required for a rumor to be effective are—

- It cannot be debunked by accurate, obtainable information.
- It must be simple, specific, and concrete.
- It must be circulated widely.
- It must be circulated in critical situations of severe emotional tension.
- It should respond to the explicit or implicit needs of the population.

In wartime or other critical situations, rumor is an effective complement to more purely political and military means of control. It is useful because it allows the originator to—

- Discredit leaders.
- Manipulate public opinion.
- Sow skepticism, discord, and despondency in enemy ranks.
- Infuse psychological rejection of terrorism against the state.
- Change the people's perception of the regime and its forces.

To circulate a successful rumor, one need only design it, characterize it as an important secret, and then feed it to those most likely to spread it effectively. It is a somewhat cynical but nevertheless apparently valid observation that the public's appetite for rumors is great while its skepticism about rumors is slight. As a result, well developed, well placed rumors often have their intended effect.

Recap and Antidote

The success achieved in a number of countries and regions where rigorous socio-psychological

methods have been applied to control, influence, and direct the population shows that mastery of this knowledge is indispensable for anyone who seriously aspires to leading or managing large groups of people. These methods can help establish a stable system of government, or they can be used to disrupt and destabilize a society prior to a grab for power. Properly applied, they can also render a society nearly impervious to outside influence.

The antidote for extreme measures of authoritarian control is to shore up social mores and formal political institutions that promote the free and open expression of ideas and opinions. Among these are inculcating by law and ethical instruction at all levels of society respect for the personal moral rights to openly criticize the regime in power without fear of retribution, and to personally participate in the selection of those who are in power. With the above in mind, the final tests as to whether Castroism has taken root in places like Venezuela and Bolivia will be if Chávez and Morales leave their offices peacefully—or at all—when the people at some point vote them out in legitimate elections; and if the people accept Castroite dictatorial authoritarianism should their leaders refuse to hand over power. **MR**

NOTES

1. For classic discussions of the legitimacy of population control, see Plato, *The Republic* (Spain: Edicomunicación SA, 1999); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Colombia: Panamericana Editorial, 2002); Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Spain: P.P.P. Ediciones, 1985).

2. Cuba's difficulties post-independence were exacerbated by the ill-advised meddling of the United States. In part, the meddling was motivated by disdain for the ability of Spanish and African descendants to establish and sustain a viable democracy. See Jose Ramon Ponce, *Al final del arcoiris: Un Psicólogo en el Contraespionaje Cubano* (Miami, FL: Support to Democracy, 2003).

3. See Sigmund Freud, *Psychology of the Masses* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1995); and Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Crowds* (Argentina: Editorial Albatros, 1995).

4. Machiavelli.

5. O. Klinneberg, *Social Psychology* (Mexico-Buenos Aires: Editorial Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965).

6. Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1947).

The All-Volunteer Army Can We Still Claim Success?

Major General Walter L. Stewart Jr., U.S. Army, Retired

[Secretary of the Army] Callaway positively glowed. On 1 July he met reporters at the Pentagon and declared the volunteer Army a success. The Army had ended fiscal year 1974 with slightly more than 783,000 men and women on active duty, approximately 1,400 more than its authorized end strength. It achieved that strength by enlisting nearly 200,000 volunteers and reenlisting some 58,000 soldiers.

—Robert K. Griffith Jr.¹

IN 1974, after just 20 months of experience, the all-volunteer Army was declared a success. But this was based solely on recruitment after a sustained period of combat had ended and at the beginning of an extended period of relatively secure garrison and peacekeeping duty, interspersed by short-duration conflicts.²

But can we continue to claim success in 2006 when we consider a U.S. population increase of roughly 100 million since 1974, the near doubling of the recruiting pool because of the opening of most military occupations to females, and deployments that, although dangerous, are not nearly as perilous as previous prolonged conflicts?³ I say we cannot, and I offer as proof the continuing modifications of personnel standards and the expansion of monetary inducements to achieve the Pyrrhic victory of recruiting 80,000 to an Active Component strength that resists expansion beyond 500,000, with junior officers and enlisted personnel stoically facing one hardship tour followed closely by another.

After 3 decades, our national experiment with an all-volunteer force has foundered during its first encounter with combat operations that last for an extended period of time. And accompanying this turn of events come consequences of even greater proportion: dangers to the viability of our Nation itself now that it raises its Army in contravention of the lessons of its history and that of Western civilization.

In the opening pages of *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, historian Edward Gibbon describes the essential nature of government: “Civil governments, in their first institutions, are voluntary associations for mutual defense. To obtain the desired end, it is absolutely necessary that each individual regard himself obligated to submit his private opinion and actions to the judgment of the greater number of his associates.”⁴

Gibbon knew that armies define nations and that volunteerism in an armed service should extend only to the voluntary submission of individual will to the collective will. This is a paradox to be examined. At a time in history when technology-intensive interstate conflict seems in decline, conflict requiring the low-tech actions of the squad and platoon is in ascension. In a



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tragedy of bad timing, in the 3 decades following the Vietnam War, recruitment of American forces discounted the human and cultural sciences in favor of the impersonal (but predictable) “supply and demand” science of markets: “Need more, pay more. Cannot pay more?—Make do with less, or substitute.”

Symbolic confirmation of this “boots on the ground” predicament is everywhere. Men and women in uniform are treated universally as scarce and even iconic commodities; the political or strategic level of war is compressed, deferentially, into the operational and tactical with the ethical and moral consequences of sending American youth into harm’s way subtly dismissed by statements such as, “They are volunteers and want to be there.”⁵ Operational commanders who know the scarcity and fragility of squads, platoons, and companies are unjustly required to make war decisions at the theater-force and ultimate victory levels. How did we arrive at such a state?

Act in Haste

In 1970, economists Alan Greenspan and Milton Friedman joined with other presidential appointees to officially deny the likelihood of negative consequences arising from the national move to an all-volunteer force. But these negative consequences are now evident and felt most heavily at the operational and tactical levels of war.⁶

The great national experiment with an all-volunteer military is a failure that awaits truth or tragedy for confirmation. It relies on fewer and fewer to bear the blood burdens of defense, absolves the many of any fiscal, physical, or mental hardships, and, in a dawning age of asymmetric, non-state, and ascendant-state warfare, denies human power in favor of a near mystical belief in technology. We marvel at the sight and promise of an F-22 Raptor—even as we count the carnage caused by decades-old 155-millimeter rounds wired with field-expedient detonators and detonated by barely trained cultural warriors. Cultural war (for example, Western liberalism versus Soviet tyranny) requires the mobilization and commitment of cultures. Although we know how to do this, we lack even the courage for bloodless debate.

On Monday, 4 December 1967, shortly after 9:30 A.M., Joseph D. Melonson Jr., a descendent of slaves, and Jesse B. Stevenson and Richard V.

Thompson, descendents of America’s move west, crossed the stage at Infantry Hall, Fort Benning, Georgia, and did what thousands of enlisted soldiers did during the Vietnam War: They accepted appointment to the rank of second lieutenant, infantry branch, U.S. Army. On 3 December, these three men were draftees, and on the 4th, commissioned officers—and all three would die in action as volunteers in Vietnam. They were not included among the 17,725 draftees counted as killed.⁷

In 1967, in an Army formed by the draft, having draftees attend officer candidate school was not unusual. Of the 138 candidates commissioned at Fort Benning on 4 December 1967, 42 had been drafted, and many of the others (had a record been kept) would have admitted to having been “draft induced.”⁸ But even as these draftees signed on for the hazards of leading platoons in a jungle war, one of the most corrupting and consequential distortions in American history—the labeling of the Vietnam War as “a class war”—entered the public discourse. It was alleged that “the vast majority of U.S. conscripts who fought in the Vietnam War were plucked off the lower rungs of the American socioeconomic ladder.”⁹ Based on anecdotal perceptions rather than scientific analysis, this distortion assumed the proportions of an urban legend—a legend that haunts us now to the point of tactical, operational, and strategic failure.

Conscription and its accompaniment, inducement, proved to be great cultural levelers and force providers. Earlier, the power of America’s drafted and draft-induced armies defeated fascism and imperialism and maintained the 38th Parallel in Korea. It would defeat the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong in every fight of significance in Vietnam. Army professionals at all levels knew how to lead citizen Soldiers then. But this aspect of leadership—and the combat power that came with it—is now forgotten.¹⁰ This great cultural and national strength is what Greenspan, Friedman, and others were directed to justify abandoning—and as dutiful servants to presidential authority, they followed orders.

Repent at Leisure

Military history records that strategic shifts and battlefield innovations are first felt at the trench level of warfare. We need only think of the rifle, its range, and the shoulder-to-shoulder line formations

it made impractical; the machine gun and improved artillery that necessitated armored vehicles; and the mass production of inferior weapons that overwhelmed the limited production of superior ones. All these changes, so deadly to troops on the battlefield, resulted from critical decisions made far from the action.

President Richard M. Nixon announced one such decision on 27 March 1969: "I have directed [The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force] to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force."¹¹ And now in 2006, we deploy junior officers and enlisted men on one hardship tour after another, trade unfilled Soldier positions for the chimera of technology, and limit the battlefield force options of senior field commanders.

That the Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force was directed to its conclusions is unarguable. Validation of the Commission's conclusions requires not just a period of relative peace but a period of sustained combat. We are now in a period of sustained combat called Operation Iraqi Freedom, and an evaluation of Nixon's fiat, and its operational and tactical impacts, is due.

History records that the decision to move to an all-volunteer force, then form a commission charged with justifying it, was based on a false premise, the myth of class-based "draft inequity," which was formally presented to Nixon in January 1969, during a meeting in the Oval Office with Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, President, University of Notre Dame, and member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Hesburgh describes the moment and the strategic wheels it placed in motion: "The thing I advised [Nixon] was to end the war in Vietnam soon. He said he was going to do that. Then I recommended giving the vote to eighteen-year-olds. Third, I said he should abolish the draft, because it was inequitable. Poor blacks and Hispanics were being drafted into the Army while most whites typically had all kinds of ways to beat it. I said we should be moving toward an all-volunteer Army . . . two weeks after that, I got [a] call . . . from Tom Gates, the former Secretary of the Navy and a very dear friend of mine. He did not ask, he ordered me to join his newly created Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. 'This was your bright idea,' Gates said. 'You talked

The great, republican equity of our draft and draft-induced armies was abandoned because of a false perception of racial and social inequity.

Nixon into it, and now I'm the chairman. So because you opened your mouth, I'm putting you on the commission."¹²

There you have it: This was the moment of conception of the "they want to be there" military. The unscientific and badly off-the-mark conclusions of a sincere man of God were instrumental in detaching American citizens from the hardships or consequences of military service. The great, republican equity of our draft and draft-induced armies was abandoned because of a false perception of racial and social inequity. By decisions such as these, cultures and the armies that sustain them are lost.

Commission Dismissals

To support his policy decision, Nixon's commissioners studied, discussed, pondered, and promptly dismissed every one of the following legitimate objections to an all-volunteer Army:

- An all-volunteer force will be very costly—so costly the Nation cannot afford it.
- The all-volunteer force will lack the flexibility to expand rapidly in times of crisis.
- An all-volunteer force will undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country.
- The presence of draftees in a mixed force guard against the growth of a separate military ethos, which could pose a threat to civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions.
- The higher pay required for a voluntary force will be especially appealing to blacks who have relatively poorer civilian opportunities. This, combined with higher reenlistment rates for blacks, will mean that a disproportionate number of them will be in military service. White enlistments and reenlistments might decline, leading to an all-black enlisted force. U.S. racial tensions would grow because of white apprehension at this development

and black resentment at bearing an undue share of the burden of defense. At the same time, some of the most qualified blacks would be in the military—not in the community where their talents are needed.

- Those joining an all-volunteer force will be men from the lowest economic classes, motivated primarily by monetary rewards rather than patriotism. An all-volunteer force will be manned, in effect, by mercenaries.

- An all-volunteer force would stimulate foreign military adventures, foster an irresponsible foreign policy, and lessen civilian concern about the use of military forces.

- A voluntary force will be less effective because not enough highly qualified youths will enlist and pursue military careers. As the quality of servicemen declines, the prestige and dignity of the services will also decline and further intensify recruiting problems.

- The defense budget will not be increased to provide for an all-volunteer force, and the Department of Defense (DOD) will have to cut back expenditures in other areas. Even if additional funds are provided initially, competing demands will, over the long term, force DOD to absorb the added budgetary expense of an all-volunteer force. The result could be serious deterioration of the nation's overall military posture.¹³

The Rebuttal of History

The concerns Nixon's commissioners dismissed—erosion of civilian control, reliance on the economic underclass, racial imbalance, isolation of a professional military, shared sacrifice, military adventurism, force expandability and affordability—appear often in contemporary debate and the warnings of history:

- Pericles, military commander of ancient Athens, weighed in on shared sacrifice and military adventurism: "For it is impossible for a man to put forward fair and honest views about our affairs [of war] if he has not, like everyone else, children whose lives may be at stake."¹⁴

- James Madison, a colonel of the Virginia militia and author of much of the U.S. Constitution, called a conscript-based force (in this case, compulsory militia) into action to enforce the laws, and said of volunteerism in general: "There never was a government without force. What is the meaning of

government? An institution to make people do their duty. A government leaving it to a man to do his duty, or not, as he pleases, would be a new species of government, or rather no government at all."¹⁵

- President George Washington, a field commander of militiamen, testified to the republican virtue of shared risk and willing sacrifice of Americans standing in the ranks together: "It has been a spectacle, displaying to the highest advantage, the value of Republican Government, to behold the most and least wealthy of our citizens standing in the same ranks as private soldiers; pre-eminently distinguished by being the army of the constitution; undeterred by a march of three hundred miles over rugged mountains, by the approach of an inclement season, or by any other discouragement."¹⁶

- Thomas Jefferson advised Secretary of War James Monroe to prepare for "interminable war": "To this end we should put our house in order, by providing men and money to indefinite extent. The former may be done by classing our militia, and assigning each class to the description of duties for which it is fit. It is nonsense to talk of regulars. They are not to be had among a people so easy and happy at home as ours. We might as well rely on calling down an army of angels from heaven."¹⁷

- Rudyard Kipling, poet and sociologist, foresaw the "Great Society" impact of a disconnected post-Vietnam War America, its effect in ever-declining inclinations to military service, and the approaching point of no return (perhaps we are already past it) in our ability to deter rising "foemen":

*Swiftly [they] pulled down the walls
that their fathers had made them,
The impregnable ramparts of old,
they razed and relaid them,
As playgrounds of pleasure and leisure,
with limitless entries,
And havens of rest for the wasters
where once walked the sentries;
And because there was need of more
pay for the shouters and marchers,
They disbanded in face of their foemen
their yeomen and archers.*¹⁸

- General Bruce Palmer Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army from August 1968 to June 1972, reflects the position of senior Army leadership at the time of

For it is impossible for a man to put forward fair and honest views about our affairs [of war] if he has not, like everyone else, children whose lives may be at stake.

—Pericles

conversion to an all-volunteer force and the Nixon administration pressure to “get aboard.” Palmer said: “Philosophically I guess none of us ([General William] Westmoreland or Palmer) really agreed with the (all-volunteer force) idea because we felt that the citizen-soldier idea was the responsibility of everybody . . . the philosophic aspects of it, I didn’t agree with. But it was clear to us that at the beginning of the Nixon Administration the draft would go out completely . . . and soon. [Secretary of Defense] Mr. [Melvin] Laird told the Joint Chiefs one day that that was a firm decision of the President. That was early [19]69. Mr. Laird didn’t agree with it. He thought the country couldn’t afford it. He predicted that eventually we would have to go back to a draft because of the cost of the volunteer force, and he is probably right . . . But that was the President’s decision and Laird expected everybody to get aboard.”¹⁹

- General John Keane, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 8 March 2001: “There are no guarantees that the all-volunteer force will continue to serve the needs of the Army.”²⁰

- Charles Moskos, a draftee and professor emeritus at Northwestern University, comments on lowering personnel standards and increasing monetary outlays to pursue fewer and fewer willing recruits: “Without conscription, what will happen? We will see, as is already happening, a lowering of military entrance standards. And, as is already occurring, there will be an exponential increase in enlistment bonuses. And we can expect new policies to recruit non-Americans into our armed forces. Recruits in the all-volunteer force are three times more costly—in constant dollars—than draftees. The erosion of the citizen soldier has made for a career force that’s top heavy. The Pentagon now

owes its Soldiers \$654 billion in future retirement benefits that it cannot pay.”²¹

Resetting the Force

In spite of the patriotism and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform, a national military policy built on a false supposition will—like a line of horse cavalry that has outlived its usefulness but not the heart’s expectation—fail at the most critical of moments. The national decision to move to an all-volunteer force, built on the falsity of draft inequity, is this line of cavalry—a line barely able to sustain combat in Southwest Asia, let alone expand to the East.

To preclude cataclysmic failure, we must return to an army that sustained itself during 17 years of cold war combat in Korea and Vietnam, suffered over 94,000 killed in the process, deterred the Soviet Union to the point of collapse, and maintained its morale and courage at the tactical level of war until overwhelmed by policy failure at the strategic level.²² This army was a draft-induced army, and there is a politically palatable way to have it back, but we must first counter the falsities that caused its loss.

In a *Wall Street Journal* article on 10 January 2003, former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger—calling on his enlisted and junior officer experience in World War II to advise against a return to a draft—makes a blatantly ill-informed observation: “There was no doubt in anyone’s mind that volunteers were far more effective than draftees and eager to train and fight.” If we are to take Weinberger’s observation at face value, one wonders how the United States prevailed over Nazi tyranny and Japanese imperialism, because in World War II, 93 percent of Army personnel were draftees.²³ And considering young Weinberger held low-ranking soldier positions—positions and ranks nearest the draftee—one wonders where he observed the voluntary 7 percent of the Army that was “more effective . . . and eager to train and fight.” The legitimacy of Weinberger’s argument collapses under cursory review, but it joins with equally fallacious “draft inequity” arguments to underpin a policy blunder that has our Nation reeling, and enemies more powerful than the 10,000 terrorists in Iraq biding their time and salivating.²⁴

The March 2003 *VFW Magazine* summarizes the service and sacrifice of the Vietnam era draftee: During the Vietnam era, 1,728,344 men were

drafted. Of the forces who actually served in Vietnam, 648,500 (25 percent) were draftees. Draftees (17,725) accounted for 30.4 percent of combat deaths in Vietnam.

Other than lending credence to former British Prime Minister James Callaghan's observation that "a lie can be half-way round the world before the truth has got its boots on," anti-draft arguments (such as that put forth by Weinberger) are without merit. But as myth, they did meld with "class war" falsities to demean the record of the Vietnam-era Army in its entirety, and the men and women who formed it, individually.²⁵ These Soldiers were the sons and daughters of the World War II generation, and to believe that the Army they formed was consumed by rampant drug use, open racial tension, and general indiscipline is to believe that this is how the "Greatest Generation" raised their children.²⁶ Yes, leaders in the Vietnam-era Army had to deal with drugs and other Soldier failings—just as leaders in our present Army must—but negative factors then were no more consumptive than they are now, and one can only speculate whether a volunteer army—abandoned during a decade-long war and after suffering more than 50,000 killed—would do any better.²⁷ I say it would not—a conclusion I make by measuring the actions now being taken to sustain our Army during the Global War on Terrorism.

Now is the time to fix a horrendous national mistake by returning to the just and awesome deterrent power of a draft-induced military. (Time is short because only a dreamer could imagine an army sustaining itself in war against tens-of-thousands when it can barely sustain itself in war against a few thousand terrorists.) A politically palatable way exists to return to the draft. But first we must dispel another false notion—that, collectively and historically, the draft has only served this country for a few years. This notion ignores the compelled-service nature of colonial



Paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 173d Airborne Brigade move off a muddy landing zone in the Vietnam jungles near Phuoc Tuy Province while on a search and destroy mission, 1966. Of the forces who actually served in Vietnam, 648,500 (25 percent) were draftees.

Army News Features

and state militias and decades of service under the command of colonial and state governors. During much of American history, compulsory militia service was a fact of life. It militarized U.S. culture in a way that was non-threatening to the Homeland, but quite threatening to potential enemies. The militia's existence and inducement effects were critical to rapidly forming regular forces during times of war. Army Rangers take their name from militia "ranging units" that countered French and Indian depredations. The English colonists and the rifle companies that joined New England militias at Boston in 1775 to form the United States Army found their recruiting base in the militia organizations of frontier America.²⁸

The Nation can follow this precedent. It can "draft" for the regulated militias of the states—the National Guards. A draft for Guard service will find political support, if done in conjunction with a reorganization of the Reserve Components. The Army Reserve should transfer its troop-unit programs to the Army National Guard; the Air National Guard to the Air Force Reserve; and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau must be elevated to four-star rank, made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and designated as commander of Northern Command.

The political will to see these things through

will come from the governors of the states, 50 commanders in chief who will gain troop units that lend themselves to state contingencies (absent Posse Comitatus prohibitions, of course) in exchange for fighter, tanker, and air cargo units that do not. No general officer, adjutant general, Soldier, or Airman will lose his or her position. Reserve forces available for federal service will be unchanged; the inducement effect of the draft, as it always has, will sustain regular forces; and the patriotic appeal of drafting for homeland defense and contingencies will fill draft calls with willing youth.

These things are possible; events have proven that sustaining the all-volunteer force is not. And it is overstretched junior leaders who must find the will

to vocal advocacy, because years ago, senior leaders were ordered “aboard” and know there is only one way off.²⁹ If they find the will to do so, young officers will once again command Washington’s “army of the constitution,” and our Republic will avoid history’s condemnation.

Let us hope that Edward Gibbon would not be able to say to us: “In the purer ages of the commonwealth, the use of arms was reserved for those ranks of citizens who had a country to love, a property to defend, and some share in enacting those laws, which it was their interest, as well as duty, to maintain. But in proportion as the public freedom was lost in extent of conquest, war was gradually improved into an art, and degraded into a trade.”³⁰ **MR**

NOTES

1. Robert K. Griffith Jr., *United States Army's Transition to All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974*, Army Historical Series (Defense Dept., Army Center of Military History, 1997), 249. Griffith reports that of the 25,940 non-prior service volunteers in June 1974, “82 percent scored in the Mental Category I-III range.”

2. The experiment with an all-volunteer force is an Army experiment, and failure will first show itself in Army personnel statistics. Arguably, the collapse of the Soviet Union (and consequent drawdown of U.S. forces) delayed the “day of reckoning” for the all-volunteer military. But a relatively small number of insurgents and terrorists in Iraq bring that day to us.

3. I do not mean to diminish the risk to Americans engaged in the Global War on Terror, or the valor, patriotism, and sacrifice of the thousands of our dead and wounded. But numbers are what they are, and in comparison, the single deadliest month of the Vietnam War—February 1968—counted 3,895 Americans killed in action. See article by Richard K. Kolb, “Korea and Vietnam: comparing participants and casualties,” *VFW Magazine*, June/July 2003, 23.

4. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. 1 (New York: The Modern Library, 2005), 196.

5. This statement (with variants) is frequently heard at and near the non-uniformed level of the chain-of-command. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in an opinion piece published by the *Wall Street Journal* on 10 January 2003, gives his version, and uses President Ronald Reagan to deliver it: “Once, early in 1982, President Reagan and I reviewed a force of young American soldiers newly enrolled. Afterwards he said to me, ‘You know, Cap, I would infinitely rather look each of these young people in the eye and know that each wants to be here.’”

6. I make specific mention of Alan Greenspan and Milton Friedman because the conclusions of the President’s Commission on an all-volunteer armed force read, mostly, as market analysis. Other members of the commission were Thomas Gates, Thomas Curtis, Frederick Dent, Crawford Greenewalt, Alfred Gruenther, Stephen Herbits, Theodore Hesburgh, Jerome Holland, John Kemper, Jeanne Noble, Lauris Norstad, W. Allen Wallis, and Roy Wilkins.

7. “The draft and historical amnesia – Now hear this: public remarks about the ineffectiveness of draftees are unwarranted,” *VFW Magazine*, March 2003, 8.

8. Special Orders Number 286, 21 November 1967, Headquarters, The Student Brigade, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. The term “draft induced” refers to those men who enlisted rather than waited to be drafted. Historically, draft inducement was a major factor in filling the ranks of the Army’s sister services.

9. George Donelson Moss, *Vietnam: an American Ordeal*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 243. Moss’s work is a superb history of our national involvement in Vietnam. That he parrots this distortion is understandable. It was easy to believe and would take extensive research and analysis to disprove.

10. Although my recollection of my lessons at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is somewhat dated, I clearly remember the unarguable conclusion that “leadership is the crucial element of combat power.” By exalting the “all-volunteer” concept to the exclusion of all else, we deny the human power that won every 20th-century war, to include the cold war.

11. From President Richard Nixon’s instructions to the All-Volunteer Commission.

12. Theodore M. Hesburgh, *God, Country, Notre Dame* (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 207-208.

13. *Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force*, February 1970, 129. Although dismissing objections was the reason for Nixon having appointed the commission in the first place, and dismissals are found throughout the final report, these nine are mentioned specifically in chapter two and thematically repeated throughout the report.

14. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 150.

15. James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on Control of the Military, 16 June 1788.

16. George Washington’s Sixth Annual Message to Congress, 19 November 1794.

17. Paul Leicester Ford, *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, Federal Edition (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1905), 437.

18. Rudyard Kipling, “The City of Brass,” *The Collected Poems of Rudyard Kipling* (Hertfordshire, Great Britain, 1994), 326-327.

19. From the Oral History of General Bruce Palmer Jr., U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

20. General John Keane, in a speech for the Institute of Land Warfare, 8 March 2001, *AUSA News*, Volume 24, Number 7, May 2001.

21. Charles Moskos, “Feel the Draft?” *Chicago Tribune Online*, 8 June 2005.

22. Richard K. Kolb, “Korea and Vietnam: comparing participants and casualties,” *VFW Magazine*, June/July 2003, 21. The article lists 36,576 Americans killed in action (KIA) in Korea, and 58,198 KIA in Vietnam.

23. “The draft and historical amnesia—Now hear this” public remarks about the ineffectiveness of draftees are unwarranted.” This article states: “In WW II, 66 percent of all U.S. forces were drafted. Of the 10.5 million Army personnel, a whopping 93 percent were draftees.”

24. I cannot imagine that 10,000 terrorists are the sum of our opposition in Iraq. However, 10,000 is the number Senator Joseph Lieberman gave in a 29 November 2005 opinion article published in the *Wall Street Journal*: “America cannot abandon the war between 27 million Iraqis and 10,000 terrorists.” Effectively, what Lieberman is saying is that 10,000 poorly trained and poorly armed fanatics have the Army at the breaking point.

25. In the last decade of the 20th century, careful study and objective authorship proved the falsity of the draft as “class war” argument. See Arnold Barnett, Timothy Stanley, and Michael Shore, “America’s Vietnam Casualties: Victim of a Class War?” 1992 study by MIT researchers.

26. America’s draft-induced armies were a microcosm of American culture; thus, the Army that fought in Vietnam was not immune from the impact of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s and the 4 April 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

27. Arguably, controlling drug use in the volunteer military is a function of “no notice” urinalysis testing. Prior to urinalysis, drug users had to be caught red-handed, investigated, and proven on the reports of others or in privacy-demeaning shakedown inspections—inspections that exempted officers and noncommissioned officers. After urinalysis was adopted, I was tested annually in the 100 percent screening of aviation personnel and once randomly while serving as a division commander. Also worthy of note is the 15 February 2006 *Wall Street Journal* report that said, “Privates that come to the Army with a history of mild depression now can take Paxil or Zoloft.”

28. Probably the most famous of the rifle companies was that raised and commanded by Daniel Morgan. Needing only 10 days to recruit 96 men to the ranks, Morgan and his company left Winchester, Virginia, in early July 1775, and after a march of 21 days reported present for duty. The march was 600 miles and not one man was lost to sickness or desertion. James Graham, *The Life of General Daniel Morgan, of the Virginia Line of the Army of the United States* (New York: Derby and Jackson, 1856), 54-55.

29. Senior leaders, almost exclusively populating defense policy levels, are most likely to suffer pride of authorship, and least likely, when proven wrong, to let that pride go. Also, the “get aboard” ruthlessness of non-uniformed leaders—the “Shinseki effect”—cannot be discounted. Once aboard, it seems the only way off is the plank.

30. Gibbon.

Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare:

French Army Experience in Africa

Colonel Henri Boré, French Army, Retired

FOR OVER 40 YEARS, French soldiers have learned the hard way the various challenges of counterinsurgency (COIN) and security and stability operations (SASO) in Africa. While training African troops and territorial militia, they have confronted profound cultural gaps and, since the 1960s, have been involved in what Marine Corps General James N. Mattis recently termed “a four-block war in a hybrid war environment,” in which their units have been called upon to frequently transition between various forms of conventional operations (first block) and less usual pacification, psychological, and information operations (blocks 2-4).¹ In light of the Department of the Army’s (DA’s) current focus on unconventional warfare and cultural awareness, it might be of some utility to consider what DA’s brothers-in-arms have learned over 4 decades of operational deployment in Africa. What kind of operational challenges did they encounter, and how did they address them?

Operational Focus: Africa

It may not seem that Africa ranks with Iraq or Afghanistan as the main effort in the war on terrorism. In the post-9/11 era, however, it looms on America’s strategic horizon. The continent’s persistent lack of security will allow terrorist groups to use African states as operational bases. The United States and France share a common approach to this security challenge. Through growing cooperation with regional and pan-African organizations, both nations have built a similar policy that rests on two dominant pillars: training African forces, and providing logistical support to African peacekeeping operations. In each area, a partnership with the African Union and resulting assistance programs have already improved African military capabilities.²

To provide African forces with the necessary skills and resources to carry out difficult missions, Pentagon officials have secured agreements with 10 South and West African nations. These agreements allow the U.S. military to temporarily use facilities to launch missions, train armed forces, and preposition support platforms, equipment and supplies.³ Pursuing a similarly proactive strategy to help Africans help themselves, France has announced it

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will reposition its thousands of African-based troops into three African bases that conform with three AU sub-regions: Senegal in West Africa, Gabon in Central Africa, and Djibouti in eastern Africa.⁴

Adjusting to new realities in the war on terrorism and facing the uncertainty of peace and security in Africa, Western and African nations will continue to forge cooperative ties. “Africa is everybody’s problem and everybody’s responsibility,” warned General James L. Jones, the commander of U.S. European Command. Jones also suggested that, given Africa’s importance, his command may have to amend its name in the future to encompass the southern continent.⁵ The U.S. military already plays a significant role in training sub-Saharan forces. More individuals and units will be called tomorrow either to train African forces or to fight hybrid wars like those recently occurring in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, and Djibouti.

Learning Africa: Sooner Is Better

French soldiers have repeatedly had to face unconventional warfare and the difficulties of operating in Africa’s many different cultures. It takes time to learn about and understand a foreign culture and to then determine how to apply the knowledge gained to all types of military operations. The sooner young French leaders learn about Africa, the more confident and, ultimately, the more successful they are when deployed.

Before any deployment planning begins, platoon leaders go through an overseas operations training course designed primarily to teach them how to fight an insurgency. They learn about the diversity of African cultures, traditions, and warfighting approaches. Then they are taught how to apply this knowledge when training national forces and territorial militia and attempting to win the hearts and minds of local villagers in rebellious areas. In regards to the African forces training, they learn how to make progress with people who are not as deadline-conscious as we are, who don’t work in a linear fashion of schedules and planning, and who don’t value controlling processes as we do. They are also taught how to maintain the fighting spirit of African units by favoring their traditional approach to warfighting, and advised to keep ethnic groups within the same units in order to benefit from their core lineage.

When I attended the course as a platoon leader, the two initial required readings were T.E. Lawrence’s *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* and Roger Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. The curriculum was designed to teach us about African cultures, local intelligence collection, African approaches to warfighting, local forces combat readiness, and African unit training. Basically, we learned to identify the various ethnic and religious forces in West Africa and the Horn and the ways they influence political and social life. We were taught how to apply this knowledge to keep the initiative in COIN, SASO, and the training of African forces.

The course addressed some key questions we had as young, inexperienced platoon leaders: How to be both a rifleman and a vital intelligence collector? How to translate subtle changes in the population’s habits or in individual behaviors into vital intelligence data? How to track guerilla infrastructure and simultaneously run pacification programs in



U.S. Air Force

French Army Captain Staphane Vidal of the Escadron de Chasse 2/3 (“Champagne”) participates as a patient in a Joint U.S. Forces/French simulated patient recovery exercise in Djibouti, Africa, 27 February 2006.



French forces live-fire in Chad, 2006.

our areas of responsibility? How to train African units and militia? How to conduct COIN, SASO, and peacekeeping operations in the desert, tropical zones, and urban areas? How to execute specific tactics, techniques, and procedures such as urban assault, checkpoint control, cordon and search, convoy protection, and border control?

Our instructor was a colonel, a veteran of Algeria's wars who had spent half of his career in Africa. Borrowing from T.E. Lawrence's aphorism—"Messieurs, just don't eat soup with a knife"—he showed us how cultural adjustments can reap great benefits and how unconventional warfare forces leaders to think creatively while executing a variety of nontraditional military operations (civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence collection). In retrospect, learning Africa from him gave us confidence; it infused us with two critical aspects of the expeditionary culture—innovative thinking and agility. At all levels of responsibility throughout our careers, we immeasurably benefited from this early instruction on African culture and unconventional warfare.

Culture in the Field

By the time we left the colonel and our platoon leaders course behind, we had fully imbibed the quintessential principles needed to conduct successful unconventional warfare. One of these principles was to never underestimate the enemy. We applied this when we were confronted with an insurgency in Chad, a mutiny in the Central African Republic, a

succession of warlords in Somalia, and a rebellion in Rwanda. African fighters are usually very effective on the ground. They take advantage of terrain they know by heart, and they master ancestral guerrilla techniques enhanced by lethal weapons systems. Although their equipment is often technologically inferior, African tribal fighters possess huge resources of creativity and are tactically sophisticated enough to inflict heavy casualties. They deftly use the population's support, time usually works to their advantage, and their leaders are highly motivated.

So, to cut an insurgency at its roots, we searched out and destroyed supply caches and command cells, but only while simultaneously running information and hearts-and-minds campaigns among the population. What we nowadays term "civil-affairs operations," "psychological operations," and "pacification" were then listed as tactical tasks in our operation orders. Prosecuting a four-block war was integral to operations. In that respect, every individual soldier became a collector of crucial local intelligence. Intelligence collection became a combat skill as valuable as expert marksmanship, audacious maneuver, and innovative tactics.

In order to pave the way for better intelligence feedback and to prevent the creation of breeding grounds for insurgency, we worked (sometimes using interpreters) with tribal chiefs, local mayors, imams, and marabouts, providing the inhabitants with what they needed to improve their living conditions. We built schools, drilled wells, repaired bridges, and provided medical support.

Our overseas education also taught us the value of making cultural adjustments while training indigenous forces in West Africa and the Horn. We learned about the hidden elements of local cultures and became familiar with the iceberg metaphor, which served to remind us that one key to mission success is knowing about the expanse of culture that exists below the surface of immediate perception.

Such knowledge was invaluable for young leaders. African national forces usually train and fight according to Western doctrine. Their troops are disciplined and dedicated to protecting their nations.

Formula for Success

Knowledge of traditions, religious beliefs, and hidden superstitions is especially beneficial when fighting guerillas or training African forces. Thus, the French Army addresses the operational aspects of local cultures throughout its war-fighting education, pre-deployment training, and professional education curriculum. Teaching leaders early in their careers to understand culture, tradition, and diverse African approaches to warfare has been the key to operational success on the ground.

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A French soldier of the 110th Infantry Regiment stands guard at a camp in the Ivory Coast, 2006.

Like Western soldiers they are proud to serve their various countries. This shapes the tip of the cultural iceberg. Below the surface, however, many Africans are torn between their cultural heritage and the West's modernity. Loyalty to lineage, family, and religious and ethnic groups often far outweighs allegiance to the state or national institutions. Ethnic and religious obedience, as well as caste identity, remain particularly strong, shaping mentalities and conditioning behaviors. Western military trainers or allied forces must therefore keep in mind that the loyalty of some Africans to their government or to a multinational coalition is often subject to challenges that can be as sudden as they are subtle.

There are beliefs and practices below the cultural surface that many Westerners miss or find difficult to fathom: a company commander in Chad shooting one of his lieutenants in the head for lack of respect in front of the unit; a captain, native of the south of Mauritania, paying obedience to his second lieutenant, who was a member of a dominant northern tribe; regular soldiers killing women and children execution-style in Rwanda. Despite these disturbing occurrences, our training allowed us to continue to walk down these less traveled roads and to continue functioning effectively; we found mission success by strengthening relationships with the local military and the population. Altogether, we were deeply aware that cultural adjustments were vital to mission accomplishment.

Expeditionary forces, regardless of their nationality, stand ready to deploy anywhere on short notice. In unconventional warfare, even the least experienced leader is expected to react quickly and properly to turn initially suspicious or hostile populations into cooperative assets. For an officer to succeed, civil-affairs, psychological operations, and intelligence collection must become individual combat skills. In Africa, as well as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other areas of interest, the effectiveness of Army leaders depends upon their ability to take operational advantage of local traditions and cultures and the way they profoundly shape wills and behaviors. Integrating unconventional warfare and the operational aspects of culture into every facet of the warfighter's education has been one of the pillars of the French expeditionary experience. **MR**

NOTES

1. LTG James N. Mattis and LTC Frank G. Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* 132, online at <<http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles05/Pro11Mattis.htm>>, accessed 17 May 2006. "Four-block war" is Mattis's expansion of former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak's concept of "three-block war." Krulak claimed that today's expeditionary Soldier must be able to fight in one city block, hand out humanitarian supplies in the next block, and then make peace between warring factions in yet another block. To this requirement, Mattis adds the necessity of conducting effective information operations.

2. Two such programs are the U.S.'s African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance and France's Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities.

3. John T. Bennett, "Jones: U.S. has 'security locations' deals with up to 10 African nations," *Inside the Pentagon*, 27 October 2005.

4. The French plan was unveiled in December 2005 at the Franco-African summit in Bamako, Mali.

5. Jim Garamone, "Africa Integral to U.S. European Command, General Says," American Forces Press Service, March 2005.

Our Strategic Intelligence Problem

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters
U.S. Army, Retired

Our national intelligence system will never meet our unrealistic expectations, nor can it ever answer all of our needs. No matter what we do or change or buy, intelligence agencies will remain unable to satisfy our government's appetite for knowledge. This isn't defeatism, but realism. We had better get used to the idea.

This does not mean that our intelligence system cannot be improved. It can. Nor does it imply that our leaders should be less demanding. Stressing the system enhances its performance. But our fantastic expectations must be lowered to a level more in accord with our present and potential capabilities.

And we *must* end the decades-old practice of blaming flawed intelligence for broader policy failures. For all of its indisputable shortcomings, the U.S. intelligence community has become a too-convenient scapegoat for erroneous decisions made by a succession of leaders indifferent to the substance of intelligence, but alert to the advantages of politics. If we want to improve our comprehensive security, we need to begin with a sharp dose of realism regarding what intelligence can and cannot deliver. We do not expect our health-care system to return every patient to perfect health. It is just as foolish to expect perfect intelligence.

While there are real, endemic problems within our intelligence system, the greater problem may be with the expectations of the public, the media, and our Nation's policy-makers. From indefensible defense-contractor promises to the insidious effects of Hollywood's long-running fantasy of all-seeing, all-powerful intelligence agencies, the lack of an accurate grasp of what intelligence generally can provide, occasionally can deliver, and still cannot begin to achieve results in reflexive cries of "Intelligence failure!" under

circumstances in which it would have been impossible—or a case of hit-the-lottery luck—for intelligence to succeed.

Despite the political grandstanding over a catalytic tragedy, any probability of preventing 9/11 through better intelligence work was a myth. Our enemies out-maneuvered and *out-imagined* us so boldly that none of those who now insist that they warned us offered any useful specificity before the event. In retrospect, many matters appear far simpler and more linear. We cannot believe that a general was so foolish in battle, forgetting that our privileged view is far different from that confronting the general amid the chaos of war. Looking back, it appears obvious that, by 1999, there was an unsustainable hi-tech bubble in the stock market—but how many of us nonetheless bought in near the top? Charges that "They should have seen it coming!" are usually wrong and rarely helpful. The only useful question is "Why didn't we see it coming?"

Sometimes the answer is that the system's attention was elsewhere. But the answer also might be that a given event was impossible to prevent without a phenomenal stroke of luck. The problem with luck is that it is not very dependable. September 11th was not only an intelligence failure, it was also a law-enforcement failure, an airline failure, an architectural failure, a fire-and-rescue failure, a long-term policy failure, and a failure of our national imagination. Our enemies told us openly that they intended to attack us. From Langley to Los Angeles, we, the people, could not conceive that they meant it. Even those of us who wrote theoretically about massive attacks on lower Manhattan have no right to claim prescience. We did not truly envision the reality. Our collective belief systems needed to be shaken by images of catastrophes on our soil.

Similarly, our military had to undergo a succession of asymmetrical conflicts to begin to shake its cold-war-era mindset. No succession of briefings, books, or articles could have had the impact of the suicide bomber and the improvised explosive device. Likewise, in military intelligence, we are beginning to see a generational divide between yesterday's technology-über-alles managers—who continue, for now, to be promoted—and a younger generation of intelligence officers who have endured the brutal human crucibles of Iraq and Afghanistan, and who do not expect a van full of electronics to do all of their work for them. Because it routinely deals with life-and-death issues, tactical intelligence, long a backwater, might improve more profoundly than strategic intelligence in the coming years.

If the events of the past decade (or century) should teach us anything about the relationship between the intelligence community and our national leadership, it is that the more reliant any policy or action is on the *comprehensive* accuracy of intelligence, the more likely it is to disappoint, if not humiliate, us with its results.

Intelligence can help leaders shape their views, but it is not a substitute for leadership. Senior members in the intelligence world must share the blame for our unrealistic expectations. In order to secure funding for ever-more-expensive technologies, too much was promised in return. While technical assets, from satellites to adept computer programs, bring us great advantages in amassing and processing data, even the best machine cannot predict the behavior of hostile individuals or governments.

The salvation-through-technology types do great damage to our intelligence effort. They deliver massive amounts of data, but become so

mesmerized by what technology can do that they slight the importance of relevance. And humans are messy, while technology appears pristine. Furthermore, there are massive profits to be made on the technology side (and good retirement jobs for program managers); thus, Congress leans inevitably toward funding systems rather than fostering human abilities.

There is no consistent lobby for human intelligence, language skills, or deep analysis. Despite occasional bursts of supportive rhetoric on Capitol Hill, the money still goes for machinery, not flesh and blood. Recent personnel increases remain trivial compared to our investments in technology. Yet, we live in an age when our security problems are overwhelmingly human problems. Despite a half-decade of reorganizations near and at the top of the intelligence system, we remain far better suited to detecting the movements of yesteryear's Soviet armies and fleets than we are at comprehending and finding terrorists. (In Washington, the immediate response to any crisis within a government bureaucracy is to rotate the usual suspects at the top, not to address the pervasive reforms required—and no one in our government understands the concept of “sunk costs.”)

Nor do our intelligence difficulties end with our inability to locate and kill Osama bin-Laden, who will be eliminated eventually, just as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was. Our hi-tech intelligence architecture even failed in many of the spheres in which it was supposed to excel. Consider just a few examples of the system falling short when required to perform:

- During the air campaign to break Belgrade's hold on Kosovo, the Serbian military fooled our overhead collectors with decoy targets composed of campfires, old hulks, and metal scraps. Hundreds of millions of dollars in precision munitions went to waste as we attacked improvised charcoal grills. It took the threat of American ground troops to force a sloppy diplomatic compromise—a 6-week air effort hit only a handful of real targets.

- Notoriously, our hundreds of billions in collection systems could neither confirm nor deny that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction as we moved toward war. Our intelligence system proved so weak that it could offer nothing

substantial to challenge or support the position assumed by decision-makers. Without convincing evidence to the contrary, the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq became little more than a matter of opinion. Opinion then attained the force of fact in the build-up to war. The lack of reliable sources in Iraq and agents on the ground left the satellites searching desperately for the slightest hint that the Baghdad regime was armed with forbidden weapons. We were no longer collecting—we were conjuring. Conjecture hardened into conviction. And we went to war focused on finding chemical rounds, rather than on a convulsive population.

- None of our technical collection means detected the wartime threat from the Saddam Fedayeen or other irregular forces. As then-Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace, the Army V Corps commander on the march to Baghdad, observed, the enemy we ended up fighting (albeit successfully) was not the enemy the intelligence community had briefed. Commanders learned as they fought, after our best intelligence had promised them a different war. In Iraq, we couldn't see what we wanted to see, so we refused to see what we didn't want to see. We relied so heavily on technical collection means that we forgot to *think*.

- Not a single one of over a hundred attempted “decapitation” strikes with precision weapons succeeded in killing the targeted individual during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom—even though most of the sites were destroyed. The concept remains sound in theory, but our ability to hit targets has far outstripped our ability to identify them accurately. It's just plain hard to find people who are doing their best to hide. Even now, our successful strikes against terrorists rely far more often on tips, interrogations, and the processing of captured material than on national collection means. On the ground in Iraq, military intelligence personnel diagram the human relationships among our enemies much as their British predecessors would have done 80 years ago (although we can do our sketching on computer screens).

- Satellites famously can read a license plate (and more). But they

rarely tell you whether that battered Toyota contains an innocent civilian, a suicide bomber, or a terrorist chieftain. If the enemy declines to use communications technologies, we are back to the human factor to do our target spotting.

The problem with the human factor is that the technocrats who dominate the intelligence community just don't like it. The “metal benders” see technology as reliable (and immune to personnel management problems), even if that reliability isn't germane to our actual needs. The more our security problems take on a human shape, the more money we throw at technology. A retired psychiatrist I know points out that one form of insanity is to repeat a failed action obsessively. By that measure, our intelligence community is as mad as Lear on the heath.

Only human beings can penetrate the minds of other human beings. Understanding our enemies is the most important requirement for our intelligence system. Yet, “understanding” is a word you rarely, if ever, find in our intelligence manuals. We are obsessed with accumulating great volumes of data, measuring success in tonnage rather than results. Instead of panning for gold, we proudly pile up the mud.

Two things must happen if our national intelligence system is to improve. Within the intelligence community, we need to achieve a more effective balance between our default to technology and the slighted human factor. At the top of the game, intelligence is about deciphering what an enemy will do before the enemy knows it himself. The very best analysts can do this, if only sometimes. But occasional successes are better than consistent failures. However imperfect the results, who would deny that a better grasp of the mentalities, ambitions, fears, jealousies, schemes, and desires of our opponents would have offered us more in the days before 9/11 or in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq (or now, in dealing with Iran) than any series of satellite photos?

If we want to improve the quality and usefulness of the intelligence that reaches our nation's leaders, we need to accept the primacy of the human being in intelligence. Instead of the current system, in which people support technology, we need our technologies to support people.

The other thing that must be done—and this is terribly hard—is for all of us, from the Oval Office, through military commanders, to the Wi-Fi crowd down at Starbucks, to have rational expectations of what intelligence can provide and how reliably it can perform. The technocrats continue to insist, against all evidence, that machines can solve all of our intelligence problems, if only we develop and buy more of them. But this age of Cain-and-Abel warfare, of global disorientation, and of a sweeping return to primitive identities and exclusive beliefs is characterized by its raw, brutal humanity. Far from bringing us together, the computer age has amplified our differences and reinvigorated old hatreds. A new, global ruling class profits, while the human masses seethe.

Nothing is a greater challenge for the intelligence system than the individual human being who hates us enough to kill us. How do we spot him in the crowd before he acts? *Why* does he wish to kill us—perhaps committing suicide in the process? How do we find him in a city's wretched crowding or amid remote tribes? What happens when he gains access to weapons of mass destruction? The long-term costs to our country from 9/11 proved to be

far greater than the 3,000 casualties we suffered that morning. What second-, third-, and fourth-order effects might even a small nuclear blast trigger?

We can defeat states with relative ease. Individuals are tougher. At present, we know approximately where Osama bin-Laden is, but we lack the specific awareness to strike him with a single, politically tolerable bomb. To have a reasonable chance of killing or capturing him, we would have to send in a large ground force, potentially igniting all Pakistan and bringing down the military regime that, tragically, is that country's sole hope. So we wait for the whispered word that will tell us what we need to know. After all of the hyper-expensive collection systems have failed, we find ourselves relying on bribes, informers, and luck, and attacking huts and caves rather than command bunkers and missile silos.

Our intelligence system can do more to protect us than it has done, but, even reformed, it will not detect or stop all of our enemies. We need to do better, but we will never perform perfectly. Intelligence is, at last, about people—on both sides. And human beings are imperfect. Yet, amid the tumult confronting us today, the imperfect human offers

more hope for intelligence successes than the perfect machine.

Decision-makers have to accept that they must live with a large measure of uncertainty. (Generals have had to do so since the Bronze Age.) Even the intelligence estimate that captures today's issues with remarkable acuity might be upended by a single distant event tomorrow. There are few, if any, static answers in intelligence. The problems we face from foreign enemies are throbbing, morphing, living, often-irrational manifestations of human problems that are themselves in the process of constant change. Intelligence *moves*. Even the best strategic intelligence provides only not-quite-focused snapshots and rough-compass bearings, not detailed maps to a predetermined future. The iron paradox of any intelligence system is that to expand its effectiveness you must recognize its limitations.

Blaming faulty intelligence for policy failures is the ultimate case of the workman blaming his tools. Even the best intelligence can only inform decisions. It cannot be forced to make them.

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MR Book Reviews

Featured Review

COBRA II: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Pantheon Books, New York, 2006, 603 pages.

Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor have delivered the second of their histories of U.S. wars in the Persian Gulf, and it might not be their last since there is grist for still another book. In the title, *Cobra II*, Gordon and Trainor promise to deliver on the invasion and the occupation of Iraq. Frankly, the title tantalizes, but the book really does not address the occupation of Iraq; rather, it looks only at the beginning of that effort.

Gordon and Trainor set their thesis

quite clearly in the first sentence of the foreword when they assert that *Cobra II* "will provide an inside look at how a military campaign that was so successful in toppling Saddam Hussein's regime set the conditions for the insurgency that followed." They effectively follow through on that promise. The result, despite the small criticism of not meeting the full promise of the title, is a book that is quite good and useful to those who serve and those who send others in harm's way.

Several of the topics that emerged in Gordon and Trainor's first book, *The General's War*, remain relevant more than a decade after the first Persian Gulf War. Chief among these are that planning, personalities, and

perception mattered in Operation Iraqi Freedom, much as they did in Desert Storm. Thucydides was the first historian to consider these themes, and they are still critical to the tale of war. As in the classical era, making war remains a political act of which military operations are but a part. Gordon and Trainor lucidly lay out the story of how perception and personality played decisive roles in planning for the war and the subsequent occupation from the moment the administration cast a baleful eye on Iraq.

The authors develop their narrative in two parts. First they show how the planners failed to account for the requirements of occupation because they used much of their time planning and debating the size

of the force and the basic concept for the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein. Second, neither the administration nor its military minions had much interest in planning for a long occupation or for the possibility of insurgency. Gordon and Trainor argue that the administration believed little needed to be done and that Central Command, led by General Tommy Franks, underestimated the difficulty.

At times, *Cobra II* is surreal. There emerges from the book a sense of implacable destiny at work in Tampa, Camp Doha, Washington, and everywhere someone developed PowerPoint® charts, conducted a briefing, or considered the coming war. Reading *Cobra II* is like reading about the *Titanic*. We find ourselves hoping the Captain will reduce the *Titanic*'s speed or that the officer of the deck will order all engines astern rather than a course change, or that the lookout will see the iceberg looming ahead in time to avert the crash. But of course the *Titanic* does hit the iceberg and in the end it sinks. All that remains is to deconstruct the event, hoping to understand why the tragedy happened and how we might avoid similar mistakes in the future.

Cobra II is a first cut at analyzing the process of planning the war in Iraq; it provides some preliminary analysis that will enable future understanding of what happened and why. For the most part Gordon and Trainor make their points by letting the actors speak for themselves.

Among the planners, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stands out. He looms above the process and all of those around him, driving the decisions that not only led to the war, but to those that determined how the war would be fought and how the occupation would be undertaken. But Rumsfeld was not alone in planning the war effort, and Gordon and Trainor devote their first eight chapters to the other players and the almost Byzantine machinations that characterized the planning effort.

Franks may have been the only protagonist who actually challenged Rumsfeld. It appears, however, that even the redoubtable general avoided confronting Rumsfeld when he could. Sometimes he mollified the Secretary, as he did when he appropriated the phrase "shock and awe," which the Secretary liked. Although

Franks used the phrase, he merely sipped rather than drank the Kool Aid® of that concept. Sometimes he listened politely to Rumsfeld or his favorites and did nothing. In that vein, perhaps the most amazing scene in the book is the one in which Rumsfeld sends Colonel Douglas Macgregor to teach Franks the art of campaign planning. Gordon and Trainor suggest that Macgregor found favor with Rumsfeld because, as they put it, "some long-standing critics of the Army leadership felt they had an ally at the top."

Fairly early in the planning cycle, Macgregor, at Rumsfeld's behest and through the good offices of Senator Newt Gingrich, flew to Tampa. There Macgregor briefed Franks on how to defeat Saddam with only 50,000 troops and how to do so in 96 hours. Both the numbers and hours resonated with Rumsfeld. According to Gordon and Trainor, Franks listened attentively, made hearty gestures of affirmation, gave Macgregor a challenge coin, and sent him on his way.

What Gordon and Trainor suggest in these eight chapters is that much of the planning stemmed from conviction rather than careful analysis. The Pentagon's chief conviction was that Saddam's regime, weakened by defeat and long-term isolation, would collapse upon receipt of a few stoutly administered blows landed with laser-like precision on just the right weak points. Moreover, little effort would be required afterward except to hand over the keys to the palaces to some Iraqi government.

Gordon and Trainor argue effectively that the planning effort was flawed by poor communication and a top-down approach that brooked almost no contrary points of view. There are a number of passages, however, where the authors refer to positions held by key players without documenting a source or making it clear that the passage actually represents a conclusion they have reached, not the thoughts of the person they are writing about. Still the book is convincing. More important, Gordon and Trainor do not bash only Rumsfeld; they rightly hold both Soldiers and civilians responsible for spending too much time debating the right size force to produce the collapse and too little time determining what to do once success was achieved.

The authors' campaign narrative is quite good and avoids the meanwhile-back-at-the-ranch syndrome that sometimes characterizes narrative accounts of big campaigns. Gordon and Trainor tell the tale of commanders and Soldiers from top to bottom while maintaining a sense of context about what is happening elsewhere. Faithful to the task they set themselves, they discuss the transition from major combat operations to "occupation."

Gordon and Trainor remind us that collaboration between government leaders and Soldiers remains essential. This was obvious to Clausewitz, and it remains obvious today; but it is still not any easier to do. Overall, *Cobra II* is a well done, useful reminder that warfare remains the province of humans and will therefore continue to be as complex and dynamic as the humans who make it. We can learn from this and may be more likely to do so because the experience is fresh. By attempting to tell the story before all of the facts are known, Gordon and Trainor took serious risks. But there is a payoff here for them and for those who must plan and execute operations.

**COL Gregory Fontenot,
USA, Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

FIGHTING FOR FALLUJAH: A New Dawn for Iraq, John R. Ballard, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2006, 184 pages, \$44.95.

Written by John Ballard, commander of the Marine Corps' 4th Civil Affairs Group in Iraq, *Fighting for Fallujah* is a first-hand account of how Marine-led Coalition forces retook the city of Fallujah from insurgent elements in November 2004. Much deeper than just a story about the most intense urban combat Marines have participated in since Hue, Ballard's insider narrative educates readers on how Coalition forces learned from early mistakes and were then able to gain the support of the Sunni population despite destroying their city.

The book begins by taking readers through the events leading up to the fight, including the gruesome murders of three Blackwater contractors, Fallujah I, and An Najaf, illustrating how Coalition forces continued to learn from their missteps and then applied the lessons they

learned to the upcoming fight. Using informative charts and endnotes, Ballard explains how the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), with the mission to destroy the terrorist elements and then restore the city to its residents, planned and then executed the retaking, resettlement, and reconstruction of Fallujah.

Ballard moves back and forth easily among the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Planning considerations for interagency coordination, information operations, civil affairs operations, and the integration of coalition forces and their important contributions are all covered in detail. The effects of political requirements on MEF planning and execution are framed around Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's need to demonstrate that his fledgling government would not allow insurgents to dominate one of their cities and that it could care for its people. With the hope that others can learn from the MEF experiences, the book concludes with lessons learned about the full spectrum of operations currently ongoing in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Ballard acknowledges that the changing situation in Iraq makes it hard to claim a lasting success in Fallujah or any other battle, but he offers as proof of the MEF's success the large number of Sunnis in Fallujah—more than in any other city—who turned out to vote in January 2005.

Written in a style that is both educational and easy to read, *Fighting for Fallujah* is an important contribution to understanding the complexity of urban operations in Iraq.

**LTC Dennis S. Burket,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

I, NADIA: Wife of a Terrorist, Baya Gacemi, Paul Cote, and Constantina Mitchell, trans., Bison Books, a division of the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 160 pages, 2006, \$24.95.

One can acquire an appreciation for Islamist militant tactics, outlooks, and world vision from many sources. One such source is this small but extraordinary book, written by Algerian journalist Baya Gacemi. *I, Nadia* describes the

life of an Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emir's wife, a woman the author met through a program offered for female victims of Islamist violence. Originally written in French under the title *Moi, Nadia femme d'un émir du GIA*, the book represents the kind of reading U.S. forces need to undertake in the Global War on Terrorism. The University of Nebraska Press has made such works in French available to American readers through its France Overseas series. This is the third book that focuses on French history and colonial policy.

Readers begin to grasp the danger of a jihadist society as the GIA takes over the small hamlet of Hai Bounab in the 1980s. Villagers and farmers are torn between supporting a government they view as out of touch with their poverty and the jihadists, whom they see as defenders of the poor. The GIA is initially supported by a portion of the population, who provide material aid, but the support erodes when the GIA's racketeering and murder for hire spills over into the butchering, raping, and kidnapping of women. The book also details how Ahmed rises within his GIA cell, and it describes, though not very clearly, his warped views on Islam (which seem to derive from extremist views in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia).

Nadia knew Ahmed only 3 months before she married him. Naively, she thought she could change his harsh and intolerant views on Islam. Ahmed, who knew little about the Prophet Muhammad's regard for women, verbally abused his bride on their wedding night and made it known to her that she would be cooking for the entire group (the GIA cell to which he belonged). Nadia's life turned into one of virtual slavery and physical abuse, and eventually she was abandoned. Ahmed justified his unwillingness to lift a finger to help his wife, saying: "We must preserve our strength to wage war on the tahgout (oppressor)."

We see a microcosm of a sick, Taliban-like Islam being enforced in the villages and homes of GIA terrorists. Ahmed quotes more from jihad theorist Sayed Qutb than he does from the *Quran*. The book's beauty is that it captures the jihadists' language, giving us a real feel for the way these people think and operate. Helpfully,

Gacemi includes a glossary.

I read this book to try to understand the mechanics of GIA-controlled neighborhoods and villages. Gacemi gives a vivid account of hidden doors and extortion, and how GIA members simply took what they wanted in the name of jihad. By the end I was anxious to see how Nadia escaped from the jihadist world she had entered.

In a 2005 letter to Mussah Al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda strategist Ayman Al-Zawahiri urged leaders to learn from how easily the Taliban fell in Afghanistan and not to isolate communities. Readers should ponder the wisdom of the decision made by Algeria's military to deprive Islamists of their political victory in 1991. It is because Islamist radicals enter the political process with such contempt for democracy that one must be cautious in legitimizing them politically. For those interested in learning how jihadists and militants are perverting Islam, Gacemi's book is a good place to start.

**LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN,
Gaithersburg, Maryland**

NEW GLORY: Expanding America's Global Supremacy, Ralph Peters, Sentinel, New York, 2005, 283 pages, \$24.95.

New Glory is riveting and hard hitting. As always, Peters puts in words what others only think about saying. With opinions and recommendations that are controversial, insightful, and prophetic, the former intelligence officer and much-published author addresses many topics, particularly why the U.S. must adjust its military, diplomatic, intelligence, and business strategies.

Peters' main premise is that the United States must redirect its national strategy to the southern hemisphere and base its overall strategy on support for human rights. He also argues articulately that the U.S. should break ranks with its current allies in Western Europe (with the exception of the United Kingdom).

New Glory makes the case that to contain radical Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists, the United States must focus on making inroads into the countries that border the Middle East: India, Indonesia, and South Africa. India, the world's largest democracy, is a highly educated state

and a traditional enemy of Islam; Indonesia, also a democracy, is a strategically located, moderate Muslim state; and democratic South Africa, because of its economy, education, technology, and political influence, is the major actor on the African continent. These should be the centerpieces of our new national strategy.

By creating mutually beneficial relationships with these three countries, America can stress freedom and democracy while at the same time forming a bulkhead against the failing despotic governments of the Middle East and their increasingly influential radical elements. Peters also believes the United States must pay more attention to Latin America, a critical region that we have ignored for far too long.

Peters contends that the driving forces behind U.S. strategy must be human rights and democracy, irrespective of region. America must stand for what is right and must not be afraid to act either with its allies or, if necessary, alone in its pursuit of democracy. *New Glory* argues convincingly that it is both morally wise and strategically prudent to support the oppressed no matter where they are found, even to the point of using force to free them.

New Glory could be improved with more quotes, better documentation, and a bibliography. That said, the book is a must-read for anyone interested in U.S. national strategy and military affairs, or in universal human rights, freedom, and democracy.

**LTC Brian Ebert, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WEAPON OF CHOICE: ARSOF in Afghanistan, Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp, Combat Studies Institute Press, Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004, 399 pages, \$61.00.

This may be one of the toughest books you ever tried to find. The press run was limited, and copies have been snapped up by the special operations community. Now, you need special connections to get a copy. That's a shame, because the book is an absolute gem.*

Weapon of Choice is an authorized history of army special operations in Afghanistan from 12 September

2001 to 15 May 2002. Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp had unprecedented access and the stern direction to "disclose no secret before its time." This was a rather daunting task, but the authors carry it off well and tell an accurate, fascinating story. However, in keeping with the secrecy surrounding the special operations community, practically every name in the book is a pseudonym and practically everyone in a photograph has a black bar across his face—it's a bit like reading a 1959 edition of *The Police Gazette*. *Weapon of Choice* is a comprehensive book covering special forces, rangers, special forces aviation, civil affairs, psychological operations, and support forces.

Weapon of Choice is destined to be a primary source for future study of the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Unfortunately, the book is not designed to support study and research: It has no index, footnotes, or bibliography. Also, a list of key actors would have been helpful, the maps are of poor quality and there is not enough of them, and the PowerPoint® maps and charts are fuzzy, as are some photographs. Finally, the book is printed on clay-coated paper, which makes it physically heavy and hard to record notes on.

These points aside, *Weapon of Choice* is an absolute must for anyone studying contemporary history or lessons learned from early U.S. Army special operations efforts in Afghanistan. It relates how skilled, brave Americans overcame severe obstacles to lead the attack on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Good luck in finding the book. It is well worth the search.

*Note: the U.S. Government Book Store is offering *Weapon of Choice* for sale online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov/>.

**LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

DARWIN AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, Bradley A. Thayer, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, 425 pages, \$40.00.

Bradley A. Thayer has an intriguing idea: Use hard science to exam-

ine topics in the soft sciences to see if the latter can benefit from the stronger underpinnings of the former. Specifically, he tries to apply evolutionary biology to the biggest issues in foreign relations, war, and ethnic conflict.

Current theories of international affairs—including warfare and ethnic conflict—rest on belief rather than fact. One way to assess and firm up these theories is to give them a hard-science foundation, specifically evolutionary biology. Thayer contends that warfare and ethnic violence have evolutionary benefit. Individual survival mechanisms are a primary cause of group conflict between and within states.

Taking a scientific approach, Thayer defines and explains evolution, describes the major criticisms of the theory, then counters those criticisms. He shows how individual survival applies to both current theories of warfare: rational choice and realism. He discusses historical and contemporary instances of warfare and ethnic conflict to see if there really is definite survival advantage in conflict. Thayer also discusses the warfare of ants and chimpanzees to show similar evolution in dissimilar species.

In a side trip, Thayer discusses the epidemiological balance of power that favored the Europeans in the western hemisphere, but worked to their disadvantage in Africa and Asia. According to him, the biological evolution was in the germs, not human beings. He returns to his major focus and takes on group relations, xenophobia, and ethnocentrism as he joins the debate over whether the underlying causes of contemporary ethnic conflict have primordial or modern origins.

Thayer finds that nothing in his theory explains the immediate causes of a specific event. Proximate causes are outside the scope of evolutionary studies; biology is irrelevant to those seeking the specific causes of a Kosovo or Rwanda in order to head off the next conflict. What evolutionary biology does is examine general underlying human tendencies. Those can be shaped through environmental alteration. Civic education and media portrayals of inclusiveness can transform isolated and xenophobic groups into a broadly inclusive multicultural

society. Integration reduces conflict by enlarging the in-group and shrinking the out-group. Reducing the triggers for the evolved tendencies toward violent behaviors can help to head off the violence.

Thayer's intent is not to provide a comprehensive exploration of the many applications of evolutionary biology to the study of international affairs; he only wants to touch the surface to show how a hard-science approach to a soft subject can work. He succeeds admirably, and his book deserves careful reading.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas**

IMPERIAL GRUNTS: The American Military on the Ground, Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, New York, 2005, 372 pages, \$27.95.

Imperial Grunts provides compelling insights into present-day American imperialism and the multifarious challenges facing U.S. forces as they prosecute the Global War on Terrorism. Using the "ground up" approach, Kaplan takes the reader on an odyssey of many of the world's hotspots as seen through the eyes of those implementing U.S. foreign policy: Soldiers and Marines. Deftly demonstrating that imperial success is more often associated with low-tech methods and the dexterity of America's military, Kaplan's work is timely in highlighting the realities of contemporary U.S. military operations.

From the individual efforts in Mongolia of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Parker Wilhelm, who was determined to make the descendants of Genghis Khan the "peacekeeping Gurkhas" of the American Empire via a remote U.S. civil affairs team in Lamu, Kenya, to the Marine's first battle of Fallujah, Iraq, Kaplan skillfully captures the diverse nature of the responsibilities undertaken by America's warrior-diplomats.

Kaplan features such personalities as retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Bob Adolph, employed by the U.N. in Yemen, and numerous Special Forces personnel deployed in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Philippines. He introduces a host of remarkable Americans, each charged with the complex task of implementing U.S. policy in foreign

lands. Given their extraordinary devotion to duty in trying conditions, it is little wonder that Kaplan has nothing but admiration for these individuals.

While he rightly praises the skill and resourcefulness of Special Forces Soldiers and Marines, Kaplan is not afraid to highlight some of the wider challenges associated with contemporary U.S. operations. Washington's predilection for joint commands comes into question, as does the issue of force protection measures. But it is the ubiquitous unease regarding rules of engagement (ROE) that is a common theme throughout the book. "If they would just loosen the ROEs, give us the assets and some helicopter platforms, this whole guerrilla siege of Arauca Province would be over in six months," states a frustrated Special Forces captain in the Philippines.

Kaplan also addresses the inherent friction between the institutional Army—headquarters-based, risk-averse, and uniform in appearance—and the realities of those located in the distant corners of the world. A Special Forces lieutenant colonel in Afghanistan cautions, "It doesn't get the beards, the ball caps, the windows rolled down so that we can shake hands with the hajis and hand out PowerBars® to the kids, as we do our patrols. Big Army has regulations against all of that. Big Army doesn't understand that before you can subvert a people you've got to love them, and love their culture."

Skillfully written, engaging, and thought-provoking, *Imperial Grunts* is strengthened by carefully researched historical preambles. From America's involvement in the Banana Wars to Great Britain's approach to the northwest frontier of India, the book provides historical context to a contemporary challenge faced by a combatant command. Combined with the insightful thoughts of those on the ground and Kaplan's untiring journalistic energy, the book is a resounding success.

The first of two volumes, *Imperial Grunts* is an absorbing and knowledgeably written depiction of the practical challenges facing the U.S. military at the tactical level. It may become a must-read for Soldiers, those keen on joining the Army, and

those looking for a light read, but *Imperial Grunts* is not a scholarly text. Nonetheless, Kaplan has an important story to tell, and he does it admirably.

**MAJ Andrew M. Roe, British Army,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY: Origins and Current Tactics, James M. Minnich, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005, 164 pages, \$27.95.

James M. Minnich, a U.S. Army foreign area officer in the Republic of Korea (ROK), leveraged 23 years of military experience as he crafted his study of the historical development, current organization, and tactics of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). A graduate of the Republic of Korea Army College with Korean language skills and rare access to senior ROK Army personnel, Minnich utilized valuable primary source materials. The annotated bibliography alone makes this text an outstanding addition to the shelf of any military or civilian assigned to the Korean peninsula. Minnich's expertise in North Korean tactics is undeniable, and the list of known personalities in the field of security studies who have positively reviewed this book is impressive.

The text is divided into two sections: The first recaps North Korea's military development since the Japanese occupation prior to World War II; the second is an unclassified, authoritatively well-referenced exposition of modern North Korean tactics. Interestingly, the most easily overlooked attribute of this book is its appendices. Comprising fully one-third of the book's pages, they range in scope from a list of influential personalities to the complete framework for the command and control structure of the NKPA.

It should be noted that for all of its merit, the book leaves many questions unaddressed with respect to the NKPA's ability to successfully wage a future war based on their proposed tactics. The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, and facilities methodology might have been a useful technique for conducting a comprehensive review of the NKPA's current capabilities and

potential for aggression based on funding, recruiting, and training.

This interesting, quick-reading book offers a unique opportunity to peer into the organization and tactical training of one of Asia's most hostile armies. Minnich has given us an unmatched reference volume, and I strongly recommend it to all serious-minded theater security personnel.

LTC Daniel M. Frickenschmidt, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE GERMAN WAY OF WAR: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich, Robert M. Citino, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2005, 428 pages, \$34.95.

Robert M. Citino's *The German Way of War* is yet another book that analyzes the Prussian-German culture and military art of war through the ages. What makes this book different is that Citino lays out a solid argument that the German way of war was consistent over a long period of time, from the Seven Years' War to the Napoleonic Wars, through the rest of the 19th century under Moltke's art of war, and finally through World Wars I and II. In each of these time periods, Citino describes the events and discusses patterns common to all Prussian-German military operations.

For readers familiar with German military history, Citino's conclusions are not surprising. For instance, that the Prussian-German military instilled within its culture the ability to execute operational-level maneuver using the "envelopment" form of maneuver has long been known. But Citino offers more. To enable and enhance this form of maneuver, the Germans trained their officers to aggressively seize the initiative and to attack the enemy's flank, both flanks, or even better, the enemy's rear. Because of this aggressiveness and the desire to strike quickly for a decisive advantage, Citino points out that logistical disaster loomed if the battle or campaign lasted too long.

So why study a military that championed the doctrine that quick and decisive warfare is the key to long-term victory, but ultimately failed in two world wars? Although many of Citino's conclusions about the German military are not new, his lessons learned are certainly worthy of further consideration for our own

doctrine. Everyone wants a quick and decisive war, but what happens when they can't get one?

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PRIVATE PERRY AND MISTER POE—The West Point Poems, 1831, Edgar Allan Poe, William F. Hecker III, ed., Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2005, 165 pages, \$19.95.

Concerning his edited work of Edgar Allan Poe's edition of 1831 poems, Army officer and former West Point professor William Hecker states that "it had become apparent that no one had truly put together a detailed assessment of Poe's four years of military discipline or seriously tried to connect that experience to his aesthetic." One of the main reasons for writing this edition of Poe's West Point-era poems is the dearth of scholarship on his military experience, particularly that of his West Point years. A widespread misinterpretation among academia and wider audiences concerning Poe is that he disdained his military experience. Hecker carefully lays to rest the specious nature of this long-held assumption.

Poe (1809-1849), who enlisted in the Army in 1827 under the name Edgar A. Perry, will always be an American favorite. Millions of us have read his horror stories and poems, all wrought from his supremely macabre twist on the anti-Classical nature of Romanticism, and critics have addressed seemingly every aspect of Poe's life and works. Notwithstanding the latter, the crux of Hecker's thesis centers around the fact that "[j]ust as biographers dismiss the important connections between Poe's military life and his poetic visions, critics, likewise, fail to consider the possibility that military culture might be embedded in his poetry." For example, Poe's training in constructing and firing artillery rounds could have contributed to the apocalyptic visions of "The City in the Sea" and "The Fall of the House of Usher."

In the book's foreword, noted poet Daniel Hoffman states, "It is remarkable that no biographer, scholar, or critic of Poe's life and writings has, until now, inquired what...were the

effects of his army experiences on his literary work." Hecker goes far in correcting this situation. One of the more enlightening points he explores is the affinity between Poe's prosody and military order, particularly field movement and close-order drill: Both needed metrical precision to be effective.

Poe made the puzzling choice to enlist in an era when enlisted service was disdained as a lowly occupation. He lived the arduous regimen of that life, learning the discipline and precision of an artilleryman. Through contemporary documents, Hecker builds an accurate picture of what enlisted life for Poe must have been like. He outlines in detail the reasons behind his enlistment and his ultimate dissatisfaction with that way of life. Hecker also tracks the changes in Poe's motivation and his perceptions of the officer corps, which would culminate in his dismissal from the Corps of Cadets in 1831 on charges of "gross neglect of duty."

The most valuable parts of the book are Hecker's introduction and Gerald A. McGowan's afterword. McGowan provides further enlightenment on Poe's poetic language and identity, as well as his employment of martial names throughout his oeuvre. Both men offer valuable interpretations of Poe's life and literary works and perceptive insights into his brief sojourn in the American military. In the end, Hecker hopes that "critics [will] begin to explore and publicly discourse about the critical and symbiotic relationship between the American nation, its literature, and its military."

As for the poetry itself, these 1831 poems will likely prove, for most, to be quaint irrelevancies compared with the Gothic genius most of us have enjoyed so much in *The Raven and Other Poems*, perhaps Poe's most enduring collection. The handful of 1831 poems Hecker discusses in his introduction could have sufficed to get his valuable thesis across to his audience. Still, this is a scholarly work, one that adds to our understanding of American literature's infamous dark genius.

Editor's note: Major William F. Hecker III was killed by an IED in Najaf, Iraq, 6 January 2006.

MAJ Jeffrey C. Alfier, Ramstein Air Base, Germany

Telling the Afghan Military Story

Lieutenant Colonel Pamela Keeton, *U.S. Army Reserve, Retired*—Having served in CFC-A public affairs during 2004-2005, I read with interest Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Rick's March-April 2006 *Military Review* article "Telling the Afghan Military Story . . . Their Way!" Everyone who has served in public affairs in Afghanistan has faced similar challenges: how to reach the media with news and information, how to work at an appropriate level with the developing government of Afghanistan, and how to reach the Afghan people with accurate and timely information. The lessons learned by Ricks and others who have served there are valuable to future PAOs who will serve in places like Afghanistan. I wish to correct three points made by Ricks.

First, while my staff didn't use a bicycle to deliver CFC-A press releases to the Afghan media, we didn't rely solely on technology either, because we knew many local media did not have access to the Internet. We hired a contract driver to hand-deliver our press releases to the Afghan media outlets, and we employed a wonderful young Afghan interpreter to make sure our releases were structured in a way that would be understood by the Afghans. If requested, this same driver would transport Afghan reporters to our press conferences because many did not have access to transportation.

Second, while the CFC-A public affairs office was available at the media operations center during the presidential elections to answer questions regarding the coalition's role in the election, we did not write messages for General Zaher Azimi or any other Afghan government spokesmen. Our presence at the media center was very limited.

And finally, a large committee of representatives from many inter-

national and U.S. agencies worked with the palace staff to help them plan media operations for the inauguration. It was Afghan President Hamid Karzai's desire to have as many officials from the provinces as possible witness the inauguration; unfortunately the inaugural hall would only hold approximately 300 people. At the same time, the head of security for the palace limited the number of news media to approximately 20, including reporters and technicians. Everyone involved in the planning knew that the first inauguration in the history of Afghanistan would draw hundreds of news media from around the world, so it was agreed by all to use a media pool approach for the event. I believe Ricks was present for some of these meetings.

Notices went out to media organizations around the world informing them of this decision and urging them not to send reporters because they would be turned away. The planning committee knew that the media would still come, in hopes of being let in to the event. The committee asked the palace for permission to set up a tent approximately 100 meters from the inaugural hall. They provided live audio and video feeds as well as Internet access and refreshments. Unfortunately, and unknown to the committee, palace security had enclosed the media area with fencing. We suspect everyone involved was quite astounded at the number of news media that showed up to the palace the day of the event. Yes, they were packed into the media operations center, but it is unfair to blame anyone—especially the coalition public affairs office—for the situation. The Palace's public affairs office did its best to ensure that local, regional, and world media were treated fairly with regard to access to the inauguration.

Those of us in Afghanistan in the fall of 2004 served at an interesting time and we all learned many valu-

able lessons. The level of coordination and cooperation between the U.S. military, NATO forces, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan, the government of Afghanistan, and a host of others was, according to some, unprecedented. Interestingly, almost no one has attempted to officially capture those experiences for future operations. Many thanks to *Military Review* for providing a forum through which those who have or are serving around the world in various types of operations can share lessons learned and ideas for the future.

Correction

Footnote 10 in the article "Telling the Afghan Military Story" should read . . . U.N. General Assembly Security Council Report A/59/581-S/2004/925 . . . ; the link in footnote 10 should read <http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/repots-SG/2004/2004-925.pdf>.

Kudo for IO

Joel K. Harding, *Senior Military Analyst, SAIC Strategies Group*—I work for SAIC in Information Operations and I just wanted to let you know that Colonel Ralph O. Baker's article, *The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations* (May-June 2006 *Military Review*), was enthusiastically and favorably reviewed by a whole slew of Ph.D.s at NDU, the JMIC, the Naval Post Graduate School and others. The team, which I call my Greybeards (even though one is female), was struggling with defining IO metrics and your article proved timely and informative. I want to thank you for such a great piece!

In my opinion this was one of the best articles I have ever read regarding IO. You truly defined the problem, implications, repercussions, end states, and defined success. I'd love to hear and read more, if you ever get the opportunity!

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